

# *OPERATION CLOCKWORK*



MIS's CONTROL OF LOYALIST VICE RINGS, THE MURDER  
OF A 10-YEAR-OLD BOY, TREACHERY, THE DECEPTION OF  
PARLIAMENT, GUNRUNNING, COLLUSION, BOMBINGS,  
FORGERY, PERJURY AND VILIFICATION

DAVID  
BURKE

# Missing boy found dead in sack

From DEREK BROWN in Belfast

The murder of a 10-year-old Belfast boy, whose burned and dismembered body was discovered in a sack on the bed of the river Lagan, has established a new and ghastly standard of savagery in a city well used to violence.

The boy was Brian McDermott, last seen alive near his home in East Belfast eight days ago on his way to play in a quiet park. After six days of widespread publicity and a major police search, Brian's body was found on Saturday when the river was drained. The remains were in a sack. Both legs and one arm were missing.

## Unexplained

The boy was identified 24 hours later when detectives compared fingerprints on the remaining hand with prints at Brian's home in Well Street. The cause and time of death are not yet known.

The police, who say there has never been such a hideous case before in Ulster, are keeping open minds on the motive. A spokesman said "At this stage there is nothing to indicate sectarian or political motives. It was ghastly and fiendish."

Brian's home is in a small street off Woodstock Road, a

dismal area of Victorian terraces which has had an ample share of rioting and shooting incidents, mainly involving Protestant extremists. There is a Catholic minority in the district, and Brian's family are Protestants, but the murder seems to be completely outside the grim pattern of sectarian crime.

Brian was born in Rugby, England, while his father was serving with the RAF. The family moved to Belfast six years ago. He was slightly built and clearly could not have been taken for an older youth, which eliminates the possibility of a "accidental" execution or assassination. His distraught parents, interviewed by local papers before the discovery and identification of the boy, said they could think of no reason why he should run away from home. He would have started at a new school today and was apparently quite happy.

The discovery of the body was almost fortuitous. A pedestrian on the embankment reported to the police that he had seen what appeared to be a body in the water. The police drained the river at a weir opposite the park and a soldier helping with the search then found the sack stuck in the river mud.

Leading article and Letter to the Editor, page 10.

# INTRODUCTION: THE FISH ROTS FROM THE HEAD.



The United Kingdom is paying a ghastly price for the decades during which the State turned a blind eye to a wide spectrum of sexual offences committed by the elite of British society.

At least three forces became the instruments of amoral politicians and their spymasters for various nefarious purposes: the Metropolitan Police in London, the Sussex Constabulary, and, in Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Senior officers were asked to bend the rules and turn a blind eye to all sorts of wrongdoing. This brought forward the worst impulses lurking inside opportunists who were prepared to do the Establishment's bidding. Many were rewarded with promotions and awards they might not have obtained in normal circumstances as a reward for their dishonesty.

A scheme to cover-up child sex abuse and 'assassinations' has slipped out of Britain's archives. It was sent to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1989 by her defence secretary, Tom King. There are, undoubtedly, others like it. It affords us a powerful insight into how Britain worked then – and possibly – works now.

The corruption that infected the police spread to all ranks. The general malaise is now becoming apparent to the public: a cohort of officers exploited their status to rape and abuse women and children. And they did so for decades.

# CHAPTER I.

## THE PUBLIC REAPS WHAT THE GOVERNMENT SOWS.

### 001. A LICENCE TO RAPE.

A scandal has erupted in Britain involving alarming numbers of police officers who enjoyed free rein to rape and abuse women.



Sir Mark Rowley, Chief Constable of the Metropolitan police, told the Police and Crime Committee of the London Assembly at the end of January 2023, that two to three officers were likely to face charges each week for months yet to come. In 2022, he acknowledged that hundreds of Scotland Yard officers were effectively ‘criminals in uniform’ and deserved to be sacked.

The assaults took place over decades. As one victim put it on Channel 4 News recently, ‘it is not a few bad apples’ rather an entire ‘bad tree’.

Constable Wayne Couzens of the Metropolitan Police, who kidnapped, raped and strangled Sarah Everard on 3 March 2021, is but one of many police offenders.



David Carrick is another. He served in the Metropolitan Police for nearly twenty years. He had been reported for violent behaviour towards women on numerous occasions. Yet, he was promoted and provided with a firearm. He was not arrested until 2021.

When the police burst in upon him, one of the first things he said to them was that he was a police officer, as if this offered him some form of

immunity. In January 2023, he admitted forty-nine sex offences including twenty-four rapes against a dozen victims.

On a night in December 2017, a railway employee found PC Terry Malka masturbating inside a train carriage, apparently drunk. A train guard approached him asking for his ticket. Malka waved his Met warrant card at him, as if it somehow entitled him to behave as he liked. Malka later pleaded guilty to gross indecency but kept his job. At the time of writing, he is still a serving officer with the Met.

On 8 March 2023, PC Thomas Andrews was sentenced to 16 months and received a restraining order after shoving a woman to the ground. He was suspended from duty and now faces a misconduct hearing.



On 9 March 2023, Jack Addis, 63, from Perthshire, Scotland, and Jeremy Laxton, 62, from Grantham, Lincolnshire, went on trial. They were charged with conspiracy to distribute or show indecent images of children between January 2018 and July 2021. Both were ex-Met officers.



Their former colleague, Richard Watkinson, 49, was found dead in Princes Risborough, Buckinghamshire, on January 12, 2023, the day he was due to appear in court over alleged child sex offences.

The Crown prosecutor said: ‘Police found indecent images of children on a number of devices. The Metropolitan police investigation found a great number of category A images, still and moving, which could be best described at the high end of category A. Officers found a hard drive, and that is the centre of the conspiracy charge where all three defendants were bringing in material to be shared on to it.’



In December 2021 Denis Jaffer and Jamie Lewis of the Met’s Charing Cross police station were jailed for photographing the bodies of murdered sisters at a crime scene in 2020, and transmitting horrific messages about them on Whatsapp to 40 colleagues.

Also in March 2023, a West Midlands arms officer was arrested, bailed and suspended for filming himself having sex with women without their knowledge. He sent the footage to police colleagues.

Across in West Yorkshire, William Loyd-Hughes, who was stationed at Huddersfield Police Station, was charged with a terrorism offence after allegedly publishing images on social media in support of the Ulster Defence Association, a proscribed group, contrary to the Terrorism Act 2000. He also faces three charges under the Communications Act 2003 of sharing grossly offensive messages on Twitter.

Also in March, Matthew Shaw, a Derbyshire PCSO, was sentenced to 14 years. He videoed children believed to be as young as six in swimming pool changing rooms and a Center Parcs in Nottinghamshire. He admitted that he may have done it around 100 times. He spoke to seven girls aged between 11 and 15 from while posing as both a teenage girl and boy, asking for and sending sexual images and videos on Snapchat. He incited one victim to perform sexual acts on a dog and attempted to incite others to perform acts involving their younger siblings. He was in the force for 15 years.



PC Lee Parker was in the West Yorkshire Police for 20 years. In January 2023, Manchester Magistrates' Court heard how he went to Roxy's Ballroom on a work night out in December 2021. Around 10.40 p.m., he entered a karaoke booth at the club and stood up with his 'penis exposed' in front of fellow clubbers. Later, he sexually assaulted two women. One of them was slapped on her bottom. He grabbed a second one by her head and pulled her face towards his and kissed her fully on the lips. Parker pleaded guilty to two charges of sexual assault and a charge of outraging public decency. District Judge Bernard Begley handed Parker a 32 weeks sentence, suspended for two years, saying 'drink is no excuse for these kinds of offences'.

PC Liam Boshein of the Met was sentenced to 42 weeks in prison on 17 March 2023. He sent a pornographic picture of two men having sex with a woman's decapitated body to a colleague. Portsmouth Crown Court

also heard how Boshein transmitted a message to a trainee officer, saying the decapitation sex scene was ‘still not as bad as [another image of a] pregnant bird’ depicting a woman giving birth alongside an erect penis.

That same day Joy Hendricks rang James O’Brien’s LBC radio show in London. She was a black woman who had joined the police in 1989. Nothing reported in the news about the police thus far had surprised her. She explained that as ‘a black woman you have a target on your back’ from day



one. Officers had sneaked into her bedroom and watched her change after a shower. After she joined the Riot police, she was asked by a white officer if she went out with white men and was asked to describe the type of underwear she wore. She was victimised on a daily basis. Complaints and pleas for help made to her superiors fell on deaf ears. Her colleagues gave her white face paint, sexually assaulted her, set her uniform alight and directed racist abuse at her. Officers called her ‘groid’, short for negroid, and also ‘bif’, short for ‘black ignorant fucker’. She was falsely accused of assaulting an officer who she believed was about to assault her with a pool cue. She punched him in self-defence. She retired with post-traumatic stress disorder. She ultimately received £500,000 compensation for the damage she had suffered.

The Met paid former PC Sarah Locker £1,000,000 in 2000 after years of sexual and racial discrimination. ‘Most days it was the most gross abuse. You’d go in and they’d say: “Did your husband fuck you last night? Are you wearing stockings? Come and sit on my cock”.’ She found pornography in her in-tray. On one occasion: ‘I was on the phone and there was a man kneeling under my desk simulating oral sex in front of the rest of the office.’

Another officer, Belinda Sinclair, won a total of £500,000 for sexual discrimination.

According to an analysis carried out by The Observer newspaper, one in 100 police officers faced criminal charges, including for sexual offences, in 2022 alone.

The Police Federation acts for officers who have been accused of disciplinary and criminal charges. They were asked deal with 1,387 claims in 2022. The federation represents around 140,000 serving and former officers in England and Wales.

In Northern Ireland (NI) twenty-six PSNI officers have been investigated for sectarian misconduct during the last five years.

Overall, the picture that is emerging is one of a cohort of men who feel that being a police officer affords them a licence to behave as they please.

## **002. UNDERCOVER POLICE OFFICERS FATHERED CHILDREN.**

The rotten tree has many branches. In the 1980s, the Metropolitan Police set up units which assigned undercover officers to infiltrate anti-nuclear protesters, animal rights campaigners and other activist organisations. Some of these officers entered relationships with members of the target campaign groups. A number of them fathered children. They deserted the



mothers and children as soon as they were withdrawn from the field without a trace.

Some of the victims were awarded compensation in 2014 One of them, ‘Jacqui’, was an animal rights activist. She had a son with one of the undercover officers.

The child, now a 37-year-old man, received an ‘unreserved apology’ from Scotland Yard in 2020 for the ‘fundamental deceit’ he had suffered.

## **003. PRINCE ANDREW WAS NOT INTERVIEWED ABOUT VIRGINIA ROBERTS BY THE METROPOLITAN POLICE.**

The Metropolitan Police failed to investigate Prince Andrew’s abuse of

Virginia Roberts, in London when she was seventeen. Roberts was a victim of trafficking.

Some of the abuse took place at the London residence of Ghislaine Maxwell. She is now in prison in the US serving a twenty year sentence.



Jeffrey Epstein, the organiser of the vice ring which ensnared Roberts, apparently committed suicide in prison in New York in August 2019 at the Metropolitan Correctional Centre in New York. He was awaiting trial for sex trafficking.

## **004. THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS A PROLIFIC PAEDOPHILE.**



The long arm of the law rarely extends to senior politicians in Britain. Sir Peter Morrison MP was Margaret Thatcher's private secretary. He was also a prolific child abuser.

Morrison died from a heart attack on 13 July 1995, aged 51. Three years later, Nick Davies, an investigative journalist with The Guardian, reported that Morrison had received a caution for cottaging with underage boys in public lavatories. He was never charged for any of his crimes.

One of his more serious offences was the rape of a 14-year-old in 1982. The child was taken to Elm Guest House in London and escaped shortly after the assault. The crime was reported to Scotland Yard by the boy and his family within hours of his ordeal. He gave a statement and was examined by a doctor. A few months later Scotland Yard contacted the boy's father and told him that the man had been sent to prison for the assault and that the matter was closed. Nothing of the sort had happened.

The boy and his family did not realise precisely how important Morrison was at the time. When they did, they made enquiries about him and discovered they had been duped by Scotland Yard. Morrison had not been charged, let alone sent to prison.



In October 2012, Rod Richards, a former MP and ex-leader of the Welsh Conservatives, implicated Morrison in the abuse in Wales. He maintained that between 1974 and 1990, approximately 650 children from forty children's homes had been sexually, physically and emotionally abused. Morrison and another high-profile Conservative politician were implicated as regular visitors to the child care homes. One of the institutions he exploited was Bryn Estate care home in Wrexham, North Wales.



In July 2014, Thatcher's former bodyguard, Barry Strevens, revealed he had told Thatcher that Morrison hosted sex parties at which under-age boys were abused. Strevens said that despite passing on the allegations to Thatcher, she later promoted Morrison to the position of deputy chairman of the Conservative party. Thatcher's private secretary, Archie Hamilton, reportedly took notes of what was said at the encounter.

Norman Tebbit, a former Chairman of the Tory Party, has revealed that 'rumours had got to my ears' that Morrison was a paedophile more than a decade before the truth was exposed.



In 2002, Edwina Currie, the former Tory minister, published account in her diary reciting that he had been a 'noted pederast'. She understood he regularly had sex with 16-year-old boys – whilst the legal age of consent at the time was 21.

Morrison might have become a cabinet minister had Thatcher not fallen from office in 1992.

The most senior officials in Whitehall knew about him too. On 4 November, 1986, Antony Duff, Director-General of MI5, 1985-88, wrote to Robert Armstrong, Cabinet Secretary, after allegations of child abuse had been made by separate sources against Morrison. At this juncture, Morrison was serving as Conservative MP for Chester and Deputy Chairman of the Conservative Party. Duff opined that Morrison was only a minor ‘security danger’. The spymaster felt the MP did not have access to valuable government secrets. By this time, he had served Minister of State for Trade and Industry, Minister of State for Employment, and Lord Commissioner of HM Treasury. One would be forgiven for thinking that with a resume like that, he would have had access to plenty of economic secrets. Nonetheless, Duff concluded: ‘At present stage ... the risk of political embarrassment to the Government is rather greater than the security danger’. There was no consideration of the ongoing risk posed by Morrison to children.



The reference to the ‘risk of political embarrassment’ implies an assumption that Morrison was not going to be reported to the police. If two senior officials were aware of child abuse, the word ‘risk’ should not have entered the equation. It should have been taken for granted that a report would be furnished to the police automatically.

After the Morrison memo came to light in July of 2015, Armstrong (famed for his use of the phrase ‘being economical with the truth’), defended his inaction thus: ‘Clearly, I was aware of it ... but I was not concerned with the personal aspect of it, whether he should or should not be pursued. That was something for the police to consider. My concern was implications of national security and international relations.’ [ BBC Radio 4’s Today Programme.]

Morrison was never reported to the police by Duff or anyone in MI5 either. Clearly, MI5 did not believe his denial of wrongdoing because they rated him as a risk. Had they believed he was innocent, he would not have been susceptible to blackmail and hence could not have been perceived as a ‘security danger’, of any significance. Morrison went on to become Thatcher’s private secretary and would receive a knighthood. He had been one of one of the first backbench MPs to support her bid for

the leadership of the Tories in 1975.

Morrison's successful upward career trajectory could not have been sustained without the sanction of MI5 who vet all high-level political appointments.

## **005. THE INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE IGNORED EVIDENCE OF VIP SEX ABUSE.**



Parliament urged the establishment of an inquiry into VIP sex abuse and begot the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) in 2014. It issued a series of limp reports, the last of which was published in 2022. Despite the fact that the inquiry was established to inquire into VIP abuse of children, it ignored a mountain of evidence about these offences. There was no inquiry into the activities of Lord Louis Mountbatten and others of his ilk.

## **006. JIMMY SAVILE IS INNOCENT – IF YOU FOLLOW THE LOGIC OF THE BRITISH TABLOIDS.**

In July 2019 Carl Beech, a former NHS manager, was found guilty after a ten-week trial at Newcastle Crown Court of 12 counts of perverting the course of justice and one count of fraud over a £22,000 criminal compensation pay-out he received for sexual abuse he claimed he had suffered. He was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment. Beech's deceit related to the existence of a fictitious VIP paedophile ring he had reported to the police. He alleged it had revolved around Westminster and involved Jimmy Savile.

The national newspapers and TV stations presented Beech's conviction as vindication of the former British prime minister, Ted Heath, 1970-74, and others.

Beech claimed he was a survivor of an 'establishment group' which

included politicians, military figures and spies. Absurdly, he claimed the group had kidnapped, raped, tortured and murdered boys in the 1970s and 1980s with impunity. This triggered an ill-fated £2million-pound Scotland Yard inquiry that ended without a single arrest being made.

There were multiple blatant indications that Beech was lying, yet they were ignored for years by the police while Beech received enormous coverage in the mainstream press.

The police have yet to explain why they took Beech seriously.

The police have not investigated the mysterious benefactor who gave Beech approximately £100,000 while he was spewing out his lies.

The police have not investigated how Beech was able to open bank accounts in false names and travel around Europe on false papers. He was about to take up residence in Scandinavia before he was finally arrested.



No one suggested that Beech's conviction meant that Jimmy Savile was innocent of child abuse simply because he had been named by Beech as one of his alleged tormentors. This was so because there were many other credible independent witnesses against Savile. The British media, however, presented Beech's conviction as a vindication of Heath although there were other credible witnesses who had suffered at his hands.

The case against Heath was made out by the Wiltshire Police. In August 2015 the force launched 'Operation Conifer' into allegations that Heath was a paedophile. In 2019 the force announced that grounds existed to suspect him of child abuse. As a matter of law, the force was not entitled to reach any conclusions about the potential guilt of Heath as he was dead and, hence, it did not. The furthest it could go was to state that if Heath were alive, he would have faced further questioning about the accusations levelled against him. Mindful of this, the force revealed that Heath would have faced questions under criminal caution relating to:

- 1 incident of rape of a male 16;

- 3 incidents of indecent assault on a male under 16;
- 4 indecent assaults on a male under 14;
- 2 indecent assaults on a male over 16.



The investigation spanned the period 1956-92.

None of these incidents took place while Heath was PM, 1970-74.

Many of the police officers involved in the Carl Beech fiasco were promoted.

Why?

The combination of the Beech debacle and the apathy of the IICSA ended the public's interest and concern about historical VIP sex abuse of children.


## **007. THE TORIES, THE MASTERS OF THE SEX CRIME COVER-UP.**

Heath was a sexual blackmailer.

On his way up the greasy pole, he served as Tory chief whip, 1956-59. This was when he began to engage in sexual blackmail. Most Tory whips were blackmailers – it was simply part of the job. Heath brought a professionalism to the task by assembling what became known as the Dirt Book, an encyclopaedia of embarrassing information about his colleagues, designed to stop them stepping out of line. It was exploited during the Suez Crisis to stem dissension in the Tory ranks.


When the Labour Party took over, Edward Short (later Deputy Leader of the Labour Party) became the new Chief Whip. He was repelled by the

‘dirty book’ and discontinued the practice.



Meanwhile, William Whitelaw, a future deputy prime minister, stepped into the post of Chief Whip for the Tory opposition. He unashamedly confessed that he continued the practice to the BBC in 1995: ‘The “Dirt Book” is just a little book where you write down various things you know or hear about people that may or may not be true. I think you could make a very good guess what sorts of things it contains.’

We know exactly what it contained: one of Whitelaw’s successors, Tim Fortescue MP, who occupied the post of whip, 1970-73, when Heath was prime minister, made it abundantly clear on camera to the BBC: ‘Anyone with any sense, who was in trouble, would come to the whips and tell them the truth, and say, ‘Now I’m in a jam. Can you help?’ It might be debt, it might be ... a scandal involving small boys, or any kind of scandal in which ... a member seemed likely to be mixed up. They’d come and ask if we could help, and if we could, we did”.



Fortescue’s reference to ‘small boys’ implies that blackmail material was gathered about MPs who were having sex with boys who were probably a lot younger than 21, the then legal age of consent. He also confessed that ‘scandalous stories’ were of great assistance to whips. ‘When you are trying to persuade a member to vote the way he didn’t want to vote on a controversial issue – which is part of your job – it is possible to suggest that perhaps it would not be in his interest if people knew something or other – very mildly’.

## **008. THE 2020 WESTMINSTER ‘DIRTY DOSSIER’.**

A modern equivalent of the Westminster Dirt Book emerged in 2020, the so-called Westminster Dirty Dossier.

It was a computer generated spreadsheet which contained the names of forty Tory MPs, including six serving Cabinet ministers. They were accused of all sorts of misbehaviour.

Katie Perrior, who served Theresa May's Head of Communications, stated that the type of information in it was 'deployed by whips to enforce party discipline'.

One veteran Tory backbencher was accused of being 'perpetually intoxicated and very inappropriate with women'.

A prominent female MP was described as having had extramarital sex with young male researchers.

Two MPs impregnated their mistresses.

Other MPs were noted to have visited prostitutes.

A male MP asked his male researcher to clean his kitchen in his underwear following a boozy night at the House of Commons.

Perhaps the most salacious entry was about an MP who appeared in a video with 'three males urinating on him'.

## **009. A HISTORY OF POLICE CRIMINALITY, BROTHEL KEEPING AND BRIBERY.**

The intelligence services often avail of the services provided by the underworld. When plain old-fashioned corruption is added to this mix, the result can be calamitous. This was certainly the case in London in the 1950s, 60s 70s and possibly well into the 1980s (if not till the present day), where the pimps and spooks found mutual ground.

John Cornwell, who worked for MI5, and wrote novels as 'John Le Carre', described to his biographer how he once took a foreign delegation to a house of ill repute during their visit to London in the 1950s. This was undertaken as part of his official duties.

In the 1960s and 70s, Frank Mifsud was one of the most successful pimps in London. He was a former Maltese police officer. He had many Metropolitan police officers on his payroll, all of whom turned a blind eye to his empire of sleaze. Meanwhile, his partner, Bernie Silver, murdered at least six of the women working for them.



Silver helped British intelligence establish brothels in NI in 1970. When Silver was subsequently put on trial for the murder of a London gangster, Thomas ‘Scarface’ Smithson, Chief Superintendent Kenneth Etheridge, the deputy head of Scotland Yard’s Fraud Squad, gave evidence on his behalf. He explained how Silver had assisted in the enquiry into the death of three soldiers in Belfast. What Etheridge did not spell out was that the source of the information that assisted the enquiry was a prostitute who had wheedled information from one of the customers of a brothel Silver had set up in Belfast.

## **010. THE BRITISH POLICE IN THE COLONIES.**

Sir Arthur Young, the Commissioner of Police of the City of London, was sent to Kenya in the 1950s to oversee police operations in the country. He was so repulsed by what he saw, he returned home.

The British campaign against the Mau-Mau in Kenya in the 1950s was merciless. In 1953, Gen. George Erskine, commander-in-chief of British armed forces in Kenya, reported to the Secretary of State for War, Anthony Head, that in the early days there had been a ‘great deal of indiscriminate shooting by the Army and Police’ and he was ‘quite certain’ that prisoners had been:

*Beaten to extract information. It is a short step from beating to torture, and I am now sure, although it has taken me some time to realise it, that torture was a feature of many police posts. The method of deployment of the Army in the early days in small detachments working closely with the police ... had evil results. ... I very much hope it will not be necessary for [Her Majesty’s government] to send out an independent enquiry. If they did so they would have to investigate everything from the beginning*

*of the Emergency and I think the revelation would be shattering.*

*Men were whipped, clubbed, subjected to electric shocks, mauled by dogs and chained to vehicles before being dragged around. Some were castrated. The same instruments used to crush testicles were used to remove fingers. It was far from uncommon for men to be beaten to death. Women were sexually violated with bottles, rodents and hot eggs.*

This all took place against a background of curfews, internment and capital punishment. Over 1,200 Kenyans died dangling at the end of a noose.

What were these ‘evil results’, the revelation of which would have been ‘shattering’? In *Cruel Britannia, A Secret History of Torture*, author Ian Cobain summarises some of the atrocities in Kenya:

*One of the torture victims was Hussein Onyango Obama who had served with the British army during the Second World War in Burma. When released after six months in detention, he was emaciated, suffering from a lice infestation of his hair and had difficulty walking. He died in 1979. His wife informed journalists that he had told her that the British had ‘sometimes squeezed [his] testicles with parallel metallic rods’. They had also ‘pierced his nails and buttocks with a sharp pin, with his hands and legs tied together with his face facing down’.*

Hussein Onyango Obama was the grandfather of Barack Obama.

A British officer, quoted by David Anderson in ‘Histories of the Hanged’, revealed just how brutal the campaign became. He described how a police officer was interviewing three suspects:

*... one of them, a tall coal-black bastard, kept grinning at me, real insolent. I slapped him hard, but he kept on grinning at me, so I kicked him in the balls as hard as I could ... when he finally got up on his feet he grinned at me again and I snapped. I really did. I stuck my revolver right in his grinning mouth ...*

*and I pulled the trigger. His brains went all over the side of the police station. The other two [suspects] were standing there looking blank ... so I shot them both ... when the sub-inspector drove up, I told him the [suspects] tried to escape. He didn't believe me but all he said was 'bury them and see the wall is cleaned up'.*

## **011. TOLERATION OF CHILD RAPE.**

The culture of brutality, blackmail and criminality among Britain's politicians and police is deep rooted, especially in London and Belfast where their depravity extended to the toleration of VIP sex abuse of children and underage teenagers. As noted earlier, a blind eye was turned by the police to the abuse perpetrated by people like Sir Peter Morrison MP. There were others who benefited similarly such as Sir Cyril Smith MP and an array of celebrities including Jimmy Savile. The blind eye turned to Prince Andrew's abuse of the seventeen year old Virginia Roberts, is simply a more recent example of this tradition.

Another example is that of the Anglo-Irish vice ring which abused children on both sides of the Irish Sea. Lord Louis Mountbatten and Sir Anthony Blunt were members of it. Many of the victims were procured from care homes. Some were as young as eight years of age. Since the police never broke it up, shades of it may still exist in one form or another.


The UK's intelligence services knew full well what was afoot but did not intervene either.

## **012. CHILD ABUSE NOW: THE PROVISION OF ILLICIT DRUGS TO CHILDREN AND FAUX COUNSELLING SERVICES.**

In the past, paedophile networks infiltrated schools, religious orders, scouting organisations, sporting groups (especially swimming bodies) and local authorities which ran care homes. Robust safeguards have been put in place to deter abusers. The modern parent is more aware of the threat posed by paedophiles and therefore more alert. Nonetheless,

paedophilia is still rampant in society. The modern offender exploits minors who are addicted to drugs. In some cases, the paedophile is the one who introduces the minor to illicit substances to create a financial dependency. Once addicted, sexual favours are extorted for drugs or the money to pay for them, or to discharge drug loans to vicious criminals.

Another ruse is to set up counselling service for drug addicts. Eric Witchell, a former Franciscan monk who was convicted for child abuse in the 1980s, presently resides in London. He attempted to set up such a service in the last two years. As a young man, Witchell was part of the vice ring which swirled around Kincora Boys' Home and Williamson House in Belfast. Witchell ran Williamson House from where children were trafficked to VIPs. The Metropolitan police do not monitor Witchell.



Drugs have never been more prevalent in society than they are now. Drug addicts are not credible witnesses, have poor recall and many die from overdoses. 4,561 addicts died in 2020 in England and Wales. While no figures are available which indicate how many of these had been abused while underage, it stands to reason that a proportion of them must have been.

### **013. THE ABDUCTION OF CHILD REFUGEES.**

There are open slave markets in Libya where children can be bought and exploited for sexual gratification as well as unpaid labour.

Children are being abducted in Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Albania is a severe problem.

Many of these victims will not survive to adulthood, either due to sexual injuries inflicted by adult perpetrators, murder or suicide.

Not all children who make it to Europe from Africa and the Middle East are guaranteed protection from abusers.

Sadly, not even Britain – the nation that led the abolition of slavery - is a safe haven for these children.



In January 2023 it emerged that 200 asylum-seeking children who had been placed in hotels run by the Home Office, had disappeared. Some, but not all, were traced.

On Monday 23 January 2023, Simon Murray, a minister at the Home Office, told the House of Lords, that children had gone missing from care. They included one girl and at least thirteen children under the age of 16.



The revelations came after the Observer newspaper reported that a whistle-blower from a hotel retained by the Home Office in Brighton had claimed that some children had been abducted off the street outside the facility and bundled into cars.

Elsewhere, a whistle-blower claimed to have witnessed children he believed were being trafficked from another hotel run by the Home Office, in Hythe, Kent, estimating that 10% of its young people disappeared each week.

The Sussex police disclosed that they had arrested two men on suspicion of human trafficking after children staying in a hotel were seen getting into their car.



No doubt, similar abductions are taking place across Europe.

Murray told the Commons that: ‘The Home Office have no power to detain unaccompanied asylum-seeking children in these hotels and we do know that some of them go missing. Many of them that go missing are subsequently traced.’



Philip Ishola, the Chief Executive of the anti-child trafficking organisation, Love146, had warned that it was unacceptable to place unaccompanied children in hotels. He told the Guardian that he had provided the warning ‘more than a year ago and it was obvious then that there were serious concerns about the

safety of young people in these hotels. Since then, the Home Office has been warned, repeatedly, that children are going missing, potentially to be trafficked and exploited, yet these concerns have been ignored.’

Since the Home Office began housing asylum seekers in hotels in Brighton and Hove in July 2021, 137 unaccompanied children have been reported missing. Of these, 60 have been located and 76 cases remain under investigation.

It emerged in October 2022 that the hotels being used to house unaccompanied children were using staff who had not been checked by the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS), as is required by government rules. Staff had access to master keys while young refugees stayed in the building.

In a further development, the children’s commissioner, Rachel de Souza, wrote to Suella Braverman, the Home Secretary, to ask for reassurance that all protocols for missing children were being followed:

*I am deeply concerned by the risks facing unaccompanied asylum-seeking children placed in hotels from those determined to exploit them,’ she said. ‘We must treat them as the vulnerable children they are and support them properly from the moment they set foot on our shores. I have been seeking assurances that appropriate care and advocacy is made available to these young people from the point of arrival, including through visits to these hotels and intake units in Kent to understand children’s experiences. We cannot expect children who have faced the worst trauma to be left to look after themselves as independents – they should be given the care and protection of the state from day one, until they turn 18.*




## CHAPTER 2.

### MURDER AND CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE

#### 014. A BLUEPRINT FOR THE COVER-UP OF CHILD RAPE AND 'ASSASSINATIONS'.

A 'SECRET' report dated 12 December 1989, has emerged from Britain's National archives. It was written by Tom King, a Conservative MP, who served as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 1985-89, and as Defence Secretary, 1989-92. He is still alive. It reveals that Margaret Thatcher was a party to the cover-up of {i} child abuse and {ii} smear campaigns perpetrated against politicians elected to Westminster, Stormont (in Northern Ireland) and Dail Eireann (in the Republic of Ireland) {iii} 'assassinations' in Ireland.



King's 'SECRET' 1989 report refers specifically to the child sex abuse scandal involving Kincora Boys' Home in Belfast.

It also mentions 'assassinations' which took place during the 1970s. For decades the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) has denied that MI5, MI6, and military intelligence ran a sectarian assassination campaign in collusion with Loyalist terrorist groups in Ireland. This lie has been exposed repeatedly in recent years, inter alia, by the fact the British government has handed over millions in compensation to the families of the victims of collusive murder. The survivors and relatives of the Miami Showband are perhaps the most high-profile of those compensated thus far. Members of the Miami showband were murdered in 1976 by a UVF gang directed by Captain Robert Nairac, an undercover British soldier. The British media has largely failed to report these settlements.

## 015. THE WISDOM OF THE FORMER POLICE OMBUDSMAN.



The ghost of King's 1989 report still haunts the House of Commons. Rishi Sunak's government is pressing ahead with the implementation of the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill. If enacted, it will thwart the prosecution of many of the offences committed during the Troubles. The provisions are wide-ranging and include those committed by the police, army, the intelligence services and their respective agents in the UVF, UDA and Red Hand Commando.

During a debate in the House of Lords on Wednesday, 23 November 2022, Baroness O'Loan, the former NI Police Ombudsman, said:

*Our history is very complex. Somehow, a situation evolved in which the police, the Army and MI5, having successfully infiltrated terrorist organisations, lost their way. There grew a time when many of the agents of the state currently under investigation were allowed to carry on their involvement in terrorism to preserve them as agents. People died because of this, and it should not have happened.*

A compelling argument can be made that O'Loan understated the case. The reality is that far from having lost its way, the state purposefully chose to confront Republican terrorists with a programme hinged on collusive murder. The architect of this policy was Brigadier (later General Sir) Frank Kitson a counterinsurgency expert who had served in Kenya, Malaya, Oman and Cyprus before arriving in Ireland in 1970.[3] (The foregoing is not a criticism of O'Loan who was not supplied with the true files on State-Loyalist collusion by the NIO, MoD and Home Office. O'Loan is outstanding figure possessed of immense commitment, courage and integrity.)

King's 'SECRET' 1989 report affords an insight into a sordid political manoeuvre designed to conceal the truth about a whistle-blower called Colin Wallace. Wallace knew about the Kincora Boys' Home scandal and other crimes. Over time it has emerged that MI5 (attached to the Home Office), MI6 (attached to the Foreign Office) and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) were involved in the scandal.



## **016. THE KIDNAP AND DISMEMBERMENT OF A 10-YEAR OLD BOY, BRIAN MCDERMOTT, AND OTHER CRIMES.**

King sent his 'SECRET' report to Thatcher outlining how a cover-up could be implemented. King's proposals were clearly accepted by Thatcher as they were deployed in full.

The rest of this book will focus on the deeds King's 'SECRET' plan set out to conceal. They include:

{i} the abduction, murder and dismemberment of Brian McDermott, a ten-year-old boy in Belfast by chief suspect, Alan Campbell (a member of the Kincora child rape network, an associate of the leadership of the DUP, and one time Secretary to the DUP);

{ii} the exploitation of paedophile networks by the NIO, MI6 and MI5 including Kincora Boys' Home, Williamson House, Bawnmore and Portora Royal College;

{iii} collusive murder on the part of the British State with the UVF, Red Hand Commando and UDA;

{iv} bombing atrocities;

{v} smear campaigns;

{vi} the manipulation of the media;

{vi} the forgery of witness statements;

{vii} police corruption;

{viii} perjury;

{ix} illegal gunrunning;

{x} malfeasance in public office; and,

{xi} the ongoing deception of the British parliament, the House of Commons.

## **016A. THE BOY WHO DISAPPEARED FROM ORMEAU PARK ON SUNDAY, 2 SEPTEMBER, 1973.**

On Sunday 2 September 1973, ten-year-old Brian Douglas McDermott left his home at Well Street, South Belfast, to go and play in nearby Ormeau Park with some friends. He went there at 1 p.m. The park was a ten minute walk away. His parents told him to be home by 2:30 p.m. for his Sunday lunch. He was due to return to school the following Tuesday.



He was the youngest of five children (three boys and two girls). He was described as quiet, timid, and ‘very, very deep’. He was bullied quite a lot at school.

Some of his friends were playing in the park. One of them was walking his dog. He described Brian as being his normal, happy self when he bumped into him. An hour later, he was seated on a swing. A friend asked him if he wanted to play. He seemed unhappy, shook his head and walked off through a gap in a wire fence towards an area of shrubs and trees.

He was never seen again.

When he failed to return home, his father, Edward, alerted the RUC.

The RUC searched the area close to his home, including derelict buildings.

# Missing boy found dead in sack

From DEREK BROWN in Belfast

The murder of a 10-year-old Belfast boy, whose burned and dismembered body was discovered in a sack on the bed of the river Lagan, has established a new and ghastly standard of savagery in a city well used to violence.

The boy was Brian McDermott, last seen alive near his home in East Belfast eight days ago on his way to play in a quiet park. After six days of widespread publicity and a major police search, Brian's body was found on Saturday when the river was drained. The remains were in a sack. Both legs and one arm were missing.

## Unexplained

The boy was identified 24 hours later when detectives compared fingerprints on the remaining hand with prints at Brian's home in Well Street. The cause and time of death are not yet known.

The police, who say there has never been such a hideous case before in Ulster, are keeping open minds on the motive. A spokesman said: "At this stage there is nothing to indicate sectarian or political motives. It was ghastly and fiendish."

Brian's home is in a small street off Woodstock Road, a

dismal area of Victorian terraces which has had an ample share of rioting and shooting incidents, mainly involving Protestant extremists. There is a Catholic minority in the district, and Brian's family are Protestants, but the murder seems to be completely outside the grim pattern of sectarian crime.

Brian was born in Rugby, England, while his father was serving with the RAF. The family moved to Belfast six years ago. He was slightly built and clearly could not have been taken for an older youth, which eliminates the possibility of a "accidental" execution or assassination. His distraught parents, interviewed by local papers before the discovery and identification of the boy, said they could think of no reason why he should run away from home. He would have started at a new school today and was apparently quite happy.

The discovery of the body was almost fortuitous. A pedestrian on the embankment reported to the police that he had seen what appeared to be a body in the water. The police drained the river at a weir opposite the park and a soldier helping with the search then found the sack stuck in the river mud.

Leading article and Letter to the Editor, page 10.




Six days later, a witness reported having seen what might have been a body in the nearby River. A search led to the discovery a hessian bag with the charred remains of his body inside it close to the Annandale embankment. Both of his legs were missing, as well as one of his arms. The body was so badly burned that fingerprints from the hand of the remaining arm had to be used to identify the body. The fingerprints matched those on his school books and confirmed that the child was young McDermott.

The authorities lowered the waters to the river's tidal weir in a search for his missing limbs, but to no avail.

### **016B. ALAN CAMPBELL, CHIEF SUSPECT IN THE MCDERMOTT MURDER CASE.**

The chief suspect in the McDermott murder case was Preacher Alan Campbell. The RUC was about to arrest him but was ordered to stand down.

Campbell was never arrested. It does not appear he was ever questioned, even informally by the police.




Campbell was perceived by many as an MI5 asset. During his life, leading journalists such as Henry McDonald, referred to Campbell in print as the 'Demon Preacher', and asserted he was a British Intelligence asset.

Campbell certainly knew all about the paedophile network of which Kincora Boys' Home was a part. A key figure in the network, William McGrath, was an MI5 agent as was the terrorist John McKeague. Another agent was Joseph Mains, the Warden of Kincora. Campbell was a friend to all of them.



Instead of pursuing Campbell, an attempt was made to frame one of his brothers who was coerced by the RUC into making a confession in 1976. He later retracted it.

## **017. COLIN WALLACE, THE MAN WHO KNEW TOO MUCH.**



Dirty tricks were deployed in 1975 to oust Colin Wallace from the British Army's HQ at Thiepval barracks, Lisburn, (HQNI). He had attempted to draw the media's attention to a number of issues including the activities of William McGrath, the paedophile housefather at Kincora Boys' Home. McGrath was a prolific and brutal child rapist.

Wallace was also deeply concerned about the abduction and murder of Brian McDermott.

Overtly, Wallace was a public relations officer serving with the British Army, covertly he worked for the Army's psychological operations unit (PSYOPS). The PSYOPS arm was known as Information Policy Unit (IPU). It was based at HQNI.

Peter Broderick, the former Head of the Army Information Services in NI, oversaw the Army's 'overt' PR. He was aware that Wallace had a covert role.



On 13 May 1985, Broderick, furnished the British police with a statement saying that Wallace ‘had tremendous leeway and freedom and was not accountable to him’ for the PSYOPS in which he engaged.

Colonel Geoffrey Hutton of the Royal Artillery and others directed the work of the IPU during the 1970s.

## **018. DUBLIN AND MONAGHAN BOMBINGS.**

As an important figure in the murky world of intelligence, Wallace was privy to insider gossip about a multitude of state sponsored crimes.

He learned of the collusion between the State and Loyalist paramilitaries. Dark whispers passed along the corridors of the intelligence community at HQNI about collusion after the UVF’s bombing of Dublin and Monaghan in May 1974. 33 people perished during those attacks.



Wallace learnt the names of the UVF bombers shortly after the twin atrocity.

Many years later he would appear on a documentary made by ITV, The Hidden Hand – the Forgotten Massacre documentary. It was broadcast on 6 July 1993, Wallace said:

*The difficulty I think with the Dublin bombings is that there was really no follow-up, no major offensive, no determination to find out whether these people had been responsible or not. And it was the lack of interest I think that concerned us, that it was a departure from normal procedure because the outrageous nature of the bombing would have justified a greater interest and that just didn’t seem to be present at that time.*

*NARRATOR: Wallace says he knew, through intelligence briefings, the names of the bomb suspects by September of*

*1974. One year later, he wrote to a former colleague, naming eight of them including Mulholland, Hanna and McConnell.*



HEADQUARTERS  
NORTH WEST DISTRICT  
Cuerden Hall Bamber Bridge Preston PR5 6AY  
Telephone Bamber Bridge Military } ext  
Preston 35436

Mr A H Staughton MBE

Your reference

Our reference

Date 14 August 1975

*Dear Tony,*

Thank you very much for your letter and the enclosed copy of my MBE citation: it was a very kind gesture and I am very grateful to you for your support. My thanks also for offering to give evidence at the Appeal Board hearing. I have discussed the matter with the IPCS, but they say that I can call only two witnesses or "friends". IPCS think it would be best to call Peter because he was at HQ NI up to last summer and wrote my IP job specification. I shall let you know if they change their minds.

In reply to your question about the political 'dirty tricks' activities, so far as I am aware, neither Jeremy Hamilton nor Adrian Feck played any part in those operations. They were directed by Denis Payne's people, with some input from IRD. Needless to say, the situation deteriorated sharply after you left and Craig was posted. Int disliked Peter intensely. They claimed he was a socialist and poked fun at the way he dressed etc. Actually, he did a really good job at Lisburn and it was a tragedy that he got so little support from MOD.

There is little doubt that Harold Wilson's attempts to carry through Heath's power-sharing initiative probably played a key part in hardening attitudes at Lisburn and Monaghan. There was intense hatred of Hees and Crue within Int/SB and there is good evidence that the Dublin bombings in May last year were a reprisal for the Irish Government's role in bringing about the Ex exit. According to one of Craig's people, some of those involved, the Youngs, the Jacksons, Mulholland, Hanna, Kerr and McConnell were working closely with SB and Int at that time.

The Sunday News cutting which I sent you about the Protestant Tank Force/Protestant Action Force was the work of the UVF in Belfast, but the interview was given by some of those involved in the Dublin bombings. Craig's people believe that the sectarian killings which took place at the end of last year were designed to destroy Hees' attempts to negotiate a ceasefire, and that the targets were identified for both sides by Int/SB people. They also believe that some very senior RUC officers are involved with this group. In short, it would appear that loyalist paramilitaries and Int/SB members have formed some sort of pseudo gangs in an attempt to fight a war of attrition by getting paramilitaries on both sides to kill each other, and, at the same time, prevent any future political initiative such as Sunningdale.

Continued over/..

The programme makers submitted Wallace's letter to a leading forensic

analyst. His analysis revealed that it was consistent with having been produced in the mid-1970s. The letter went on

*to make an even more startling claim. He writes that some of the Dublin suspects 'were working closely with INT – intelligence – at that time.*

There is more evidence of MI5's involvement in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings which will be examined in a later section.

## **019. KNOWLEDGE OF CHILD ABUSE.**




MI5 and MI6 oversaw the repugnant 'honey trap' operation that exploited the residents of Kincora Boys' Home.

British military intelligence was not involved – certainly not those who worked with Colin Wallace at HQNI.

Some of the residents were used as bait to ensnare Loyalist politicians and paramilitaries who were paedophiles.

British military intelligence knew that abuse was taking place and the identity of a key members of the vice ring. He was William McGrath, a leading Orangeman and friend of Ian Paisley. Acting on orders from his military superiors, Wallace tried to interest the media in the grotesque truth about McGrath.

McGrath was a friend of John McKeague, the leader of the Red Hand Commando (RHC). McKeague was a serial killing sadist and paedophile. One of McKeague's victims has revealed that McKeague was a terrifying and violent rapist. MI5 was able to blackmail McKeague on account of his abuse of the boys at Kincora. In turn, McKeague lured other paedophiles into bedrooms which were bugged by MI5, including one man who later became a DUP Westminster MP. The bait was a boy from Kincora.



The Army also knew a lot about Joseph Mains, the warden of Kincora who was also close to McKeague.



## **020. THE VICTIMS.**

Richard Kerr was placed in Williamstown House where he was abused at the age of eight. Kerr was sent to Kincora at the age of 14, in 1975. He was the youngest boy at the home.



He was subjected to abuse by a string of men. While he was at Kincora, he was spirited out of Ireland to Manchester, London and Venice, among other destinations.

The photograph shown here is of Kerr in Venice. According to the State, Kerr was in Belfast at the time of this photograph. On its own, the picture makes a nonsense of all of the enquiries that have taken place into Kincora, namely Terry (1982), Hughes (1984), Hart (2017) and Northern Ireland Police Ombudsman (2022).

Many of the children who were raped became drug or alcohol addicts. A number committed suicide. Most, if not all, yearn for one thing: recognition that they were fed into a meat grinder by the State for its own nefarious purposes and an apology to enable them to heal.

Instead, they are vilified as liars and fantasists.

As long as their experience is denied, they will suffer psychological torment. Quite a few committed suicide. Others have died prematurely from stress and ill health. Few have made a success of their lives.

It is now too late to see justice done for Clint Massey. He died in February 2018. Massey recalled a lot of 'suits' arriving at Kincora, often in the evening. 'In those days, there were loads of people over from London. I

have always assumed they were senior figures from Whitehall. I certainly heard English accents,' he once revealed. Mike Nesbitt, the then leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, described how Massey had had 'to live his entire adult life carrying the burden of abuse which was forced upon him through no fault of his own, by those who were charged with protecting him. His story is one of ultimate failure by the State and those acting on the State's behalf. Yet Clint not only waived his right to anonymity in his efforts to secure justice for fellow survivors, he spoke publicly without an ounce of self-pity'.



James Miller, has described how Joe Mains, the Warden of Kincora, trafficked him and other residents to a hotel in Bangor. He had to wait in the van outside the hotel while, one after another of the boys returned to it. He recalls they were sobbing after the ordeal they had suffered inside the building. On this occasion, Miller was lucky not to be sent inside. His evidence was presented to the Historical Institutional Abuse inquiry (HIA), chaired by Judge Anthony Hart, in 2016. No one doubted he was telling the truth, nor challenged his credibility. Hence, Miller presented a serious problem for Hart as he undermined the narrative Hart had latched onto at an early stage i.e. that the abuse at Kincora went no further than the home itself. Since there was no way to undermine Miller's credibility, Hart's solution was to simply to ignore him.

[The James Miller described in this section is not to be mixed up with a man with the same name who was an MI5 agent. His activities are described elsewhere in this book.]

## **021. ERIC WITCHELL, A WOLF IN A MONK'S HABIT.**

Eric Witchell was a key figure in the NI vice ring. He ran Williamson House. He is currently living in London, safe in the knowledge that what he and associates did in Belfast, London, Manchester and Liverpool, will be ignored by the UK police.

In 2023, Witchell defamed Richard Kerr by claiming that he was a liar, a

slur propagated by the Hart Report. Witchell, a convicted paedophile, and his ilk are the only people who now dare cite the Hart Report as a persuasive authority. Ironically, they, more than any other group in society, know that it is a travesty of the truth.

Witchell, who hailed from England, was born in 1948. He became a Franciscan at the age of 19. Before his appointment to Williamson House, he had been a housefather in an English boy's school attached to the Franciscans. He became the Officer-in-Charge of Williamson House in May of 1975, at the age of 27. The small boys Witchell abused were abandoned, vulnerable and powerless waifs. A select few were later sent to Kincora where they were used as bait in a series of MI5 'honey trap' blackmail operations.

The Williamson House scandal is worse than the outrage at Kincora insofar as younger children were abused at it. Witchell supplied very young children to VIPs including Enoch Powell MP.

The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) which was set up to investigate allegations of child abuse by VIPs including Westminster MPs, ignored Witchell although he was living in London where it sat.

Witchell is one of the most important living witnesses to the existence of a VIP vice ring.

Witchell did not appear before the Hart Inquiry either.

Witchell secured the post at Williamson House despite the fact his tutor at the National Children's Home Training College in England had advised the appointment panel of Belfast's Welfare Department that at 'this stage I would have some doubt in commending him to be the Officer- in-Charge... I would commend him to you for employment, but I would not commend him to you for employment as Officer-in-Charge'.

It was fortuitous for the vice ring that Witchell secured the post because he was the vilest sort of paedophile, someone who was prepared to farm out the children in his care to an array of child molesters. This suited MI5 because it enabled them to manufacture blackmail opportunities and

ensnare Loyalist politicians, paramilitaries and Orangemen in their clutches.



After Witchell took over the home, he moved into an apartment in the attic. It had a TV, sofa, sleeping quarters and a drinks cabinet. This was where he abused the young boys. He would usher his chosen victim upstairs and lock the door behind them. Physically, he was tall, thin and imposing. He wore glasses and had black longish hair. He was an exceptionally cruel and violent man with an insatiable sexual appetite. His preference was for prepubescent boys but he assaulted teenagers too. His taste ranged from masturbation to anal rape.

To a child, anal rape is indistinguishable from torture, especially where damage is occasioned to internal organs. Oral rape can inflict profound psychological damage. At least three of Witchell's victims would never recover from the assaults he and his associates meted out to them. They committed suicide. Another two attempted to kill themselves.

## **022. PRESSURE FOR THE TRUTH.**

A number of people attempted to stop the abuse at Kincora during the 1960s and 1970s. They ranged from associates of William McGrath, members of Ian Paisley's church such as Valerie Shaw, to military personnel working at HQNI. One of the most determined was Colin Wallace.

Wallace paid a high price for trying to do the right thing. In 1975, he was unfairly dismissed from both his overt and covert positions at HQNI. This was done at the behest of senior MI5 officers, including the Director-General of MI5, Sir Michael Hanley. As part of the conspiracy against him, MI5 denied that he had ever had been assigned a covert PSYOPS role and hence had not been entitled to provide classified documents to journalists. Later, his reputation was destroyed after he was sent to prison for six years for a crime he did not commit. Dirty tricks and perjury were used to secure his conviction.

In 1989, a series of files emerged at the MoD in London which confirmed that Wallace had been telling the truth about his covert duties. This presented a problem for Thatcher and others who had misled Parliament about his role in NI. The politicians could claim they had acted in good faith while making their pronouncements. Silence and inaction, however, would now amount to an endorsement of the fiction they had promoted. Retractions, corrections and some sort of a probe were becoming unavoidable.

The key passage in the Tom King's 1989 report addressed how he felt it was going to 'be important to restrict' the 'terms of reference' of the forthcoming inquiry' into the handling of the case 'so that [the investigator] could avoid getting drawn into [the] Kincora [child rape scandal], "draw this Orange" [and] alleged assassinations, etc'. [Clockwork Orange will be addressed in detail later in this book. It involved, inter alia, smear campaigns against politicians on both sides of the Irish Sea.]

## **023. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PATRICK FINUCANE CASE.**



The British state continues to resist a judicial enquiry into the murder of Pat Finucane, a Belfast lawyer killed in February 1989.

In February 2019, the Supreme Court in London expressed the opinion that an adequate investigation had never taken place. It stopped short of directing a public inquiry, ruling it was a matter for the government.

The Finucane assassination was perpetrated by UDA assassins controlled by the RUC's special branch and, above them, MI5. The killers included Ken Barrett and William Stobie. [Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Patrick Finucane 1 April 2004.] Peter Cory, the retired Canadian judge who carried out an enquiry into Finucane's murder, ascertained that it had been discussed at Cabinet level.

The fact that Thatcher was prepared to ignore possible evidence about the ‘assassinations’ King alluded to in his 1989 report, adds to the suspicion that she had foreknowledge of the Finucane murder; worse still, she was the ‘Cabinet level’ figure who sanctioned the shooting. If this sounds extreme, it is open to 10 Downing Street to convene the judicial enquiry the Supreme Court has urged it to hold and thereby clarify the matter once and for all.

## **024. KOMPROMAT AND BLACKMAIL.**

The British State has denied for decades that it was involved in the collection of what Soviet intelligence officers used to call ‘kompromat’, i.e., damaging material, often of a sexual nature.

There is a difference between kompromat and blackmail. Blackmail involves a threat to release damaging information unless a victim agrees to obey the demands of a blackmailer. In the case of ‘kompromat’, the information is released to undermine or destroy the target, not withheld to get him or her to obey a command. Hence, a typical target might be photographed in a compromising situation, yet not learn that he had been placed under surveillance until a picture of him is circulated to his family, employer, or to the media, without warning or demand.

## **025. CANCEROUS BOMBS AND EXPLOSIVE UNDERWEAR.**

While MI5 and MI6 were collecting ‘kompromat’ about politicians, Wallace was engaged in IPU-run PSYOPS designed to undermine and unnerve the IRA. One notable success was to deter female supporters of the IRA from transporting explosives for the organisation. Wallace put a story into circulation that the static from the typical female pair of nylon knickers generated sufficient electricity to cause the bomb materials being transported to explode. As a result, there was a great reluctance to move explosives.

In reality, the prospect of an explosion being caused by static electricity was minimal.




this 98-95-3 – IRIS – US EPA, ORD”.

Similarly, the PSYOPS unit put it about that the use of nitro benzene in home-made explosives was potentially carcinogenic. This claim is supported by the United States Environmental Protection Agency who considered nitro benzene a likely human carcinogen. See “Nitrobenzene why is

## **026. FROM RUSSIA WITH ROCKET LAUNCHERS.**

The IPU was the military’s PSYOPS wing. It worked with three civilian services: MI5 (attached to the Home Office), MI6 (attached to the Foreign Office) and the Information Research Department, or IRD, (also attached to the Foreign Office) from time to time.



The top IRD official in NI was a man called Hugh Mooney.

Mooney and his colleagues manufactured links between the IRA and the KGB.

One story included an ingeniously crafted yarn that Soviet submarines were supplying guns to the IRA. A photograph taken between Scandinavia and Scotland was published in the British press with a claim it had been shot off the Donegal coast during an operation to arm the IRA. Wallace helped plant the story on the front page of the News of the World.



IRD-inspired newspaper reports also claimed that Arab terror groups such as Black September, were arming the IRA.

## **027. THE HIGH COURT JUDGE WITH A HIGH REGARD FOR COLIN WALLACE.**

Mr Justice Barron was asked by the Irish government to produce a report on the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings of 1974. He interviewed Wallace about them and formed a favourable opinion of him:

*Colin Wallace is an important source of information about the workings of the intelligence community in Northern Ireland during the period preceding and following the bombings in Dublin and Monaghan on 17 May 1974. His work for the Information Policy unit [IPU] gave him access to information denied to all but a few. In addition, his service as a UDR captain, together with the fact that he is a native of Northern Ireland, gave him a depth and breadth of understanding which many of his colleagues lacked. This is confirmed by the then Chief Information Officer who in giving evidence to the Civil Service Appeals Board on Wallace's behalf, said:*

*He also had knowledge of the Irish situation which was totally unique in the Headquarters and surpassed that even of most of the Intelligence Branch. As time progressed, he was not only the main briefer of the press, but also the advisor on Irish matters to the whole Headquarters and – because of his personal talents – contributed much creative thought to the Information Policy Unit. In order to do his job, he had constant and free access to information of high classification and extreme sensitivity.*

Barron added:

*In person, Wallace comes across as intelligent, self-assured, and possessed of a quiet yet unwavering moral conviction. Though he has reasons enough to be bitter – the abrupt and unjust ending of a promising career in Northern Ireland, five years spent in prison on a conviction which has since been quashed – he displays no outward signs of resentment towards individuals or institutions. He remains intensely loyal to his*

*country and to the Army: insofar as he has a quarrel, it is with individuals rather than the institutions concerned. He says he believes that much of the propaganda work undertaken by Information Policy was justifiable in the interests of defeating subversives and promoting a political solution to the Troubles.*

*When speaking of matters directly within his own experience, the Inquiry believes him to be a highly knowledgeable witness. His analyses and opinions, though derived partly from personal knowledge and partly from information gleaned since his time in Northern Ireland, should also be treated with seriousness and respect.*

## CHAPTER 3.

### VILIFICATION

#### 028. CLOCKWORK ORANGE.

Tom King referred to ‘Clockwork Orange’ in his 1989 report to Thatcher. What was it?



At the end of 1973, Operation Clockwork Orange came into existence. This happened shortly after Denis Payne, a senior MI5 officer, became the overarching spymaster of Northern Ireland, the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence (DCI) of

NI.

According to Wallace, Clockwork Orange:

*was originally conceived at the end of 1973, or early in 1974, during a meeting at the Northern Ireland Office attended by Denis Payne, a senior member of MI5 who had recently become the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence in the Province. I recall the occasion because I had never met Denis Payne prior to that, and think I only saw him again at one subsequent meeting. I do not think he was the originator of the idea – he only contributed to the discussion about how it would be managed. Contrary to what the MoD has asserted, ‘Clockwork Orange’ was not a single activity. It was an umbrella title for an open-ended project aimed at using Psy Ops more strategically to address major ongoing issues such as racketeering, sectarian assassinations, arms trafficking etc. The so-called ‘IRA defector’ story was one of the early ploys approved for implementation.*

Numerous files were opened. Hence, Clockwork Orange 1, 2, 3 and 4

came into existence.

The civilian agencies developed operations directed against mainstream politicians. Wallace always felt the focus should have been exclusively on the paramilitaries.

## **029. THE MYSTERIOUS JOHN SHAW.**

Hugh Mooney left NI at the end of 1974. After that, a man called 'David' arrived. 'David' adopted the pseudonym 'John Shaw'. Wallace met him at an office at the NIO:

*At the time of the NIO meeting, Hugh Mooney, the former Foreign Office IRD official who had been based at Army HQ, had recently left Northern Ireland and there was a discussion about how we were going to replace the IRD material he had access to. Denis Payne said that he would find someone at the NIO to liaise with me and provide appropriate material of a similar nature to what Hugh Mooney had done in the past. During a subsequent visit to the NIO, I was introduced to a person who was to take on that role. On that occasion, the contact and I agreed that he would use the name of a known journalist when he attempted to contact me at Army HQ NI. The reason for that was that when I was out of my office at Army HQ, or otherwise unavailable, telephone calls for me were re-routed to the Army Press Office as part of my cover role. The name my contact and I selected for him was 'John Shaw' because a Press Association journalist by that name visited Northern Ireland from time to time during the 1970s. However, when my contact's telephone calls to me were answered by the Army Press Office, he would ask the officer on duty to inform me that he was calling from 'The White Gables' hotel near Lisburn. That latter piece of information enabled me to know that it was not the real John Shaw who was calling me. In recent years, MI5 have stated that 'John Shaw' was not one of the official cover names used by their members. That denial is totally irrelevant in the circumstances I have referred to above. Indeed, as MI5 were aware, the fact that 'John Shaw' was a name that he and I agreed on was made clear by Paul*

*Foot in his book 'Who Framed Colin Wallace'. Was MI5's claim about cover names just more deception? To the best of my knowledge, 'John Shaw' never visited me at Army HQ in Lisburn. On the few occasions when we had face-to-face meetings they took place at 'The White Gables'.*

'Shaw' was of medium build, in his late thirties, with a full head of straight dark brown hair, a pale complexion, an English accent (middle class, possibly Home Counties), and was about 5' 10". He lived in a flat or a house between Lisburn and Belfast, on the Lisburn side of Belfast. Wallace found him pleasant to deal with.

### **030. WALLACE'S CLOCKWORK ORANGE NOTES.**



Shaw provided Wallace with information which he placed into the various Clockwork Orange files. It was not long before events began to move in a more sinister direction. 'Shaw' began to supply him with 'dirt' about all sorts of politicians, including Westminster MPs.

*Some of the material I was given by 'John Shaw' was of a similar political nature, but I did not disseminate any of it while I was at HQ NI. Indeed, I returned all such original material to him in around October that year. I did, however, retain the handwritten notes which I had compiled from his material. In July 1987, the press (The Observer and Channel 4 News) commissioned a leading document forensic examiner in London, Dr Julius Grant, to report on the likelihood that my handwritten notes were compiled in 1974. Dr Grant concluded that they were consistent with being written in that year. Obviously, I cannot say for certain which Government agency 'John Shaw' worked for. Some of the material which he passed to me was not of a political nature, but some of it was very similar to the material which emanated from the IRD in 1972/73. In my experience, the Army did not collect, or have access to, such information. Similarly, I have good reason to believe that the material did not come from serving members of MI6. By a process of elimination, the two remaining sources*

*were either IRD or MI5. Given that it was a senior MI5 officer who initially suggested that he would arrange for someone to liaise with me regarding suitable material for 'Clockwork Orange' the balance of probabilities points strongly to 'John Shaw' being part of MI5.*

One of the files related to William van Straubenzee, a Tory MP. He had served as deputy Secretary of State for NI under William Whitelaw, 1972-74. According to Shaw, he was vulnerable on account of his sexuality. Van Straubenzee, a lifelong bachelor, was later named in child abuse files unearthed by the Cabinet Office in July of 2015.

Others politicians in the Clockwork Orange files were categorised as vulnerable because of their political beliefs, for example if they had once had communist leanings.

More again were vulnerable due to financial misconduct.

The smearing of mainstream politicians did not commence with Clockwork Orange. Hugh Mooney of the IRD had been involved in these types of manoeuvres long before he left NI in December 1974. All told, politicians such as John Hume, Charles Haughey and Ian Paisley, along with an array of Labour MPs at Westminster were attacked. The British officials used a polite euphemism to describe this activity, 'disinformation'.

Wallace was bewildered by the lengths to which civilian PSYOP officers went to discredit politicians such as Haughey. He felt their efforts were a distraction from the war against the paramilitaries.

### **031. SMEARING JOHN HUME.**



Colin Wallace is sometimes linked erroneously – and unfairly – to some of the nastier political black propaganda operations that unfolded in the early 1970s. Significantly, Wallace was not involved in MI5's treacherous plotting against the government of Harold Wilson. It involved the dissemination of smears and fictitious stories about Wilson and his

colleagues.

John Hume was also the victim of a campaign of character assassination in the early 1970s. It was spearheaded by Mooney.

Mooney and his IRD associates sought to depict John Hume:

- as part of a communist conspiracy intent upon transforming Ireland into Europe's Cuba;
- as a supporter of the IRA;
- as a fundraiser for the IRA;
- as a thief who stole charitable donations;
- as a man for whom a warrant had been issued for his arrest in 1972.

Hume visited the US for a number of reasons. One of these was on behalf of the Northern Ireland Resurgence Fund (NIRF), a charity which raised funds to encourage employment and self-help projects in Belfast. Hume was its chairman. One of its early initiatives had been to raise money to re-build Bombay Street, which rampaging Loyalist mobs had torched in 1969.

IRA. Among those who have received funds from the ACH was John Hume the SDLP MP as Chairman of the Northern Ireland Resurgence Trust Fund/for non-sectarian distribution on housing, factories and job training. This payment was made in 1970. It would be remarkable if the money could be spent in the manner envisaged by the ACH, since these areas were ~~the~~ and remain the responsibility of Government. In 1971, the Roman Catholic Primate of All-Ireland, Cardinal Conway, received 10,000 dollars for non-sectarian relief. A similar sum went to Maynooth College, Dublin, for relief. It is not known how these funds are administered.

See  
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***Mooney's smear briefing about John Hume.***

The IRD and MI6 claimed some of the money raised by the NIRF had been diverted to the IRA while Hume had carved off a slice for himself.

The IRD forged a bank account purporting to show theft from various US charities. The IRD showed a briefing paper to a select group of American reporters. It (a) linked Hume with IRA fundraisers, and (b) hinted that he had stolen money which had been donated by the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH) in America. According to it, Hume 'received 10,000 dollars'. Scribbled alongside this in red ink was 'see bank a/c'.

The smear oozed its way into The Christian Science Monitor, an international publication which, while it was available on subscription, was also distributed free to influential political figures throughout the world. The story festered and spread until Hume was obliged to denounce it.



In April 1987 Barry Penrose of The Sunday Times confronted Mooney with the briefing paper. At first, he denied he had written it, or had seen the forged bank account. Later, he conceded the handwriting on the briefing 'could be' his.

It is likely that the briefing paper and the fraudulent bank account statement were shown to Irish-American politicians by British diplomats in Washington in 1972. The British ambassador at the time had a background in banking, Lieutenant-Colonel George Rowland Stanley Baring, 3rd Earl of Cromer.

The British Ambassador to Ireland at the time was Sir John Peck. He ran the IRD in the 1950s.

## **032. SMEARING THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT.**

Mooney and the IRD had another swipe at Hume by attempting to portray the civil rights movement, of which he was a leading light, as a violent communist conspiracy.

Mooney generated press briefings which were shown and/or given to journalists. They were also shown to politicians by British diplomats in places such as Washington. Some of them linked the civil rights movement to the Soviet Union and the IRA as part of a Soviet conspiracy. According to it, the civil rights movement was part of a:

*murder and sabotage plan, fronted by the IRA, which basically seeks to create in Ireland a socialist republic on Cuban lines. This achieved, the next step would be the drive for a British Workers' republic.*

The 'Civil Rights movement' was described as being 'IRA and Communist controlled'.

Mooney also claimed that:

*Communist involvement in Irish political violence has been slow to reach the firm control it now exercises, but it was always there.... Soon it was staging militant demonstrations, using the front of demands for civil rights, and when the demonstrations led to street disorders the IRA came into the picture as escort for their parades.*

The overall picture depicted by Mooney was that:

*militant students, the civil rights bodies, the IRA, and the various Citizens Defence Committees which came into existence in Catholic areas, all had the same objective. In the words of one of their leaders 'We don't want reform of Northern Ireland-we want a revolution in Ireland.*


### 033. VILIFYING CHARLES HAUGHEY.



The IRD also attacked Fianna Fail politicians in the Republic including Charles Haughey.

These sought to portrayed him as the

mastermind behind Provisional IRA bombings in Belfast. The IRD also took copies of pamphlets produced by the Official Republican movement and republished them with additional entries designed to vilify Haughey. The smears had little impact as Haughey became leader of Fianna Fail in 1979 and served as taoiseach 1979-81; 1982; 1987-92.



### 034. SMEARING LABOUR LUMINARIES.

In 1973, the Foreign Office was in the process of reducing the role of the IRD. Mooney and his colleagues saw the conflict in Northern Ireland and the industrial unrest in the UK as an opportunity to avoid those cutbacks. His document, 'Soviets gain control over British Communists', was an attack on the British Labour Party led by Harold Wilson in the run up to the General elections in 1974. In IRD's view the Miners' Strike and the 'Three Day Week' crisis were Communist inspired.

Mooney and others would go on to smear an array of British Labour MPs, union officials and other left-wing groups. The victims included PM Harold Wilson, Deputy PM Ed Short, Denis Healey and Tony Benn.


That Sinn Fein produce and publish in booklet form its case against full membership of the E.E.C. and outlining the alternative; this booklet to be launched in conjunction with the British Labour Party against full membership of the E.E.C. - the second part of the resolution to be implemented, subject to prevailing conditions.

(Mellowes Cumann, Dublin)

Insofar as Ireland was concerned, Mooney's main strategy was to demonstrate that the conflict in the North was Communist inspired. One of the smear tactics was to place an annotation on the front of a Sinn Fein Ard Fheis document which linked Sinn Fein to the British Labour Party.

The IRD also forged a Bloody Sunday commemoration leaflet designed to show that certain British Labour politicians were 'sympathetic with the IRA'.

A colleague of Colin Wallace revealed in 1990 that he had read forged documents purporting to show that Merlyn Rees 'had made financial contributions to the IRA cause'. Rees subsequently became NI Secretary and later again, Home Secretary. Needless to say, the allegation was malicious.



***Edward Short (left) and the forged bank account in his name (right).***

Edward Short was Deputy Leader of the Labour Party. A similar attack to that on Hume was launched against him, namely the forgery of a bank account showing the receipt of dubious funds.

The IRD also forged a document purportedly 'signed' by Denis Healey who served as Secretary of State for Defence under Harold Wilson. It was a forgery designed to make him look as if he was serving the interests of

the Soviet Union. Healey also served as Chancellor of the Exchequer under Wilson.


### **035. SMEARING THE CARDINAL.**

Mooney also attacked Cardinal Conway in his John Hume finance document. This was probably done because MI6 and the IRD believed the Cardinal had failed to deal effectively with a priest who had allegedly been involved in the bombing of Claudy.

Conway also played a role in exposing the torture of internees. He discovered what had happened to the Hooded Men (hooding, death threats, white noise, beatings, stress positioning etc) and flew to Downing Street where he confronted Heath. Heath then had to take steps to halt the abuse.

### **036. SMEARING IAN PAISLEY.**

Ian Paisley was another victim of smears. The IRD forged share certificates and a Swiss bank account in his name. The forgeries indicated the substantial purchase of shares in Canadian companies with misappropriated funds. 'I've got no shares anywhere', Paisley thundered in April 1987. 'But I mean it's common knowledge put out by the dirty tricks department that I have ranches in Canada and ranches in Australia', he added sarcastically. 'That has been common parlance for years.'



In 1990, Mike Taylor stated: 'I can support everything Colin Wallace says and can confirm that the Clockwork Orange operation did include the smearing of British politicians. There were two Clockwork Orange files which were always in use during my period... I saw forged documents, for instance that the Reverend Ian Paisley had a

bank account in Canada'. The forgeries were shown to gullible, lazy or compliant journalists.

### **037. SMEARING WILLIAM CRAIG.**

Another target was William Craig MP, Leader of the Ulster Vanguard Party. It was alleged he had organised the kidnap of the Grundig executive, Thomas Niedermayer, in 1973, because he – Craig – was having an affair with Niedermayer's wife, Ingeborg. In reality, Niedermayer was kidnapped by the IRA, who murdered him in December 1973. His decomposed remains were discovered in March 1980. One of the conduits for the Craig smear was a British Army major based at Lisburn, but he was not acting for the IPU.

The smear reached the German newspaper Bild and prompted a headline which asked: 'Did the consul die because of a romance?' Craig and his wife sued Bild and received £8,000 in damages.

Colin Wallace had no hand, act or part in the Craig smear.



### **038. SEXUAL 'KOMPRMAT'.**

British intelligence ran brothels in Belfast such as the Gemini Health Studio where heterosexual prostitutes ensnared targets. The Gardenia was a trap for homosexuals. Men who liked underage boys were also targeted. They included Unionist MPs such as Enoch Powell, James Molyneaux, Sir Knox Cunningham QC, and at least one senior DUP politician who retains a significant influence over his colleagues to this day.

Heterosexual males were also routinely targeted by MI5. Peter Wright of MI5 described in *The Spycatcher's Encyclopaedia of Espionage* that

*It is well-known that MI5 gained useful information by employing ladies who gave sexual favours to foreign diplomats and agents. It has been suggested that this means that we require our female agents to become prostitutes. This is rubbish. We recruited prostitutes as agents.*

Anthony Cavendish, who served with both MI5 and MI6, has described how MI6 used children in entrapment operations in his book on MI6:

*Then there is the [foreign] agent who is set up for blackmail from the beginning. The groundwork having been laid and the agent having been photographed in bed with a small boy or his boss's wife, is then forced to provide information. [Cavendish, p. 4]*



## **039. 'KOMPROMAT' TO SAFEGUARD THE NI POWER SHARING EXECUTIVE OF 1974.**



Prime Minister Edward Heath, 1970-74, was one of the key figures in securing the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 which led to the Northern Ireland Power-Sharing Executive. Sunningdale had the support of the Tories, the Irish government, the Unionist Party and SDLP. An Executive was set up to run NI. There was, however, opposition to it which coalesced around the Ulster Workers Council (UWC).

British officials planned to release 'kompromat' to undermine the Unionist opponents of the Executive. The information MI5 and MI6 had gathered about Unionist politicians was political dynamite. The spies accrued more than enough dirt to destroy the top tier of Unionist

leadership in NI.

They knew that Ian Paisley had been involved in at least one bombing during the campaign to topple the prime minister of Northern Ireland, Terence O'Neill, in 1969. In addition, that Paisley was a friend of William McGrath, the vicious Kincora paedophile and commander of a paramilitary group known as Tara.



The spies knew that James Molyneux MP was a homosexual, something that was a crime in NI at the time. Molyneux, as a member of Brian Faulkner's party, was not someone who was in danger at this juncture because Faulkner and his party were participating in the Executive. The information about Molyneux was something that could be filed away for use another day. Molyneux's homosexuality was something which would have shocked the typical Loyalist voter of the time. He went on to lead the dominant Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), between 1979 and 1995. He was also a friend of William McGrath. He too was sexually attracted to young males. Molyneux mixed in the circles that revolved around Tara. When one young member left Tara, Molyneux made inquiries to find out why he had departed from the organisation.

Molyneux inherited his Westminster seat from Sir Samuel Knox Cunningham MP, QC, in 1970. Molyneux had served as Cunningham's constituency agent before the latter retired from Westminster at the 1970 general election. Cunningham once described the young Molyneux as a 'pretty little thing'. While at Cambridge, Cunningham had earned the nickname, the 'Boxing Queen' because of his homosexuality and prowess as a pugilist. He became a heavyweight boxing champion at the University. In later life he was elected as a Unionist MP. In the 1960s he represented South Antrim at Westminster. He served as Parliamentary Private Secretary to Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, 1959-1963, and as such routinely attended Cabinet meetings at 10 Downing Street. Cunningham remained an extremely influential figure inside the Unionist Party and the Orange Order during the early and mid-1970s.



***James Molyneaux and Christopher Luke. Luke met the UUP leader in 1984, when he was 17 and the politician was 64, at a meeting of the Conservative Party's 'Monday Club' in London. Harvey Proctor MP, another Monday Clubber, was a friend of both men.***

Cunningham abused Kincora boys. There were other Unionist figures with embarrassing secrets, many of which were recorded in MI5 and MI6's files.

## CHAPTER 4.

### A CLASH OF INTERESTS.

#### 040. STEPPING ON THE TOES OF MI5.

The British Army was not aware that William McGrath, the commander of Tara, a Loyalist paramilitary organisation, was a critical player in MI5's endeavours to spy on Unionist paedophiles. To the military, he was a terrorist and, therefore, a target to be neutralised.

During the summer of 1973 Colin Wallace of the British army's psychological operations wing, the IPU, was instructed by his superiors 'to brief the press unattributably' about McGrath and Tara. This move had the added benefit of exposing the existence of the child abuse network in Northern Ireland of which McGrath was a member. Kincora was only one of a string of care homes which were compromised. The children at Williamson House, Bawnmore and elsewhere, were being preyed upon too.

Wallace could not call a public press conference to denounce McGrath as the military had to protect their confidential sources. Hence, Wallace circulated a press briefing in his normal discreet manner. It described how the 'OC' or Officer-in-Command of Tara was:

*William MCGRATH. He is a known homosexual who has conned many people into membership [of Tara] by threatening them with revealing homosexual activities which he himself initiated. He is a prominent figure in Unionist Party politics and in the Orange Order.*

Also, that McGrath:

*uses a non-existent evangelical mission as a front for his homosexual activities and also runs a home for children on the 236 Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast (Tel: B'fast 657838).*

Some 'off the cuff' information on TARA for the Press.

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Notes. 1P

TARA

TARA first came to notice in the late sixties when the group issued a statement to the Press claiming to be "the hard core of Protestant resistance", and it is thought that the organisation was set up as a counter to the civil disturbances associated with the NICRA marches.

The name TARA is derived from the place where the ancient high kings of Ireland were crowned and is, therefore, an unusual choice of title for a Loyalist paramilitary group.

Operating from its HQ at Clifton Street Orange Hall, Belfast, as 'The Orange Discussion Group', TARA was organised initially into platoons of 20 or so men and run on military lines not unlike the old Ulster Special Constabulary ('B' Specials). Membership is drawn almost exclusively from the Orange Order and each platoon has a Sgt/QM (Quartermaster) and 10 (Intelligence Officer). Contributions: 50p per month - half to a central fund - half at pin level. Pins are able to draw on the central fund if the opportunity to buy stores arises. Training includes radio, weapons and guerrilla tactics.

The OC is William McGRATH. He is a known homosexual who has conned many people into membership by threatening them with revealing homosexual activities which he himself initiated. He is a prominent figure in Unionist Party politics and in the Orange Order.

McGRATH uses a non-existent evangelical mission as a front for his homosexual activities and also runs a home for children on the Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast (Tel: B'fast 657838). Also at [redacted] Newtownards Road (B'fast [redacted]).

The TARA 2 i/c is Roy GARLAND, <sup>he said he resigned</sup> a close personal friend of McGRATH and his former employer.

McGRATH's 'ADC' is Frank MILLER who comes from the Shore Road area of Belfast and who is also an active member of the Unionist Party. He is the author of a number of political pamphlets including one called 'Dangers and Sinister Realities'.

TARA's 'Intelligence Officer' is Clifford SMITH who lives with McGRATH, and the group's 'Admin Officer' is David BROWN from Bangor Co Down. BROWN is Deputy Editor of Rev PAISLEY's 'Protestant Telegraph'.

Other people closely associated with McGRATH and aware of his activities are Thomas PASSMORE, Rev PAISLEY, Rev Martin SMITH, James MOLYNEAUX and Sir Knox CUNNINGHAM QC MP.

\* 'ULSTER'S children of conflict'. New Society 15. Apr 71

Dr. M. F. O'Sullivan?

Also, that McGrath:

*uses a non-existent evangelical mission as a front for his homosexual activities and also runs a home for children on the 236 Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast (Tel: B'fast 657838).*

The foregoing was the address and telephone number of Kincora Boys' Home.

Jim Molyneux MP was listed in the final paragraph of the briefing as one of a number of 'people associated with McGRATH' and who was 'aware of his activities'.

## **041. JOURNALISTS CONFIRM THEY SAW THE TARA PRESS BRIEFING.**

A number of journalists have confirmed that they either saw the 1973 press sheet or received a briefing from Wallace about Tara based on the information that was contained in it.

On 13 March 1977, The Sunday Times published an article entitled: 'The Army's Secret War in Northern Ireland' by David Blundy. It reported that at a British Army briefing in 1974:

*at which a Sunday Times reporter was present attempts were made to link Paisley with the Protestant para-military group called Tara, a small, obscure and ineffective group as Ulster's para-military organisations go. The Sunday Times has a copy of an Army intelligence summary on Tara which contains accurate details about its organisation. .. One member, which the summary names, is called a 'homosexual and has conned many people into membership by threatening them with revealing homosexual activities which he had initiated.*

The Sunday Times believed the purpose of the briefing was:

*to link Paisley with homosexuals and Communist sympathisers. .. Our sources say that the army has produced three anonymous documents on this theme which circulated in Belfast.*

Kevin Dowling of The Sunday Mirror was another of the journalists who saw it. He gave the Hart Inquiry 'a copy of a telex he had sent to his editor


in 1973' as a result of information furnished to him by Wallace. The telex stated that 'according to Mr. Wallace the CO [i.e. Commanding Officer] of Tara was William McGrath and a homosexual' and that 'McGrath apparently uses a non-existent evangelical mission as a front to entice young Protestant men into homosexuality. Once in they are potential blackmail victims and soldiers of Tara.'

David McKittrick of the Irish Times also received a similar briefing.

In his Kincora Report of 2017, Judge Anthony Hart doubled over in contortions to undermine Wallace, yet he was not able to deny that Wallace had alerted the media to McGrath's abuse of 'young' men in 1973. In other words, the document that refers to James Molyneaux's knowledge of McGrath's activities is recognised – officially – by the British state, as genuine.

The reason Hart had to make this concession – despite his obstinate bias and determination not to find anything that might upset MI5 and the NIO – was because the evidence of its existence was overwhelming.

## **042. A THREAT TO THE MOST AUDACIOUS DIRTY TRICK OPERATION SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR.**



In February 1974 Harold Wilson returned to power at Westminster. MI5 and elements inside MI6 and the CIA were aghast as they believed Wilson was a communist. They resolved to destroy him. James Jesus Angleton of the CIA in particular believed Wilson was part of a global KGB conspiracy. Angleton was sacked from the CIA on Christmas eve 1974. His paranoia about KGB moles in the CIA and the illegal surveillance of US citizens had become too much for the CIA and President Gerald Ford to bear.

In 1974, the anti-Wilson conspirators in MI5 set about creating an organisation to oppose the Northern Ireland Power Sharing Executive. No

doubt, one would have emerged anyway without any input from them. In the event, opposition rallied around the banner of the Ulster Workers Council (UWC). MI5 planned to use the UWC to tear down the Executive. They hoped this would make Wilson look impotent.

Wallace's 1973 press briefing about McGrath and Tara now became a threat to the UWC strike. The information in it had the potential to lower morale and spark infighting inside the UWC. For a start, Ian Paisley, who supported the UWC strike, and some of his colleagues, might have been drummed out of public life.



A journalist could call Wallace and ask about Tara at any moment. Wallace mixed with them daily in his overt role as the public relations officer of the British military at HQNI.

Wallace had become a ticking bomb. One way or the other, he had to be taken off the pitch.


### **043. JAMES MILLER, MI5 AND TARA.**

According to one MI5 agent, MI5 did not join the UWC bandwagon, they were the carpenters who assembled it. The agent, James Miller, was an Englishman born in 1932. He had served in the British Army as a sergeant major, and, in later life, became a lift engineer. This occupation afforded him access to places such as the Rossville Flats in Derry which were out of bounds to the RUC and British army. Miller also had the run of the Divis Flats in Belfast

Miller settled in Monkstown, County Antrim and married an Irish woman. At one stage in the early 1970s, members of the IRA denounced him as a spy but he managed to convince Ivor Bell, a senior Belfast Provisional IRA leader, that he had been wrongly accused and was exactly what he presented himself as: a straightforward working-class man. At the time the accusation was made, Bell took Miller to his home where he protected him.

Miller knew a lot about a variety of Loyalist groups and their leaders. In 1970 or 1971, Miller was assigned by MI5 to spy on Loyalists who were associated with Tara. It does not appear that Miller was briefed that its commander, William McGrath, was already a British agent. Conversely, McGrath appears to have known that Miller was, like him, a British agent. McGrath invited Miller to at least one Tara meeting. This provided Miller with an opportunity to network with an assortment of Loyalist terrorists. At this time, many members of the UVF interacted with Tara at their meetings.

Roy Garland, once second-in-command of Tara, recalls that Miller ‘was never a Tara member but appeared at a meeting at the Clifton Street Orange Hall. I am pretty sure it was in 1970 but possibly early 1971. I think he was of medium build. The UVF people recognised him as having worked on lifts in the Falls Road and said he was MI5 – they may have said British intelligence. I passed this information on to McGrath and was asked by him to see Miller out, which I did. Miller said nothing – not a word from what I remember as he left. I last saw was him walking towards Belfast centre. I knew little about him before this and since, apart from what I have read. I suspect McGrath had invited him.’[Interview with Roy Garland May 2021.]



Miller did manage to pick up some information about McGrath’s sexual activities which he passed over to MI5. This underlines the point that he was not aware McGrath was an MI5 agent.

In a report dated 7 April 1972, Miller told MI5 that McGrath ‘had been accused of assaulting small boys ...’. This document was examined by the Hart Inquiry. Judge Hart reported in 2017 that ‘by virtue of section 5 (1) of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967, MI5 was subject to the same legal obligation as everyone else in Northern Ireland to report the commission of an ‘arrestable offence’ (that is an offence punishable with five years imprisonment) to the police where they knew or believed that such an offence, or some other arrestable offence had been committed. An alleged assault on small boys could, depending on the nature of the alleged assault have been an arrestable offence which ought to have been reported to the police’.



***Judge Anthony Hart. He ignored evidence, failed to read his brief, contradicted himself, failed to secure the co-operation of crucial witnesses, defamed victims, ignored credible evidence, took short cuts and pulled notions out of the air. The result was an incompetent error strewn report. It appeared in January 2017 on the same day as the inauguration of Donald Trump thereby attracting little or no media attention.***

Hart did not bother to ask MI5 why it failed to report McGrath to the RUC. He decided to figure out their lapse on his own. The notion he drew from the air was that MI5 had failed to act against McGrath to protect Miller from exposure as an agent. This demonstrated a profound ignorance of the basic facts of the Miller case. Miller had spoken to The Sunday Times newspaper. As millions of its readers knew, the UDA realised that Miller was a British agent in 1974. This resulted in him fleeing to England where he was provided with a new identity and a small business in Devon.

Hart should have read the papers before him properly. Had he done so, he should then have asked MI5 why it failed to report McGrath to the RUC {i} in 1972 and, if they said this was to protect Miller, {ii} in 1974 after Miller returned to England.

Hart's speculative reasoning is not particularly impressive. By 7 April 1972, when Miller reported on McGrath's sexual proclivities, hundreds,

if not thousands, of people either knew or had heard rumours about McGrath's sexuality.



MI5 has not volunteered an explanation for its inaction in response to Miller's April 1972 report since Hart published his report in 2017. MI5 has not corrected

Hart's mistake either.

McGrath was not exposed until 1980. McGrath was a prolific abuser of boys. Children as young as eight were being abused by members of the vice ring of which he was a leading figure. A large number of boys were assaulted by McGrath during the period 1972-76.

## **044. JAMES MILLER, MI5 AND THE UDA.**



After the failure of his Tara mission, Miller was instructed by MI5 to penetrate the UDA. He did so successfully and rose to become the UDA's director of intelligence.

In 1987 Miller told journalist Barrie Penrose that in 1974 his MI5 handlers had encouraged him to generate opposition in NI to Harold Wilson. 'My case officers told me to do it. MI5 wanted to get at Wilson. They said he was a Soviet agent.' [Barry Penrose, *The Enemy Within?: The case against MI5*, Sunday Times, 3 May 1987.] Penrose quoted him in the Sunday Times as having revealed to him that:

*'I did a dangerous job over there for nearly five years and many UDA and IRA men went to prison as a result,' Miller said last night. 'But I could never understand why my case officers, Lt Col Brian X and George X, wanted the UDA to start a [Loyalist] strike [against the Northern Ireland Power-Sharing Executive]*

*in the first place. But they specifically said I should get UDA men at grass-roots level to ‘start pushing’ for a strike. So I did.’*

*.. [He] said that in early 1974 his case officers instructed him to promote the idea within the UDA of mounting a general strike which would paralyze Northern Ireland. The result, says Miller, was the Ulster Workers’ Strike in May 1974 which severely embarrassed Wilson’s government and helped to torpedo the Sunningdale Power Sharing Executive of Catholics and Protestants, which had included an ‘Irish dimension’ by allowing the Irish government a consultative role in Ulster.*

[Barry Penrose, *The Enemy Within?: The case against MI5*, Sunday Times, 3 May 1987.]

‘Brian X’ was Lt Col. Dixon. [Paul Foot, *Who Framed Colin Wallace* (Pan Books, London 1989), p. 245.]



Miller’s career came to an end in 1974 after the UDA became suspicious of his true loyalty. He returned to England permanently.

In later years, Brian Nelson, another British intelligence agent, became the UDA’s director of intelligence. Nelson was run by a military intelligence unit called the Force Reconnaissance Unit (FRU). He was a proficient torturer who specialised in using electricity to extract confessions. He directed multiple murders in Belfast including the February 1989 murder of the Belfast solicitor Patrick Finucane. Ultimately, the Stevens Inquiry resulted in him being placed on trial. At his trial the head of the FRU, Gordon Kerr, spoke up in his favour.

## **045. THE DUBLIN AND MONAGHAN BOMBINGS.**

The destruction of the NI Executive was achieved by the activities of two Loyalist paramilitary groups, the UDA and UVF.



Both organisations were penetrated by MI5.

Miller encouraged the UDA to deploy its muscle to make sure the UWC strike brought the North to a standstill.



The smaller, more clandestine UVF bombed Dublin and Monaghan at the height of the strike, on 17 May 1974.

Some gardai concluded the bomb attacks were masterminded by British intelligence, or at least an out-of-control rogue element within it. Thirty-three people were slaughtered. It spelt the death knell for the Executive.

Eamon Doherty, who became garda commissioner in November 1987, told Yorkshire Television in 1993 that:

*I didn't think at the time and I don't think now that any Loyalist group could have done this on their own in 1974. I believe that if they participated in this operation, they must have been helped.*

Doherty's comments were broadcast on 6 July 1993 as part of The Hidden Hand: The Forgotten Massacre programme. On it another garda officer criticised the lack of assistance the RUC provided to the garda enquiry into the twin atrocities;

*You were dealing with the Protestant force [i.e. the RUC] and there was definitely a lack of co-operation. Our operation had to end because we couldn't get any further in the North. The well just ran dry.*



Forensic examinations of the bombs indicated they contained chemicals which the IRA were known to use but were apparently unknown to the UDA. This led to the suspicion the bombs were made from explosives confiscated from the IRA and preserved by the British army or the RUC, but later smuggled out to the 1974 bomb makers. The Dublin bombs also boasted sophisticated timing devices which managed to detonate three car bombs within 90 seconds of each other, an expertise which the UDA had never managed to achieve prior to the attack, nor subsequently repeat.

## **046. THE UVF BOMB GANG – AGENTS OF THE RUC SPECIAL BRANCH AND MI5.**


Some of the Loyalists involved in the atrocity were agents of the RUC Special Branch. The latter organisation worked hand in glove with MI5. The RUC agents included the notorious serial killer, Robin Jackson. Various official inquiries have gained access to RUC Special Branch files. Some of them reveal an agent-handler relationship between members of the Dublin and Monaghan bomb gang and the RUC. The key RUC Special Branch figure in the area where the gang operated was Frank Murray. There is no doubt that he knew that Robin Jackson of the UVF Mid-Ulster division was involved in the Dublin bombings, as did many in the RUC Special Branch and MI5. Nonetheless, Murray and his officers continued to protect Jackson from arrest.

The Executive fell on 28 May 1974, due in no small part to the bombings.

Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave reacted to this with a fury which he directed at Harold Wilson whom he blamed for not having done enough to crush the UWC strike. At one stage he had even suggested that the UWC pickets and their barricades should have been hosed off the streets. Dublin was infuriated because power sharing had worked so well: the Unionist, Alliance and SDLP ministers had got along famously. It would take decades of carnage before another power sharing executive was created.

## **047. THE ROLE OF FRANK COOPER.**

The SDLP were angry too, especially about the role of chief civil servant at the NIO, Frank Cooper. The SDLP felt he did little to help defeat the UWC strike. Austin Curry of the SDLP wrote:



*However, what the Secretary of State (Merlyn Rees) lacked in decisiveness was usually made up for by his Permanent Secretary, Frank Cooper, who had occasion under Whitelaw, [Francis] Pym and [Merlyn] Rees, displayed a ruthless attitude. For some reason, this attitude was not apparent in his government's dealing during the loyalist strike, a factor which in itself raises certain questions in my mind about intentions and motivations. [Austin Curry, All Hell Will Break Loose, p. 268.]*

## **048. JOHN HUME AND THE MAN FROM MI5.**

John Hume, the future leader of the SDLP and Nobel Peace Prize winner, was a minister in the Executive. His biographer Barry White described how Hume believed there were 'indications that the UWC had early warnings of security decisions', e.g., where the military would be deployed to remove road blockages. White also wrote about how the UWC's

*main source of information was through a former senior civil servant who retained good contacts at Stormont, and there was a valuable reassurance in an anonymous telephone call midway through the strike. A man with a cultured voice, who*

*seem to know what was happening inside Stormont, simply told [strike leader Andy] Tyrrie to ‘keep up the good work’ and victory was certain.* [White p. 167.]



Hume sat in on a meeting at which the then overarching British spymaster in NI, DCI Denis Payne, attended. Hume had challenged the assertion that the NI electricity service had been reduced to a paltry thirty per cent output due to the strike and sought a meeting with the well-meaning but naïve NI Secretary of State, Merlyn Rees, to challenge the claim. Payne was produced to confirm the alleged position.

## **049. THE STATE CONSPIRATORS BEHIND THE UWC STRIKE.**

It is difficult to believe that the UVF gang which included Robin Jackson, an agent of the RUC, bombed Dublin without the foreknowledge of the RUC’s special branch.

It is more likely that the RUC and MI5 was directing him – and quite possibly others – in the same way that MI5 had instructed James Miller to agitate for a strike to topple the Executive.



The cabal pulling the strings most likely included Denis Payne, Ian Cameron, Peter Wright and Michael McCaul of MI5.

Peter Wight was the assistant to Michael Hanley, the D-G of MI5. He was one of the key anti-Wilson plotters. He wrote about the plot in his book, ‘Spycatcher’. He also revealed how he had wanted to murder the leader of EOKA in Cyprus in ‘Spycatcher’. He was directly involved in the surveillance aspect of the EOKA leader. There was also a revelation in the book about a nerve gas plot to kill Nasser in Egypt. Yet, there were things Wright did in Ireland which he left out of the ‘Spycatcher’. He wrote a second book in which he said he was not going to reveal his Irish activities. What could he have

had in mind? What could be more sensitive than his revelations about Cyprus, Egypt and the anti-Wilson plot? A clue might lie in the fact he made no disclosure about James Miller or any of the assistance MI5 gave to the UWC strike. Wright did compile a secret dossier containing the secrets the kept out of ‘Spycatcher’. It has never surfaced.

Michael McCaul was another senior MI5 officer. He was – or was about to become – the man MI5 used to maintain contact with the gardai in Dublin. He was named in the House of Commons as one of the anti-Wilson plotters. He was close to Wright. He became very close to Larry Wren, the director of Garda Intelligence in Dublin in the 1970s.

Other suspects include Frank Cooper at the NIO.

Frank Murray, the senior RUC special Branch officer in Mid Ulster, may have been involved too as it was his officers who ran Robin Jackson.

## **050. THE IRRITATION OF HAVING TO BUILD UP ANOTHER BODY OF EFFECTIVE ‘KOMPRMAT’**

The anti-Wilson plotters wanted to keep the ‘kompromat’ on the Unionist leaders up their sleeves, for use another day when it might once again suit their purposes. If Paisley and Molyneaux were to sink into disgrace because of briefings from Wallace, MI5 would have to build up a body of ‘kompromat’ about those who would replace them.

That would not have meant that MI5 would have to start from scratch. The process of collecting ‘kompromat’ was ongoing and omnipresent. One Loyalist whose star was in the ascent ticked three boxes: {i} he was a transvestite, {ii} a member of Tara and {iii} a lover of McGrath. He became an MI5 agent.

By 1976, MI5 would secure a recording of another promising young DUP politician. It would be made in a bedroom on the first floor of the Park Avenue Hotel in Belfast. The recording featured the DUP man and a boy from Kincora. The politician – who is still alive – has a reputation as a wife beater. He was a friend and admirer of John McKeague, the notorious paedophile and terrorist.

## CHAPTER 5.

### COLIN WALLACE, A MARKED MAN.

#### 051. MI5 HAD TO DESTROY WALLACE TO CONCEAL ITS DIRTY LINEN.

Colin Wallace became a threat to these complex intrigues. His 1973 press briefing threatened to expose McGrath and Paisley. As described earlier, he was hearing dark rumours about the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. He also knew of the scheming against the Labour Party (and others) from his dealings with 'John Shaw'.

Wallace became increasingly uncomfortable with 'Shaw' and the direction in which he was taking Operation Clockwork Orange. In 1974 he told him that he no longer wanted to have any part of it.

He returned the documents 'Shaw' had given him but kept the notes he had made from them.

Knox Communications, Molgroux, Paisley, Beames, Smith, Tora, etc. etc. etc.	
Smyth (aka), Baird, Craig. → McGrath, McKeegan, Van Stuyveland,	
Meeting between PIRA and Wilson/Beames of great help to accounts. Wilson's meeting was organized by Hanley — See also Wilson	13-3-72

If McGrath was exposed in public because of Wallace, a domino cascade of revelations might commence. Harold Wilson was still prime minister. He had the power to instigate all sorts of inquiries. All sorts of secrets might yet spill out.

Wallace was now a marked man.

No less a figure than Sir Michael Hanley, the D-G of MI5, would become

involved in the plot against Wallace.

Stella Rimington, D-G of MI5, 1992-96, described Hanley in her memoirs as ‘a large, gruff, red-faced man, who had a reputation for being abrupt and having a fierce temper’.

The document which proves Hanley’s involvement in the plot is reproduced in this volume. It reveals nothing less than malfeasance in public office.

An MI5 officer called Ian Cameron – a man once tipped to become director-general of MI5 – led the campaign of dirty tricks to destroy Wallace and protect the gamey leadership of Unionism and MI5’s other dirty linen. A photograph of Cameron has yet to surface. He was round faced, dark haired, medium to well built, about 5’ 9 or 5’10 inches tall. He had served with MI5 in Berlin. During his career, he sometimes posed as an employee of the MoD.

MI5 connived to have Wallace dismissed for handing over classified information to the journalist Robert Fisk.



Yet, it was Wallace’s job to do precisely this under the terms of his approved job ‘justification’. He never once leaked a document without the permission of his superiors.

Since Wallace and his military superiors were not aware that McGrath was both an MI5 and MI6 asset, they had no inkling of the minefield into which they had stumbled.

## **052. THE BRIAN MCDERMOTT CHILD MURDER MEMO WHICH WAS SUBMITTED TO COL GEOFFREY HUTTON.**

Wallace continued to cause trouble for MI5. On 8 November 1974, Wallace produced a memo for Col. Geoffrey Hutton, his superior (hereafter ‘The Brian McDermott Child Murder Memo’). It highlighted

the abuse at Kincora and at other children's homes. It also focused on the horrific murder of Brian McDermott. In it Wallace stated:

①

RUC involved in investigation  
& can open up with the  
Security Services.

WALLACE  
RUC HQ  
KNOCK RD  
BELFAST  
CASKEY  
023 2650 227

**RECEIVED**  
26 MAR 1982  
T.E. & SON

'TARA' - REPORTS REGARDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES ASSOCIATED WITH THE  
HOMOSEXUAL COMMUNITY IN BELFAST

REFERENCE A: Attached RUC background paper on 'TARA'  
REFERENCE B: Attached report on the death of BRIAN MCDERMOTT  
REFERENCE C: Your request for a Press investigation into the matters  
referred to above

1. Reference A adds nothing of real significance to what we already know of the background to 'TARA'. Furthermore, it contains a number of inaccuracies and there are various holes of important information missing from it. It is difficult to say whether these flaws are the result of poor intelligence, or whether they are disinformation provided for our consumption.
2. If we are to reinvest the Press in this matter with a view to exposing what has been taking place and thereby stopping further assaults on the youngsters in this hostel, then I would suggest strongly advise that we make use of all our background information and exclude the entire content and, indeed, probably suspect a desire contained in the above. As you know, I did try to develop Press interest in this matter last year but without any success. I also find that it is difficult to justify our involvement in what is purely a police and political matter because, in my opinion, 'TARA' is no longer of any fundamental Security interest.
3. In theory, 'TARA' was basically a good idea conceived from a loyalist paramilitary point of view, but it never progressed beyond the planning stage. Such a body could, no doubt, have made good use of the Orange Order's name selection and 'vetting' system for screening potential recruits, and it would have had ready-made premises for clandestine training of recruits use of the Orange Hall throughout the Province. The idea failed for a number of reasons, namely because of WILLIAM MCCARTHY'S rather strange political views which were more akin to Zech's abolition or Republicanism than Loyalism, and the fact that other organisations which appeared to be more in keeping with the needs of the Loyalist community at that time, sprung up during the period.

2. *If we are to interest the press in this matter with a view to exposing what has been taking place and thereby stopping further assaults on the youngsters in these hostels, then I would strongly advise that we make use of our own background information ... As you know I did try to develop press interest in this matter last year but without any success. ...*

7. *McGRATH was himself the subject of an internal investigation by the Belfast Corporation Welfare Department in 1972/73, following allegations of more homosexual assaults on the*



*inmates of Kincora. One of our own sources confirmed in 1972 that a number of complaints had been received about his behaviour and that, although the complaints had been passed to senior welfare staff and to the RUC no action had been taken against him.*

10 (b) *The Rev PAISLEY is aware of the situation but has failed to take any action because of possible blackmail pressure owing to his connection with McGRATH, DAVID BROWN and JOHN McKEAGUE. ...*

### **053. WALLACE BEGINS TO SUSPECT THE PAEDOPHILE RING IS BEING PROTECTED BY THE POLICE.**

Under the heading 'conclusions and recommendations' in the Brian McDermott Child Murder Memo, Wallace stated:

*I am far from happy with the quality of the information available on this matter, and I am even more unhappy because of the, as yet unexplained, failure of the RUC or NIO to take on the task.*

*I find it very difficult to accept that the RUC consistently failed to take action on such serious allegations unless they had specifically received some form of policy direction. Such direction could only have come from a very high political or police level. If that is the case then we should be even more wary about getting involved.*

*On the other hand, if the allegations are true then we should do everything possible to ensure that the situation is not allowed to continue. The youngsters in these hostels almost certainly come from problem families, and it is clear that no one will fight their case unless we do.*

## **054. ALAN CAMPBELL, CHILD SERIAL KILLER AND AN AGENT OF MI5.**



*Brian McDermott and Alan Campbell.*

Alan Campbell was suspected of the murder of Brian McDermott. He was a friend of William McGrath and John McKeague, the sadistic and murderous leader of the Red Hand Commando. Campbell and McKeague had been key figures in the Shankill Defence Association (SDA), the

forerunner to the UDA. Both were associates of Ian Paisley. McKeague once served as Paisley's bodyguard.

RUC officers were about to arrest Campbell for the murder of McDermott when a force more powerful than they stepped in and stayed their hand. Campbell was never charged. Authors Jim Cusack and Henry McDonald have stated that he was a British agent. They described him as 'The Demon Preacher'.



Campbell is suspected for the murder of four other boys who disappeared never to be found.

The RUC officers who investigated the McDermott murder – and who were about to arrest Campbell for it – informed British military intelligence at Lisburn of their intention. The Army was being kept in the loop by the RUC because Campbell was a member of Tara. Suddenly, the RUC was ordered to leave Campbell alone. Only MI5 and the NIO have that sort of power.

Wallace indicated in the Brian McDermott Child Murder Memo that members of McKeague's circle were implicated in the murder of McDermott. In the conclusion section of his report he stated:

***Those responsible for the murder of Brian McDermott must be brought to trial before another child is killed, and if it can be proved that there is a connection with this homosexual group, then the RUC must be forced to take action irrespective of who is involved.***

Wallace recommended that the Army should enjoin the RUC and responsible journalists to investigate the scandal.

Had Wallace's recommendation been accepted, the Kinchora scandal might have erupted in late 1974.

Railton failed to act against the paedophiles.

Instead, six weeks later Wallace was dismissed from his job.

## **055. ANOTHER HEADACHE FOR IAN CAMERON OF MI5.**

Capt. Brian Gemmell, a military intelligence officer who reported to Ian Cameron of MI5, also learnt about Kincora in the mid-1970s. ‘The Kincora information was part and parcel of my Intelligence Reports (Intreps) on [William McGrath’s paramilitary group] Tara. It was classified Secret and sent/taken by me to HQNI and handed over to MI5 staff there.’



Gemmell had obtained his information from three different sources: James Miller, Roy Garland and Jim McCormick. Garland, had served as the second-in-command of Tara.

After he submitted his report to MI5, Gemmell was summoned to a meeting by Cameron.

According to Gemmell, ‘Ian Cameron was very much a father figure to me at the time’. He was then in his mid-20s while Cameron was in his early 60s. According to Gemmell, the MI5 boss was ‘normally a very nice chap, but he reacted very strongly. He told me that MI5 did not concern itself with what homosexuals did and he ordered me to stop using an agent I had within Tara, who we had codenamed Royal Flush.’

The Hart Inquiry reported in 2017 that MI5 had confirmed to it that {i} Gemmell had indeed reported on Tara to Cameron and {ii} that Cameron had acknowledged that he had told Gemmell to desist from further enquiries into allegations concerning homosexuality. [Chapter 29, paragraph 175.]

Despite all this, Hart dismissed



the claim that Gemmell reported the abuse at Kincora to MI5 because Gemmell had stated that he had done so in a four-page written report. The problem with this was that MI5 could not find such a report for Hart. The absence of the report convinced heart that Gemmell was a fantasist.

## **056. IAN CAMERON'S SECRET REPORT ON THE USE OF DISINFORMATION BY THE BRITISH ARMY.**

An internal MI5 memo, dated 22 February 1990, addressed to MI5's Legal Adviser, Bernard Sheldon, and copied to the Director-General of MI5, Patrick Walker, reveals that Cameron knew full well that the Army was involved in the dissemination of disinformation. The significance of this is that it illustrates that Cameron was aware of the 'PSYOPS' unit of which Wallace was a member. Clearly, many others did too. Yet, Cameron would pretend otherwise as part of MI5's plot to get rid of Wallace. The 1990 memo noted that:

*Cameron was in no doubt – as his report says – that disinformation was carried out by the army and believed that the Generals gave clearance for some operations.*

This was a reference to the Information Policy Unit (IPU) of which Wallace was a member. There were other military wings which participated in psychological activities.

The MI5 memo proceeded to describe how:

*Cameron thought the NIO was involved with some operations – but might have confused the period when this happened – after [John] Leahy arrived at the NIO (probably 1975) there was no doubt that Leahy gave clearances. Cameron thought that 39 Brigade [which was based in Belfast] and other brigades [of the British Army] carried out low level ploys without reference. [John Leahy was a FCO official who had previously served on the staff of the British Embassy in Dublin where he was undoubtedly a key participant in campaign to thwart the political ambitions of Charles Haughey. Leahy*

*became an Assistant Under Secretary at the NIO in 1975. He replaced Michael Cudlipp, who had been appointed by Harold Wilson the previous year as information adviser to Merlyn Rees, the NI Secretary.]*

Yet, in 1974 and 1975, Cameron would weave a complex web designed to oust Wallace from his job on the basis that he did not have clearance to pass sensitive files to journalists.

## **057. WALLACE IS PUT FORWARD FOR AN MBE.**



One of the challenges in trying to derail Wallace's career was that he was hugely popular amongst his colleagues. He was put forward twice for an MBE in 1974, by Tony Staughton, the Chief Information Officer at Army HQ NI. Wallace was only 29 years of age. The recommendation of an MBE for a man as young as this was virtually unheard of.

The MoD procrastinated about making the award out of a concern it might draw attention to Wallace's covert activities. Yet, the same MoD would soon dismiss him for engaging in PSYOPS in the pretence he had no clearance for such activity.

After Staughton left, Peter Broderick succeeded him. One of the requests Staughton made to Broderick was to maintain the pressure on the MoD to award Wallace with an MBE.



Cameron was unmoved by the hard work, long hours and creativity Wallace had brought to his job. To him, Wallace was a threat to the ongoing rape of children which was benefitting MI5 'kompromat' and blackmail operations. Cameron resolved to shaft Wallace by making it appear he was leaking restricted and secret files to the well-known journalist,

Robert Fisk, without authority. To achieve this, he would have to conceal Wallace's secret PSYOPS role.

## 058. THE HYPOCRISY OF IAN CAMERON IN RELATION TO WALLACE AND FISK.

Telegrams from the Irish Joint Section (IJS), a high level intelligence coordination body comprising the Army, MI5 and MI6, reveal that the IJS regarded Robert Fisk as a 'good investigative journalist'. They also show that between April and October 1974, Wallace was asked by the IJS to engage with Fisk to encourage him to write an exposé on the activities of Bill Fuller, a perceived major IRA fund-raiser and arms supplier who was based in the USA. The IJS made a request to Wallace to 'give Fisk as many names and leads to follow up as possible'.

Wallace was given a 'dossier' by the IJS to supply to Fisk. It was one designated 'Secret'.

There is a world of difference between 'secret' and 'restricted' documents.

Document 4 - 21 October 1974

FROM [REDACTED] — US HQNI	ORIGINATED DATE 21 Oct 74 TIME 1650Z	ADDRESSED [REDACTED] — SIS LONDON
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FOLLOWING ALSO FOR [REDACTED] — US LONDON

[BILL FULLER] US / HQNI

YOUR TELEGRAM ADDRESSED [REDACTED] OF 31 JULY 74.

1. [REDACTED] HAS NOW INFORMED WALLACE THAT THE STORY IS NOW ALL SET TO GO (YET AGAIN) BUT [REDACTED] WOULD LIKE A PHOTOGRAPH OF FULLER ATTENDING THE FUNERAL OF PIRA MURDERER [REDACTED] (WHICH HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE DONE BY ARMY SOURCE [REDACTED])

2. THE ARMY HAVE EXTENSIVE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE FUNERAL CONCERNED AND ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] HAVE NOW OBTAINED AN ORDINARY PHOTOGRAPH OF FULLER, IT IS DIFFICULT FROM IT TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY FULLER AMONGST THE MANY ARMY PHOTOGRAPHS. DOES [REDACTED] HAVE A SOURCE WHO KNOWS FULLER BY SIGHT AND, IF SO, ARE WE SO SURE OF THAT SOURCE AS NOT TO WORRY ABOUT THE FACT THAT A PHOTOGRAPH HE IDENTIFIES AS BEING OF FULLER APPEARS SHORTLY THEREAFTER [REDACTED]? IF THERE IS SUCH A SOURCE WE WILL SEND YOU THE PHOTOGRAPH CONCERNED.

3. MEANWHILE, WE ARE MAKING EFFORTS HERE, THROUGH IP, HONI, TO HAVE FULLER IDENTIFIED. OBVIOUSLY THERE IS CONSIDERABLE VALUE IN PUBLISHING A PHOTOGRAPH WHICH STRESSES HIS LINKS WITH PIRA TERRORISTS.

HANDWRITTEN ANNOTATIONS

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

CODEWORD

US LONDON

PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

Virtually all British army documents were classified 'restricted' – even the 'tribal' street maps of Belfast which showed where Nationalist and Loyalist communities were located. 'Secret' documents are far more sensitive.

The Army Press Desk at HQNI frequently gave visiting journalists copies of the 'tribal' map of Belfast as well as the 'Yellow Cards' and 'Blue Cards' issued to soldiers. These cards contained the rules for arresting people and for opening fire.

Despite all of this, Ian Cameron's plot to destroy Wallace involved alleging he had leaked low level documents to Robert Fisk without authority.

Document 2 (Page 1) - 7 June 1974

FROM [REDACTED] — US HQNI	UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7 June 74 1845Z TIME	ADDRESSED [REDACTED] — DCI STAFF
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[BILL FULLER.] ✓ DOCUMENT REFERENCE  
[REDACTED] OF 10 MAY 1974.  
MOD OFFICER J

1. MAJOR [REDACTED] HAS NOW SHOWN THE SANITISED WRITE-UP TO COLIN WALLACE WHO IS AT PRESENT CONSIDERING THE BEST MEANS OF EXPLOITING THE INFORMATION. IN THIS CONTEXT, THERE ARE ONE OR TWO FACTORS CONCERNING [REDACTED]'S CURRENT DIMINISHED INTEREST IN THE STORY AND HIS PRESENT RELATIONSHIP WITH HQNI, UPON WHICH, ACCORDING TO G/INT, WALLACE CAN BE RELIED TO GIVE SOUND ADVICE. FOR THE RECORD WALLACE UNDERSTANDS THE DOCUMENT WAS COMPILED BY G INT HQNI.  
*PROTECTION OF IDENTITY*
2. WE ARE CLOSELY FOLLOWING THE SITUATION THROUGH MAJOR [REDACTED], AND ARE ADVISING PRIOR TO ANY ACTION.  
*MOD OFFICER J*
3. WALLACE HAS PRODUCED THE FOLLOWING FROM HIS QUOTE PRESS SOURCES UNQUOTE WHICH, IF HE FINALLY DECIDED THAT THE PAPER SHOULD BE PASSED TO <sup>Fisk</sup> [REDACTED] WILL FEED IN ORALLY:  
*PROTECTION OF IDENTITY*  
/QUOTE.

It is fair to comment that the hypocrisy at this juncture is staggering. Cameron was a key IJS participant. He was plotting to frame Wallace for leaking low level ‘restricted’ information to Fisk while at the same time he – Cameron – was participating in IJS meetings at which documents with a far higher designation were being channelled to Fisk via no less a figure than Wallace.

## **059. PUSHING WALLACE OFF THE PITCH.**

Before Cameron plunged his dagger, a move was made – undoubtedly arranged by Cameron – to move Wallace off the pitch without creating too much of a fuss. On Christmas Eve 1974, Wallace was interviewed at the MoD and told that he was being posted from NI to the North West District at Preston, England. He was told this was part of a career move. There was a vacant post in Preston and it required filling immediately.

Wallace returned to NI, packed his bags and drove to Preston where he was assigned a room at the British Army’s HQ North West District.



Behind his back, the plot against Wallace was at an advanced stage. The RUC was centrally involved in the conspiracy.


## **060. THE INTERVIEW AT PRESTON: ‘I THINK YOU HAVE BEEN SET UP BY YOUR OWN SIDE.’**

On his second day at Preston, Wallace was called in by his chief-of-staff and informed that two police officers had arrived to see him. One was the Head of the Lancashire Special Branch, Frank Taylor. The other was Detective Inspector ‘K’ from the RUC. They asked to look at the documents Wallace had brought with him from Lisburn. Those he had were in boxes in his bedroom. The officers searched them but found nothing of interest.

Next, the pair conducted an interview in the chief-of-staff’s office. Taylor was aggressive, the RUC man was not. Wallace explained that he would

have to get clearance to talk about some of the work he had undertaken in NI.

Before they left, the RUC officer told Wallace: 'I think you have been set up by your own side'.



The RUC officer was reporting to David Johnson, his superior in the RUC Special Branch. Johnson had directed the surveillance of Wallace during which Wallace had dropped materials to Fisk. While Wallace was doing this as part of his job, it would nonetheless be used as ammunition to justify dismissing him.

After the meeting, Wallace went to see John Groves, the head of public relations at the MoD in London. Groves told him he could talk to the RUC Special Branch about his covert activities but only about those directed against the IRA, not Loyalists

The fact Wallace was now living in Preston placed him at a significant disadvantage going forward. The secret dimension to his employment by the MoD would soon become of paramount importance. Had he been back in his old office in Lisburn, he could have called in a small army of colleagues to tell the RUC investigators that he had a PSYOPs role. In those days, communications between Preston and NI were primitive. There was no prospect that Wallace would be able to make contact with Lisburn and find a colleague was prepared to talk over an open line to the police in Preston.

Wallace had also been told by MI5 that his life was in danger and he should not return to Lisburn, something which further isolated him. No evidence has ever emerged that anybody had targeted Wallace. The allegation was undoubtedly another lie planted by Cameron.

## **061. MI5 ALLEGATIONS REGARDING INFORMATION 'LEAKS'**

Cameron's plot was to pin a series of 'leaks' or unauthorised disclosures of information to the press in general, and to Robert Fisk of The Times in particular, on Wallace. Again, the hypocrisy here is staggering as MI5 continued to leak to journalists including Fisk after destroying Wallace's career.



The first of the complaints was that Wallace was responsible for a report that had appeared in The Times of London by Robert Fisk in 1973 about the

'Blue Card' being issued to troops in NI instructing them in arrest procedures. That card was classified 'Restricted'.

Virtually all documents in the Army at this time were classified 'Restricted' or higher, even the 'tribal' street maps of Belfast. Journalists who visited NI knew that the Army Press Desk at HQ NI gave out copies of the 'tribal' map of Belfast as well as copies of the 'Yellow Cards' and 'Blue Cards' issued to soldiers and containing the rules for arresting people and for opening fire. All of these documents were 'Restricted'. The notion that the MoD and MI5 were unaware that they were being distributed to the press is risible.



On 19 March 1974, The Times published a story stating that SAS units were operating in NI. That leak emanated from Whitehall where the Government wanted to demonstrate that it was taking robust measures to counter the growing number of IRA operations in rural areas. An MoD inquiry in later years, initiated by the Permanent Undersecretary (PUS) Sir Michael Quinlan concluded 'there was no evidence at all that he (Wallace) was responsible for the SAS leak.'

On 31 August and 2 – 3 September 1974, Fisk published a series of articles about the British government's plans to increase the strength of

the RUC. It had been mooted that the RUC would recruit police locally on religious grounds. In other words, Catholic officers would police Republican areas and only Protestants, Loyalist areas. Such a strategy was destined to increase the sense of religious segregation. The leak about the proposal was initiated by General Frank King who believed the policy it would cause great harm to the RUC. He also thought that the strategy was probably an initial step by Harold Wilson to disengage from NI.

Next on Cameron's list was a report that had appeared in The Times Diary on 24 September 1974 revealing that Army units had been



requested to report all contact with them during the previous two days. Wallace was not responsible for this either.

There was one charge against Wallace which can fairly be described as preposterous. It claimed that Wallace had called at

Fisk's home and furnished him with him photocopies of 'secret' papers about the UWC strike. What appears to have happened here is that a reporter from the 'Belfast News Letter' who knew Wallace gave him some documents which had been passed to him by an official at the NIO. They concerned the UWC Co-ordinating Committee. The reporter assumed that they contained disinformation intended for publication in the press to discredit the UWC strike. The journalist gave Wallace a copy of the documents because they contained criticisms of the way in which the Army had been handling the UWC strike. Wallace passed a copy of the documents to his superiors, who agreed that he should draw the attention of appropriate journalists to them to highlight that they were disinformation. It is likely that he gave a copy of these documents to Fisk and other reporters. The supreme irony here is that the documents were fictitious and therefore could not have been deemed 'classified'. The MoD, NIO and MI5 have never been able to identify the documents as official papers.

A subsequent report initiated by Sir Michael Quinlan of the MoD in 1989 referred to this matter and commented: 'the problem over this incident

was that no-one knew what these secret papers were'. It went on to say:

It is, of course, quite possible that the 'secret papers' were not classified SECRET and that they may not have been that damaging. That seems on the whole to have been Sir Frank Cooper's view. Cooper was the PUS at the NIO. In 1976 he became PUS at the MoD.

The final complaint related to a report which was published on 5 December 1974 by Fisk in The Times about computer-linked observation posts which had been installed beside the main roads in NI. Fisk told Wallace that he had obtained the information from someone who worked in telecommunications. Wallace subsequently passed details of that 'leak' to a senior officer in Army Intelligence at HQNI to prevent the further seepage of information from this source.

## **062. DIRTY TRICKS, SMEARS AND ABSENT WITNESSES.**

During the masquerade that purported to be a RUC investigation into Wallace, Peter Broderick, who worked with him on PSYOPS, told Det. Insp Cooke of the RUC that Col Geoffrey Hutton was Wallace's PSYOPS line manager. Yet, the RUC never interviewed Hutton. (Nor did the Hart inquiry which issued its report 2017).

The MoD terminated Wallace's employment on disciplinary grounds. Wallace appealed. He had no inkling that the most senior official – bar nobody – at the MoD and the D-G of MI5, Sir Michael Hanley, were participating in a conspiracy against him.

## **063. JAMES DUNNETT AND MICHAEL CARY OF THE MOD.**


The position of Permanent Undersecretary (PUS) at the MoD, i.e., the figure in charge of the ministry, has always been one, if not, the most sensitive posts in the British civil service. The PUS had access to details of Britain's most up to date military and scientific data, not to mention the nation's battle plans. The officeholder is heavily vetted and

scrutinised by MI5. In the wake of the Cambridge Spy ring debacle which featured two homosexuals, Guy Burgess and Anthony Blunt, MI5 became obsessive about the sex lives of civil servants with access to NATO, nuclear and other secrets, especially homosexuals.



The PUS at the MoD, 1969-74, was Sir James Dunnett. Infamously, he paid underage male prostitutes he picked up at Piccadilly Circus – ‘Dilly Boys’ – for sex. His reputation was shattered by his involvement with Vicky de Lambray, a transvestite male prostitute who stole his cheque book. De Lambray was put on trial in March 1983, for the theft, instantly igniting a media frenzy during which Dunnett’s name was made public.

It is impossible to imagine that the Metropolitan Police and MI5 did not know that Dunnett was an abuser of Dilly boys. That would mean that his bodyguards and the bobbies on the beat who sometimes arrested the men who preyed on the Dilly boys, never once spotted him lurking around Piccadilly Circus. The area was in the centre of London and the activity of the rent boys was conducted with little discretion.



Had any of the various Soviet intelligence services in London discovered his weakness, it would have opened him up to blackmail.

It is likely MI5 knew about Dunnett’s nocturnal habits. It is not inconceivable that they approached him, let them know what they knew, and told him they would not expose him, but that he would have to contact them immediately if anyone tried to blackmail him.

Dunnett served as PUS during part of 1974 and may have been involved in the plotting against Wallace. What is certain is that his successor became a key figure in the campaign to destroy Wallace.


Dunnett’s successor was a man called Michael Cary who ran the MoD,

1974-76. His record shows that he was deferential towards MI5 although it was attached to the Home Office, a separate department. His deference is evident from a letter he sent to the D-G of MI5 which will be examined in the next section. Why he jumped so readily to MI5's tune is a mystery.

The worst-case scenario is that MI5 did not have 'kompromat' with which to blackmail him and he was fully aware of {i} the rape of children at Kincora, Williamson House, Bawnmore and elsewhere and {ii} the value of this to MI5 and {iii} the existence of collusive assassination programmes, and was prepared to assist MI5 maintain these operations by destroying Wallace, an innocent man.

## **064. THE LETTER TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF MI5, MICHAEL HANLEY.**

Cary wrote a letter on 11 December 1974. It reveals malfeasance in public office and fraud on his part. He sent it to the Director-General of MI5, Michael Hanley. It describes a meeting he had just had with Jock Shaw. Shaw was the person who was going to chair Wallace's appeal against his dismissal.



The letter outlines how Shaw was prepared to reject the appeal without hearing both sides of the argument.

The letter from Cary to D-G Hanley is worth reciting in full so that its deeply mendacious nature can be absorbed.

Colin Wallace

*As you know, Colin Wallace has now been informed that he is to be dismissed and has told us that he intends to appeal. The next stage is that Wallace must present his case in writing to the Civil Service Appeals Board, who will forward it to the Department for comment and reply. (Our reply will be shown to him). There will probably then be an oral hearing. Wallace*

*appears for the moment to have abandoned his idea of briefing a solicitor and has gone instead to the 'IPCA's, who have I understand agreed to help him even though he is not a member.*

*In anticipation of this, I had a strictly private and personal word yesterday with Jock Shaw, the Chairman of the Civil Service Appeals Board. I started out by:*

- a. Rehearsing the charges against Wallace.*
- b. Outlining in the most general terms Wallace's connection with 'information policy' in Northern Ireland*
- c. Explaining that both the circumstances and the nature of the man made it possible that the hearing would be attended by damaging publicity.*

*I went on to say that I had asked Jock for this meeting for two reasons. First, while we had no wish to embarrass him by pressing on him information which did not relate strictly to the charges and would not be used in 'open court', the fact was that, as he had no doubt realised, the formal charge was merely the tip of the iceberg and, if he would find it useful, I would be prepared to consider arranging for him to have a briefing on the general background to the case. I added that the decision was not up to me since other Departments, such as the NIO, were involved but that if he were interested I would see what could be done.*

*Secondly, I said that I wanted to ask his advice about how the hearings should be handled in order to minimise the risk of publicity.*

*Jock Shaw, whose background in personnel security work enabled him without difficulty to read between the lines, reacted very helpfully indeed. On the first point, he said that it would undoubtedly be of assistance to him if he were able to be fully briefed on the background. As to the second point:*

*a. He said it was open to him to choose his two fellow Assessors. He had it in mind to pick those whom he had used for the [Redacted] hearing. Not only in his opinion where they are absolutely reliable, but also, and from our point of view even more important, he felt that if he, having been briefed on the background, asked them to take his word on its significance and relevance, they would do so.*

*b. He said that there was no formal understanding about hearings 'in camera', the problem never having arisen so far, but remarked that the Press had been excluded from the [redacted] hearing in which they had shown some interest. He offered to discuss this point further with [redacted] at the CSD. (I said that this would be very helpful).*

*c. He pointed out that because [redacted] had threatened to use the documents produced at the hearing in a book he was writing, legal arrangements had been made to limit the use of the documents to the appeal only. I doubt if this will be of much help to us, since our main worry is unattributable stories, but it may be worth bearing in mind.*

*The purpose of this letter then is to secure your agreement, and Frank Cooper's, to briefing Jock Shaw on the background to this case. What I have in mind – and he agreed – was that we should put together a dossier of the key documents and allow him to sit in a corner of my office and read it. He would not take the documents away, nor would he wish to (though it would also be most helpful if you could make available your Case Officer to answer any supplementaries).*

*The dossier should, I suggest, consist principally of the following items*

*a. Frank Cooper's letter to Douglas Allen of 25 September 1974 setting the investigation in train.*

*b. Frank Cooper's letter to me of 11 December 1974, together with the associated Security Service report and the report from*

*[Redacted].*

*c. The sensitive report of the exchange between Fisk and Wallace on 4 February 1974.*

*d. The HQ NI report prepared for Bernard Charlton and forwarded to me by the GOC and 15 April.*



*This approach may appear somewhat unorthodox but nonetheless there does seem to me to be a strong case for giving Jock Shaw access to the background in order to satisfy him that the Department's actions were not, as might be concluded from the overt facts of the case, an over-reaction to what could at its most serious be described as an individual error of judgement, but rather that it was the final step in a series of events which convinced us that, whatever Wallace's motives, we could no longer continue to employ him in public service. Conversely, I think there are virtually no risks involved. Certainly, insofar as the documents lie within my discretion, I am completely happy to act in this way. Jock Shaw is absolutely trustworthy and the information would not go beyond him. (I should say here that I hope everyone concerned will respect Jock Shaw's confidence*

*in the meeting which, to use his own words, 'did not of course take place').*  
*After Jock had returned to his office, he rang my Private Secretary to let us know that Wallace's letter to the CSAB stating his intention to appeal had now arrived and that, in his view, there would be merit in acting as quickly as possible. I should be glad to discuss with you and Frank Cooper should you wish.*

## **065. THE SMEAR WALLACE WAS IN THE UVF.**

An ingredient in MI5's plot to destroy Wallace was to portray him as a UVF terrorist. According to Peter Broderick

*A few days before Wallace's appeal, the chief of public relations for the MoD in London spoke to me on the 'phone. He told me: 'You know this Wallace chap is an active member of a militant volunteer force. He is an active terrorist, a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force.' The suggestion was laughable – that sort of thing would have been known about. It simply was not true.* [Sunday Observer 4 February 1990.]

Broderick also revealed that John Groves, his boss in London, told him that this was the 'real reason we want him out of the way':

*He told me that the charge of leaking the document to a journalist was 'just a convenient way' of getting rid of him. The clear implication was that I should bear this in mind when I spoke at the tribunal.*

When asked about this in February 1990 by the Observer Newspaper Groves, said:

*I have never heard of this before. It sounds like something Colin Wallace might invent; those two [Broderick and Wallace] got on rather well together.*

Groves was promoted to the position of Director-General of the Central

Office of Information before he retired from the civil service in 1982.

The real reason for the destruction of Wallace's career was, of course, because he was trying to expose Kincora and would not cooperate with the more excessive aspects of Clockwork Orange, namely the smearing of mainstream politicians including members of Westminster. He also had a shrewd idea that MI5 was involved in tearing down the NI Power Sharing Executive.

## **066. AN UNETHICAL SOLICITOR.**

Other smears may have been circulated. They certainly were later. A minute sent by the staff of MI5 at the NIO to Bernard Sheldon, MI5's Legal Adviser, on 29 November 1990, alleged that Wallace had a 'closer and occasionally more clandestine' relationship with Robert Fisk of 'The Times' 'than with other journalists'. That was not true.




Bernard Sheldon.

Sheldon was one of those to whom a copy of the letter from the PUS at the MoD, Michael Cary, to Hanley was sent. He knew that the case against Wallace was entirely bogus.

# 067. ‘.. LINKING THE MPS WITH LOYALIST PARAMILITARY FIGURES INVOLVED IN HOMOSEXUAL PROSTITUTION AT A CHILDREN’S HOME IN BELFAST’.

CONFIDENTIAL



HEADQUARTERS  
NORTH WEST DISTRICT  
Cuenden Hall Bamber Bridge Preston PR5 6AY  
Telephone Bamber Bridge Military  
Preston 35436

RECEIVED  
30 SEP 1975  
I.P.C.S.

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Cliff Crook Esq  
The Institution of Professional Civil Servants  
Northumberland Avenue  
London  
WC2N 5BS

Your reference  
Our reference  
Date 29 September 1975

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Dear Cliff,

Thank you very much for your letter of 26 September regarding the Appeal hearing on 6 October.

I am concerned that we have still not received a reply to my letter of 2 July to John Groves requesting access to the various documents listed. You will recall that when I had a brief interview with him on 11 February to seek guidance on what information I could give to the RUC about my work on psychological operations, he said that I should confine my comments to justifiable activities directed at the FIRA and not at loyalists. My concern now is that there may be an attempt by the Ministry to deny any form of official 'dirty tricks' organisation existed within the Security Forces. For example, in the Ministry's summary of my oral representations made to John Groves and Mr Fairbairn on 10 May reference is made in paragraph 3 to "actions" which I was asked to launch during the WWC strike. The word "actions" appears to have been used by WCD to conceal the fact that I referred to the attempts made by the Security Service to discredit various Loyalist politicians, including the Rev Ian Paisley, by the use of forged documents and by linking the MPs with Loyalist paramilitary figures involved in homosexual prostitution at a children's home in Belfast. I can fully understand why the Ministry would not want to put such information on record, but I wonder if evidence of that nature will be made available to the Board sub rosa. For example, will the Board have access to the statement I gave to Inspector [REDACTED] RUC?

After his dismissal in 1975, Wallace wrote to his former boss at HQNI. The letter referred to 'homosexual prostitution at a children's home in Belfast'. The relevant extract reads as follows:

*My concern now is that there may be an attempt by the Ministry [of Defence] to deny any form of official 'dirty tricks' organisation existed within the Security Forces. For example,*

*in the Ministry's summary of my oral representations made [at an employment tribunal] to John Groves and Mr Fairbairn on 10 May reference is made in paragraph 3 to 'actions' which I was asked to launch during the [1974 Ulster Workers Council anti-power-sharing] strike. The word 'actions' appears to have been used by MOD to conceal the fact that I referred to the attempts made by the Security Service [i.e. MI5] to discredit various Loyalist politicians, including the Rev Ian Paisley [of the DUP], by the use of forged documents and by linking the MPs with loyalist paramilitary figures involved in homosexual prostitution at a children's home in Belfast.*

## **068. WALLACE'S CLOCKWORK ORANGE NOTES AND A REFERENCE TO 'A PROSTITUTION RING SUPPLYING BOYS TO HOTELS IN BELFAST AND BANGOR'.**

Wallace has other documents to prove his case.

Wallace was asked by MI5 to assist Operation Clockwork Orange. Towards this end, he was provided with information which he recorded in his notebook. Forensic examination has proven that his notes are authentic. In December 1974 Wallace recorded the following:

*Joseph Mains may be extensively involved in a prostitution ring supplying boys to hotels in Belfast and Bangor. The hotels include: Girton Lodge, Park Avenue; Stormont; Europa and the Queen's Court in Bangor. [John] McKeague is said to use the Royal Avenue Hotel for the same purposes. Bearing in mind that the East Belfast UDA leadership use the Girton*

*Lodge and the Park Avenue for their meetings, it is simply [not] credible that they did not know what is going on there. Note: Mains has a brother in the RUC. He also has a questionable relationship with Belfast Corporation Welfare Chairman (Cardwell) and Legal Adviser (Young).*

3. Joseph Mains may be extremely involved in a paedophile ring supplying boys to hotels in Belfast and Bangor. The hotels include: Glisson Lodge; Park Avenue; Sturrock; Europa and the Queen Court in Bangor. McKeague is said to use the Royal Avenue Hotel for the same purposes. Security in and the RUC Belfast with landscaping use the Queen Lodge in the Park Avenue for their meetings, it is simply credible that they do not know what is going on there. Note: Mains has a brother in the RUC. He also has a questionable relationship with the Belfast Corporation Welfare Committee Chairman (Cardwell) and Legal Adviser (Young).



Wallace's Clockwork Orange notes and his September 1975 letter were furnished to the Hart Inquiry which produced a report in 2017. Judge Anthony Hart who led the inquiry clearly did not appreciate the significance of either. On their own – and at a minimum – they confirm that MI5 knew about the existence of a paedophile network involving Joseph Mains and John McKeague in Belfast and Bangor five years before it was exposed in the Irish Independent in 1980, yet did nothing to interfere with it. On the contrary, they continued to exploit it.

## **069. CHECKMATE.**

On 17 October 1975, Wallace's appeal came before Jock Shaw's bent Civil Service Appeal Board (CSAB) at the MoD in London.

Some of Wallace's superiors stood by him including those who worked in the overt public relations department of the British Army. Peter Broderick, the former Head of the Army Information Services told the appeal hearing that:

*I do not hesitate to say that Colin Wallace is the best thing that ever happened to Army Public Relations in Northern Ireland; that if it had not been for his talents, knowledge and efforts the*

*Army could well have lost the propaganda war; and I could not wish to meet anyone more dedicated to the Army than he was and, so obviously, still is. He acted resolutely and to effect against anyone – republican or loyalist – who was destroying his country.*

This was, however, never going to be enough to cut the mustard as Jock Shaw and his two hand-picked accomplices were merely going through the motions and had no intention of conducting a fair and transparent hearing.

Lt Colonel Jeremy Railton, the number two figure in the PSYOPS unit at HQNI, was meant to attend the hearing in London at the MoD. Wallace was represented by Cliff Crook, an assistant secretary of the Institute for Professional Civil Servants. He recalled:

*We were all awaiting [Railton's] arrival and then we were suddenly told that, due to an apparent lack of military precision, he had missed his plane, something to do with Belfast airport being fogbound. It was a gloriously sunny day on the mainland.*

Few knew better than Railton that the charges against Wallace were a tissue of lies because it was he who sanctioned Wallace to disseminate information to journalists. He also knew about Kincora and the links to the murder of Brian McDermott because Wallace had presented him with a report on these and other issues in the Brian McDermott Child Murder Memo. It is not clear why he went along with the plot against Wallace. Put simply, his connivance in the plot against Wallace ensured countless children were raped and abused for years to come.

## **070. WALLACE IS DESCRIBED BY SIR FRANK COOPER, THE TOP CIVIL SERVANT AT THE NIO AS A 'FESTERING BOIL'.**

The tribunal decided that Wallace's dismissal would be upheld but gave him the opportunity to resign and thereby save a little face.

It would provide some respite from this litany of deceit to imagine that Hanley and Cameron threw this tiny morsel at Wallace because they had guilty consciences. However, other less altruistic, motives were at play. Sir Frank Cooper, the PUS at the NIO referred to Wallace as a 'festering boil'. The comment was recorded by J. P. Waterfield of the NIO in a 'NOTE FOR FILE' dated 25 May 1976. He recorded Cooper's view that:

*4. The key to this festering boil, is, as Sir Frank Cooper said yesterday, for Wallace to get a job. The difficulty is that any job which requires PV (positive vetting) is clearly out. Nor would it be acceptable for him to come to NI in any quasi official capacity.*

Suffice it to say that without the stain of dismissal on his CV, Wallace would be able to secure a job. While seeking alternative employment, it would be very much in his interest to conceal the trouble he had just experienced. Also, it meant that if he secured a job, his time would be occupied and he would be less tempted to brood about what had happened to him. Overall, this meant he would be less likely to talk to his contacts in the press, of whom he had many.

## **071. FISK PUBLISHES A REPORT ABOUT TARA.**

On 19 March 1976 Fisk wrote a short piece about Tara in the New Statesman. Fisk described the 'army's account of their [i.e. TARA's] activities collated by an intelligence officer at Lisburn' [i.e. Wallace].

It is clear from a glance at the article that it was based on the 1973 Tara press briefing in which McGrath was described as a homosexual blackmailer.

Cameron was sufficiently alarmed by Fisk's article, that on 22 April 1976 he sent a report about it to MI5's HQ in London.

Cameron's report was addressed to 'Box 500', a coded reference to MI5.

*1. In an article in the New Statesman and team March 1976*

*about the extreme Loyalist organisation TARA (copy attached marked A) Robert FISK refers to 'the Army's account of their activities collated by an intelligence officer at Lisburn'.*

*2. The reference is almost certainly to a summary on Tara (held in the AIS records at HQNI. The information in the summary was no doubt drawn from G (Int) files at a time when the IP [Information Policy Unit] element within the AIS was working closely – too closely! – with G (Int).*

*3. WALLACE would have had access to the AIS file and I do not think there is much doubt that, also in this instance, he was Fisk's source.*

*4. The passages which have been underlined had been published in one form or another, previously.*

E - CLASSIFICATION

E



HEADQUARTERS NORTHERN IRELAND  
British Forces Post Office 825

Army Network Lisburn Military Post Office Lisburn 9211

E - SECTION DESIGNATION	E - FILE REFERENCE	Your reference
BOX 500		Our reference
Copied to: D - MIS DIRECTOR LOI		Date 22 April 1976

29/4

In an article in the New Statesman on 19 March 1976 about the extreme Loyalist organisation TARA (copy attached marked A) Robert RISK refers to "the Army's account of their activities collated by an intelligence officer at Lisburn".

2. The reference is almost certainly to a summary on TARA (copy attached, marked B) held in the AIS records at EQMI. The information in the summary was no doubt drawn from G (Int) files at a time when the IP element within the AIS was working closely - too closely! - with G (Int).

3. WALLACE would have had access to the AIS file and I do not think there is much doubt that, also in this instance, he was RISK's source.

4. The passages which have been underlined had been published in one form or another, previously.

E - SIGNATURE

SIGNATURE: I D Cameron

ENCL 3  
26 APR 1976  
E - FILE REFERENCE

Enc:

# 072. KEEPING THE NIO MINISTER IN THE DARK.



In 1975, Wallace and his solicitor met with his Member of Parliament, Roland Moyle. At the meeting, Wallace shared various documents with Moyle, including the Brian McDermott Child Murder Memo of November 1974.

Moyle was not merely Wallace's MP, he was also a minister in the NIO, 1974-76.

Hence, a senior government minister came into possession of papers which revealed that children were being abused and a child killer – the man who murdered Brian McDermott - was at large in NI.

The most senior officials at the NIO and MoD were alarmed at the contact between Wallace and Moyle. On 13 May 1976, the NIO wrote to Ewen Broadbent at the MoD. The letter was copied to the DCI in NI. It read as follows:



**Brian McDermott and his brother Edward.**

*Dear Ewen,*

*Following our talk, and my consultations with the FCO and within NIO, may I send you as you are away today, the enclosed "Note by NIO" of the position as we see it with our recommendations, and attached draft speaking notes which we advise that Sir Frank Cooper should use at the earliest opportunity with Mr Moyle.*

*2. We would prefer that your PUS did not go as far as is set out in the first part of para 8 of the speaking note unless this is*

*absolutely necessary to convince Mr Moyle. But we must leave it to your PUS to judge in the last resort what is necessary. The speaking note has been seen and agreed as drafted by the Head of the (DCI staff) in NIO.*

*3. For obvious reasons the papers are being held on a very restricted basis within NIO. Our PUS [at the NIO] is now generally aware of the case and is aware that I am writing to you. If any practical questions arise in my absence in Belfast until next Tuesday (redaction) is the best point of contact and could explain how I could be reached in Belfast at any time.*

*4. I apologise for any trespass on MOD's internal affairs in these papers, but I thought it might be helpful if I had a first shot, as a basis for any subsequent discussion. I am only too well aware that there may well be points involving MOD responsibility which you will want to correct.*

*5. Because of our vital interests, perhaps you would be good enough to consult NIO if any variations on our advice are proposed. In any case we would be grateful to be kept informed.*

*6. I might add that Mr Moyle has not said anything about his discussion with Frank Cooper in NIO, nor are we proposing to say anything to him.*

Unfortunately, the MoD did not spell out the nature of its 'vital interests'. A safe guess is PSYOPs, the Brian McDermott murder, knowledge of McGrath's sexual proclivities and military collusion with Loyalist paramilitaries.

On 25 May 1976, J. P. Waterfield of the NIO wrote a 'NOTE FOR FILE' which recorded the steps the NIO was taking to keep Moyle in the dark.

*I have now learned from [DCI redacted] that the information which Sir Frank Cooper said yesterday [the] MOD had received about Wallace being in touch with the Daily Mirror was specifically something which Mr [Chris] Ryder of the Sunday*

*Times had mentioned to an Information Officer at HQ NI. The information amounts to no more than Mr Ryder's understanding (how we do not know) that Wallace's is believed to have been in touch with the Daily Mirror with a view to a story.*

*2. I also understand (redacted) that Wallace has been considering whether, if it gets no change from Mr Moyle, he should approach the Secretary of State with a view to asking for his help.*

*3. We are continuing to say absolutely nothing in NIO to Mr Moyle and I did not mention it when seeing him on other matters at some length this morning.*

*4. The key to this festering boil, is, as Sir Frank Cooper said yesterday, for Wallace to get a job. The difficulty is that any job which requires PV (positive vetting) is clearly out. Nor would it be acceptable for him to come to NI in any quasi official capacity.*

*5. Sir Frank Cooper is going to take the next steps with Mr Moyle on the lines agreed. Meanwhile, we should continue to say nothing to Mr Moyle, nor will we say anything more to the Secretary of State who was acquainted with the story at the time of Wallace's dismissal but has not been involved since.*

Ryder's report to the 'Information Officer' was wrong. Wallace had not approached the Daily Mirror or any other newspaper.

If Moyle read the papers submitted to him, he failed to act upon them.

On 14 April 2015 Colin Wallace wrote to Tam Dalyell MP responding to several questions he had posed. In one of his replies, Wallace said:

*I later provided my solicitor with a copy of the handwritten version of the November 1974 memo which I had in my possession at the time I briefed my London solicitor, Graham Dodd (Blackheath), prior to meeting with Roland Moyle MP*

***in 1975. I did not have a typed version of the memo in my possession at that time. The handwritten memo was one of several documents in had in my possession in preparation for my disciplinary appeal hearing in 1975.***

If Wallace was a liar, he would hardly have exposed himself to an unnecessary denunciation from Moyle by fabricating such a response.

When asked about the issue in 1990 by Archie Hamilton MP and a minister at the MoD, Moyle said he recalled being approached by Wallace but not the substance of the approach. Moyle died in 2017.

## CHAPTER 6.

# MEN OF GOD: IAN PAISLEY, WILLIAM MCGRATH AND JOHN MCKEAGUE

### 073. WILLIAM MCGRATH WAS A MENTOR TO IAN PAISLEY.

In 1976 Ian Paisley traced Colin Wallace in England and quizzed him about the smear campaigns which had been run against him.

A lot of Paisley's trouble was connected to his long standing close ties to William McGrath. Paisley first met McGrath when he – Paisley – was 22 or 23, in 1949 through his involvement in the Unionist Association in the Shore Road area of Belfast. Paisley had moved into the locality to study at a bible college.



In later years, Paisley visited McGrath at Kincora. He did even after he had been told by one of his Church staff in 1973 that McGrath was a paedophile.

One of the former residents at Kincora, James Miller, who was at the home between 1976 and 1978, told the Hart Inquiry on 8 June, 2016, about these visits. Miller thought it ‘just seemed strange that [Paisley] was so friendly with Mr McGrath, you know’. [Day 210 page 75.]

After the eruption of the Kincora scandal in 1980, Paisley would pretend to have difficulty even remembering who McGrath was.

Had Paisley wanted to expose the Kincora scandal – and there is no reason to suppose that he did – his hands were tied behind his

back because of what McGrath knew about him, especially the bombings carried out during the campaign to unseat Capt. O'Neill as Stormont prime minister.

Paisley was nearly ten years younger than McGrath. The older man became a mentor to the young Paisley. McGrath perceived the Catholic Church as the instrument of the Antichrist and was determined to expunge it from the four corners of island of Ireland so that the Protestant community – which he believed was descended from the Tribe of Dan of Caanan, one of the Lost Tribes of Israel – could prevail. He perceived himself as a soldier in what he called the ‘battles of the Lord’. His self-anointed duty was to prevent the Pope ‘enslaving the people of God’, not just in Northern Ireland but throughout Britain.

Paisley came to share these views

## **074. PAISLEY WAS ALSO AN ASSOCIATE OF JOHN MCKEAGUE.**

Paisley and McGrath also knew John McKeague. The trio went back a long way: McKeague had once served as Paisley's bodyguard; McGrath was often at Paisley's side.

Paisley would be haunted by his association with them until the end of his life in 2014. To his last breath, he would maintain he had not known about the abuse at Kincora before it was finally exposed in 1980.



***Ian Paisley (right). John McKeague (left).***

Belying this, in October 1973 Valerie Shaw, a member of Paisley's church, informed him that McGrath was abusing children at Kincora. Paisley fobbed her off with empty promises to do something about it but failed to act. She denounced him in public in 1982.

Nonetheless, through a combination of bluster and compromised inquiries, Paisley weathered the Kincora storm.

## **075. A ROLLING MAUL OF LOYALIST ORGANISATIONS.**

Throughout his career Paisley was involved with a bewildering array of Loyalist organisations. The names of the groups matter little. However, the paramilitaries in them – who were also in Paisley’s orbit – are significant. They included:

- William McGrath, paedophile, member of Orange Order, Tara, UCDC; British agent and housefather at Kincora;
- John Dunlop McKeague, paedophile, sadistic torturer, serial killer, member of UCDC, UPA, UVF and Red Hand Commandos;
- Gusty Spence, Leader of the UVF; imprisoned in 1966 for the murder of Peter Ward, a Catholic barman in 1966. Forged an alliance with McKeague’s Red Hand Commandos in the 1970s;
- Billy and Eddie Spence (brothers of Gusty Spence);
- Noel Doherty, member of Orange Order, UPA, UVF, Orange Defence Committee and editor of Paisley’s Protestant Telegraph. He used to refer to Paisley as “our Moses”;
- Billy Mitchell, UPV, Tara and UVF.
- Alan Campbell, a leader of the Shankill Defence Association (SDA – forerunner of the UDA), and a member of Tara.



*Billy Mitchell*



## **076. PAISLEY AND NOEL DOHERTY.**

In 1966 Paisley and Noel Doherty instigated the

Ulster Constitution Defence Committee (UCDC). Concealed inside it, they organised a paramilitary branch, the Ulster Protestant Volunteers (UPV) which included former B Specials, McKeague, McGrath and Mitchell, and probably Alan Campbell.

Doherty became leader of the UPV. Under Paisley's instructions, he was charged with setting up 'cells' throughout Northern Ireland, and acquiring arms. A printer by trade, Doherty also oversaw the establishment of Paisley's Puritan Printing Press, which produced Paisley's literature, including his newspaper, the Protestant Telegraph.

## **077. PAISLEY'S PLOT AGAINST BRIDGE BUILDING NI PRIME MINISTER TERENCE O'NEILL**

In 1968 the Stormont prime minister of Northern Ireland, Captain Terence O'Neill, tried to persuade his fellow Unionists that if Catholics were given houses, jobs, cars and televisions, they might accept Stormont, and Partition would become permanent. 'He is a bridge builder, he tells us. A traitor and a bridge are very much alike for they both go over to the other side', Paisley thundered in response.

The animosity between Paisley and O'Neill dated back to the start of O'Neill's premiership in 1963. He had sinned grievously in Paisley's eyes by seeking a rapprochement with the Republic. Paisley, Noel Doherty, the Spence brothers, McGrath and McKeague would become the protagonists in a clandestine plot to topple him.



*Capt. Terence O'Neill (left; Colin Wallace (middle)*

## **078. PAISLEY, THE UPV AND UVF.**

The long-defunct UVF reformed in the 1960s. It became part of the plot to topple O'Neill.

On 21 April 1966, Paisley took Doherty and Billy Mitchell to meet a Loughgall farmer, James Murdock. It was later alleged that Paisley left the meeting to attend another one in Armagh, and that during his absence the three others discussed the supply of arms and explosives to the UPV.

In 1968 Noel Doherty was tried on bombing charges, convicted and sentenced to two years. On the day of his imprisonment, Paisley made a speech outside the prison in which he denied all knowledge of Doherty's offences before announcing that he was forthwith expelled from the UPV and the UCDC.

The UVF also publicly denied that Doherty was one of its members.

## **079. PAISLEY AND THE EXPLOSIVES AT LURGAN.**

Contrary to Paisley's posturing at the time, there are grounds to suspect he had been involved in the anti-O'Neill bomb campaign.

Before his imprisonment, Doherty and Billy Mitchell had been introduced to James Marshall, and a supply of explosives from quarries in Lurgan had been secured. The explosives would be used to cause explosions at a Castlereagh electricity station, Silent Valley Reservoir and another electricity station at Ballyshannon in County Donegal. The most intense period of UVF/UPV violence took place between 30 March and 23 April 1969. McKeague was deeply involved.

The objective of the bombing campaign was to make it look as if the IRA was responsible for it and thereby undermine O'Neill's authority. The bomb plotters wanted the public to believe that the IRA had smelt blood in the weakness of O'Neill's moderation. O'Neill resigned on 1 May,

1969. 'Either we live in peace or we have no life worth living', he told his party. These were prophetic words.

## **080. MCGRATH AND PAISLEY MEET THE NEW PM.**

An indication of McGrath's importance to Paisley at the close of the 1960s can be demonstrated by the fact he was at Paisley's side during the early hours of 14 August, 1969, after the eruption of the Battle of the Bogside in Derry. Paisley led a delegation to see the new premier, Major James Chichester Clark, who was monitoring events at the RUC's HQ at



Knock in Belfast. One of the delegation, Roy Garland, commented in 1982 that it was surprising that 'at the height of this violence McGrath, Paisley, myself and a man called Black from Armagh were talking to the Prime Minister, Major James Chichester-Clark about it...We were demanding that the B Specials be mobilised and a 'People's Militia' be formed'. Chichester Clark, however, was not interested.

Meanwhile, McKeague was leading rioters, arsonists and looters in a hate-filled rampage against Catholic homes in Belfast.

## **081. PAISLEY'S HUSHED WHISPER.**

Paisley, McKeague and McGrath continued to cooperate after the eruption of the Troubles.

On 10 November 1969, John McKeague, Samuel Stevenson and others were charged with a bomb attack at Dunadry, on 24 April 1969. Stevenson confessed and was charged with the unlawful possession of gelignite.

McKeague's trial took place before a jury in Belfast in February 1970. Stevenson, who had already been sentenced, was called as a Crown witness. He told the court that when he had been in the police station,

Paisley had visited him and whispered: ‘Did you talk?’.

Meanwhile, McGrath had circulated a document about the affair which the trial judge had to instruct the McKeague jury to ignore.

McKeague and his co-defendants were acquitted.

At some stage after this, the paths of McKeague, McGrath and Paisley began to diverge.

## **082. COLIN WALLACE, PAISLEY AND THE UVF.**

While stationed at HQNI, Colin Wallace learned that Paisley and Desmond Boal had been ‘closely involved in the reformation of UVF in mid 1960s with Gusty Spence’.

Paisley and Boal later went on to form the DUP.



Intelligence also reached Wallace at HQNI that Paisley had been present while Noel Doherty and Billy Mitchell had collected explosives in Lurgan.

Unfortunately for Paisley, McGrath knew about the events at Lurgan, something that undoubtedly enabled him to control Paisley in later years when he desperately needed help after the eruption of the Kincora scandal.

## **083. THE REASONS FOR THE UVF SPLIT WITH TARA.**



McGrath ran his own Loyalist paramilitary organisation called Tara. Roy Garland served as his deputy. Tara flourished for a while but it fell into decline after McGrath refused to deploy his troops during the August 1969 riots. Tara had enjoyed strong links with the UVF whose

members then began to lose faith in McGrath. Additional doubts were raised because McGrath was given to boasting about having links to British Intelligence.

UVF inquiries led them to conclude McGrath was indeed connected to one of Britain's intelligence services. McGrath's homosexual relationship with a British diplomat in Dublin in the 1950s may have served as his introduction to MI6 and kickstarted an arrangement wherein McGrath may have helped MI6 convey anti-Communist propaganda pamphlets behind the Iron Curtain on ships which docked at Dublin harbour.



The UVF decided to undermine McGrath by highlighting his homosexuality instead of denouncing him as a British agent. He was challenged by the UVF leader, Samuel 'Bo' McClelland, at a Tara gathering in 1971. According to Chris Moore, author of the 'Kincora Scandal': 'McClelland's questions were aimed at pressing McGrath into revealing whether or not he was homosexual. McGrath became embarrassed and responded by calling for McClelland to be 'drummed out'. The UVF leader stood up and called for his men to leave. They left, never to return'.

Tara took a battering but struggled on. A declassified British file dated 13 February 1976, which was furnished to the Hart Inquiry, revealed that a 'source' had alleged that Tara:

***Had been destroyed in 1972 by a smear campaign. They had then been 300 strong and included a number of UVF members. Now they were much smaller and of a higher calibre and were UVF's main rivals... McGrath (according to source) has long made a practice of exploiting other people's sexual deviations and Tara is vulnerable on this account. Paisley has expressed strong animosity towards McGrath.***

## **084. PAEDOPHILE SPIES IN THE ORANGE CAMP**

In June 1971 McGrath, a man with a well-deserved reputation as a sleazy sexual predator, secured a job at Kincora. Moreover, he did so without any type of welfare training or experience. His only qualification was as hairdresser.

McKeague, who had become a British Army informant in the early 1970s, was almost certainly blackmailed into becoming a full-blown agent of MI5 in 1976. There is a significant difference between an informer and an agent. An informer is someone who maintains a lot of control over what he does, whereas an agent normally acts in accordance with commands from above.

As the 1970s dragged on, McGrath and McKeague would become increasingly sharp thorns in Paisley's side because of their links to MI5 and MI6, and their addiction to abusing children.

It was probably McGrath who passed on the information about Paisley's involvement in the collection of the Lurgan explosives to the British, i.e., the information that reached Wallace at HQNI.



## **085. THE IPU'S INTEREST IN TARA.**

Whatever about MI5 and MI6 – which are both civilian organisations – William McGrath was not a British military intelligence asset. Indeed, he became a target of British Army psychological operations designed to destabilise Tara. They are described elsewhere in this book.

Colin Wallace believes he 'first became aware of Tara in 1971...From a military perspective, Tara posed no real threat to the Security Forces at that time. My initial interest in Tara was that some former members of the Ulster Protestant Volunteers were allegedly attending its meetings.'

## **086. WALLACE IS TOLD TO IGNORE KINCORA BECAUSE IT WAS ALREADY THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERATION BY ‘OTHER PEOPLE’.**

Wallace believes he first learnt that McGrath was a child molester in early 1972 after he met a social worker who told him “that she had a young boy in her charge who had claimed that he had been “sexually assaulted” at Kincora. She went on to say that:

*There had been other similar claims involving other inmates and that, although the matter had been reported to the police, no action had been taken. She asked if I could, through Army channels, get the police to investigate. She appeared to be very distressed about the situation and asked that her identity should not be disclosed. I was given to believe that she was particularly worried because key members of the welfare department which ran Kincora were involved and ‘might take reprisals against her’. She also explained that one of the staff at Kincora ‘was a prominent figure in Ulster politics’. This man she identified as William McGrath.*

Wallace reported the conversation to one of the Intelligence staff at Lisburn after he returned to his office. He asked

*if the matter could be raised with the RUC through our liaison channels. Some days later the officer to whom I had given the information came to my office and said that I should leave the matter alone because it was already the subject of consideration by ‘other people’. I did not regard this as unusual because similar situations arose quite frequently when interest by one intelligence group could quite easily damage an operation which was already in progress. Also, at that time the information was of more significance to the police than it was to the Army.*

## **087. VALERIE SHAW TELLS PAISLEY ABOUT KINCORA.**

In October 1973 Valerie Shaw, a member of Paisley's church, informed him that McGrath was abusing children at Kincora. Paisley fobbed her off with empty promises to do something about it.



There were probably others who alerted him but it was all to no avail. From this point on – if not long before – Paisley had to live with the fact that a witness – if not a congregation of them – existed who could reveal that he knew about Kincora.

## **088. WALLACE BRIEFS AGAINST MCGRATH.**

Meanwhile, during the summer of 1973 Wallace had been instructed by his superiors 'to brief the press unattributably about McGrath's sexual preferences, his use of blackmail to force young people into homosexual practices, and the fact that he 'runs a home for children on the Upper Newtownards Road'.

The briefing which Wallace gave to journalists such as David McKittrick and Kevin Dowling in 1973 is explained elsewhere in this book.

## **089. FURTHER LINKS BETWEEN PAISLEY AND TARA.**

Wallace adds that by 1973: 'The PSYOPS unit had acquired a significant amount of additional information about Tara'. They were 'aware that a number of prominent Tara members were closely linked with the Rev Ian Paisley'. These included:

- James Heyburn, Secretary of Paisley's church;
- Hubert Nesbitt, who provided the land on which Paisley's church was built;
- David Brown, Deputy Editor of Paisley's Protestant Telegraph.


## 90. TARA AND THE RUC.

Tara had supporters in the RUC. According to Wallace:

*We also had information alleging that serving members of the RUC not only attended Tara meetings, but also were involved in the running of the organisation. There were indications that McGrath was obtaining Intelligence information from the RUC on Republicans and there were even claims that RUC stations in East Belfast had supplied Tara with firearms which had been surrendered to the police by members of the public. I do not know how reliable the latter information was, but it was sufficient to make the Army very wary of the RUC when dealing with Tara-related information.*

## 091. CONFIRMATION OF WALLACE'S CLAIMS.

As described elsewhere in this book, Kevin Dowling of the Sunday Mirror and David McKittrick of the Irish Times confirmed they received briefings on Tara from Wallace.



Furthermore, on 13 March 1977, the Sunday Times published an article entitled: 'The Army's Secret War in Northern Ireland' by David Blundy. It reported that at a British Army briefing in 1974:

*at which a Sunday Times reporter was present attempts were made to link Paisley with the Protestant para-military group called Tara, a small, obscure and ineffective group as Ulster's para-military organisations go. The Sunday Times has a copy of an army intelligence summary on Tara which contains accurate details about its organisation...One member, which the summary names, is called a 'homosexual' and has conned many people into membership by threatening them with revealing homosexual activities which he had initiated.*

The paper believed the purpose of the briefing was:

*to link Paisley with homosexuals and Communist sympathisers... Our sources say that the army has produced three anonymous documents on this theme which circulated in Belfast.*

## **092. THE IPU ATTEMPTS TO STRIKE A BLOW AGAINST PAISLEY.**

According to Wallace the first IPU ‘planned attempt to discredit Paisley’ by linking him with McGrath took place in 1974. It ‘was an attempt by the Army to weaken the power of the Loyalist paramilitaries’ during the Ulster Workers Strike (UWC) which was aimed at toppling the Sunningdale-inspired Power Sharing Government. However, the Army ‘plan was not put into action during the strike because of the adverse reaction of the RUC to the Army operation which led to the arrest of quite a few figures in those paramilitary organisations’.



There were subsequent operations against McGrath and Tara. Wallace believes they ‘were initiated by the Army because of the threat he posed to the political process and to the discussions between Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries. I think Paisley was a target at times because he kept changing his stance on key issues.’

Wallace has also revealed that the British Army/IPU was supplied with forged share certificates and a bank account in Paisley’s name which indicated he had made a substantial purchase of shares in Canada with misappropriated funds. Wallace believes the fabrications were manufactured by Intelligence sources in London because the Army in NI had neither the knowledge nor the skills to produce them.

Unfortunately for the smearmeisters in London, Wallace was ‘unhappy about the political nature of the material I was being given and did not show those items – or any of the other political material – to journalists at that time. Clearly, someone else was circulating them. I did send copies to Mrs. Thatcher in 1990 in the hope that she would initiate a proper investigation.’ However, no one from the Government ever contacted him as a result.

In 1990 Michael Taylor, who also worked at Lisburn, confirmed the existence of the forgeries: ‘I saw forged documents, for instance that the Reverend Ian Paisley had a bank account in Canada.’

### **093. AN MI5 PLOT TO MURDER PAISLEY.**



On 28 April 1987 the Guardian newspaper reported that MI5 had contemplated murdering Paisley in the early 1970s as part of its campaign to break up and discredit the Loyalist powerbase, ‘according to a former civilian intelligence operative who worked in Northern Ireland at the time’.

The Guardian also reported that the ‘allegation was supported yesterday by Mr Paisley who told the Guardian that he had been tipped off about the plot by an army intelligence officer’.

Wallace also spoke to the Guardian in 1987 and was able to point to a letter he had written to Thatcher in November 1984 which had included an account of how an MI5 officer had asked him to produce an analysis of the likely reaction in NI to the assassination of certain ‘prominent leaders in various scenarios’. While this was not particularly unusual, Wallace told the paper, this ‘project was, however, significant (with hindsight) in that it put forward inter alia, the hypothesis that the Rev Paisley might be killed in a Loyalist internal feud involving a homosexual vice ring and the misappropriation of Loyalists’ funds’.

## **094. THE LETTER WHICH DESCRIBED THE ATTEMPT TO LINK PAISLEY TO ‘HOMOSEXUAL PROSTITUTION AT A CHILDREN’S HOME IN BELFAST’ FIVE YEARS BEFORE THE KINCORA SCANDAL ERUPTED.**

After Wallace was shunted out of Lisburn, he engaged in a correspondence with the MoD. One letter from 1975 refers to the attempts ‘made by the Security Service [i.e. MI5] to discredit various Loyalist politicians, including the Rev Ian Paisley, by the use of forged documents and by linking the MPs with Loyalist paramilitary figures involved in homosexual prostitution at a children’s home in Belfast’.

## **095. PAISLEY MEETS COLIN WALLACE IN LONDON.**

In early 1976 Paisley had become convinced that the NIO – which acted as a front for MI5 and MI6 – was plotting against him. Wallace has revealed that:

*In 1976, a member of Ian Paisley’s church contacted a member of my family and said that IRKP (i.e. Ian Kyle Richard Paisley) wanted to get in touch with me because the press had told him that the Army had been attempting to discredit him and that I had been identified as being involved in that activity. In 1976 I was living in London, having left Northern Ireland in February 1975.*

Wallace and Paisley ‘met briefly near Parliament’. Wallace recalls that Paisley ‘began by clearly referring to the material that I had given to the press in 1973/74 relating to William McGrath and Tara. I confirmed that I had briefed the press about McGrath and Tara, but that he and a few other individuals we referred to, such as the Rev Martin Smith [the Head of the Orange Order], were simply mentioned as being people whom we believed were aware of the sexual abuse allegations relating to McGrath.’



Paisley then proceeded to tell Wallace that ‘he had it on good authority from a source at the NIO that a Foreign Office psychological warfare team at Stormont was engaged in

a project to discredit him and key members of the DUP’. Paisley then ‘asked me what I knew about such a committee and I told him that I didn’t know anything because I had been away from Northern Ireland for more than a year’.

The meeting ‘lasted only a few minutes and I never heard from him again’, Wallace has explained.

## **096. PAISLEY WAS ‘VERY WORRIED’ ABOUT THE HOUSEFATHER AT KINCORA.**

Wallace also says that:

*Looking back on it, I find it interesting that Paisley was clearly aware of the potential danger of his association with McGrath. He didn’t discuss the matter with me in any way, or volunteer any information, he just asked me questions about the briefings I had given to the Press about McGrath and about the [NIO] Information Coordinating Committee.*



Wallace ‘got the distinct feeling that Paisley was almost frightened of McGrath, or the extent to which McGrath could damage him’.

In February 1976 Paisley told the House of Commons that a smear campaign against him and other Loyalists was afoot. He specifically referred to the Jeremy Thorpe affair, a scandal which had involved an

allegation that Thorpe, the Leader of the Liberal Party, had hired a hitman to kill Norman Scott, his former – and much younger – lover. This indicates that Paisley anticipated smears of a sexual nature.

In the 1980s, Paisley would pretend that he severed all links with McGrath after 1973 on account of what Valerie Shaw had told him about McGrath's proclivities. This, however, is belied by the fact Paisley officiated at the wedding of McGrath's daughter, Elizabeth, on 22 January 1976.

Irrespective of the charades being performed in early 1976, actual steps were being taken by the DUP to place a distance between itself and Tara. According to a declassified NIO cable dated 7 December 1976, 'the DUP had decided that members of the paramilitary organisation, Tara, who were also members of the DUP should be forced to resign from the party' and that 'Peter Robinson (Secretary of the DUP) would produce a list of other [DUP] members who are members of Tara. These persons will be dismissed in due course'.

## **096A. PREACHER ALAN CAMPBELL, MEMBER OF TARA, PAEDOPHILE AND CHILD KILLER.**



Preacher Alan Campbell was an important figure in Tara. Like Paisley and McGrath, he was a British Israelite.

He was the RUC's chief suspect in the murder of Brian McDermott, a ten year old boy who was abducted in 1973.

Colin Wallace produced an internal memorandum about the killing and the links to the abuse network that revolved around Kincora.

Campbell was protected from arrest by MI5 - undoubtedly by Ian Cameron - because he was an MI5 agent.

The Wallace document is referred to in this book as the 'Brian McDermott Child Murder Memo'. It is discussed elsewhere in this book.

The murder of Brian McDermott is the darkest and most foul secret of the entire Troubles.

The murder of Brian McDermott is the most shameful secret in MI5's history.

The cover-up of what happened to this child is still taking place. A TV production company called Alleycats uncovered new evidence about the murder. A documentary was scheduled for release on BBC NI in May

# CHAPTER 7.

## THE KINCORA COVER-UP.

### 097. THE CASKEY COVER-UP.




In January 1980 The Irish Independent in Dublin finally exposed the rape of the residents at Kincora.

The RUC now set about covering-up the role of the police and intelligence services in the scandal.

A key figure in this was RUC Det. Chief Inspector George Caskey. He led a variety of investigations into Kincora until 1985.

Caskey was a deceitful and wily operator. As noted earlier, in November 1974 Wallace had submitted a memo about Kincora – the Brian McDermott Murder Memo - to his superior, Col Geoffrey Hutton. It was a handwritten document. Wallace kept a photocopy which his solicitor had typed up in 1982. It was duly handed over to the RUC. Caskey responded by claiming that two typewriters had been used in its creation. This was largely irrelevant – as the original was handwritten. Few people realised that the original document had been handwritten. Hence, Caskey's bombast gave him a purported reason to dismiss the '74 memo as a forgery.



Caskey was not even telling the truth about the use of two typewriters. The late Paul Foot, a renowned investigative reporter, commissioned a

forensic reports from two independent document examiners (Radley and Davis) who confirmed only one typewriter had been used.

000-000 of SUBJECT 1 - 1483      ACTION      Number 4

Reporting Unit: District 1 - Cooke  
 Other name of Officer or Employee: \_\_\_\_\_

NATURE OF ACTION

Conner Dixon B. Roberts Essex  
Police re Harold's notes for handing  
over documents re x 703

See file \_\_\_\_\_      Index \_\_\_\_\_

ALLEGED TO

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Sex: \_\_\_\_\_ Age: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Sex: \_\_\_\_\_ Age: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Sex: \_\_\_\_\_ Age: \_\_\_\_\_

RESULT OF ACTION  
 (Fill with facts in case)

21 February 1974. Telephone Dixon Roberts re documents re alleged notes of the RUC. He stated he had produced a photostatic copy that had been removed from the original document and photostated. Various things had been crossed out by Harold in pencil. The source stated he did not think he got the document from a very high so well placed source. He advised he believes that Wallace advised he should submit the documents. Could be removed. He also believes that Wallace was aware that Harold was producing these documents to the police.

Caskey pretended that the Brian McDermott Murder Memo of November 1974 Kincora memo was in a typed format. It wasn't. It was hand written by Wallace. Next, Caskey pretended that the typed up version was a forgery because two typewriters were used to create it. That was also a lie.

Caskey and the RUC knew that the typed version of the November 1974 memo was a copy of the handwritten document, not the purported original. It was typed up for reading convenience. The Special Branch of the Essex Police told the RUC as much in this memo to DI Cooke of the RUC.



**098. FORGED AND FRAUDULENT WITNESS STATEMENTS ABOUT THE BRIAN McDERMOTT MURDER MEMO OF NOVEMBER 1974. ANOTHER INSTRUMENT IN CASKEY'S DIRTY TRICKS TOOLBOX WAS THE MANUFACTURE OF**

## **FRAUDULENT WITNESS STATEMENTS.**

One statement was prepared but never signed by a colleague of Wallace. The forgery was presumably prepared but never presented to him as it became clear he was close to Wallace and was not prepared to lie. He will be referred to as Michael Schneider (not his real name). An unsigned copy of his 'statement' was furnished by the Hart Inquiry to Schneider decades later.

The fabricated and fraudulent Schneider statement contained a brief resume of his career including the fact that he had: 'worked as an Information Officer in the Ministry of Defence in Northern Ireland from 1972 until 1976. The exact dates I am not sure.'

Schneider in fact worked at this post until December 1975, a date of which he was well-aware. Presumably, the prevarication in the statement was designed to make him look indecisive and provide ammunition to undermine him if it became necessary to do so later.

Schneider's relationship with Wallace was introduced next: 'Whilst at Northern Ireland I (worked) with the chap called Colin Wallace'.

Schneider says that he would never have used a word such as 'chap'. The phrase is, however, typical of the type of language used by the upper class type of Englishman that MI5 and MI6 employed.

Significantly, Schneider's alleged description of Wallace did not include any reference to his PSYOPS role although Schneider was well aware that Wallace carried out psychological operations:

*Colin Wallace and I were serving as officers in the army cadet forces and this is where my contact with Wallace was initiated. Initially Wallace and I were both [illegible] same grade but later in my service with MoD, Wallace was promoted to Senior Information Officer. Wallace was at no time answerable to me and we were both involved at a level in similar work.*

The statement also conceals the important fact that Schneider had access

to intelligence files at Lisburn. Indeed, he knew about the abuse at Kincora because he had read some of the files that were flowing into Lisburn about the home. Yet, in the forged statement the very opposite picture is painted. Schneider has described the next passage to me as a ‘blatant lie’, namely:

*I have been asked if I ever heard about Kincora Boys’ home in my/any capacity whatsoever. I have never seen any official document to my knowledge, on Kincora boys’ home although I do recognise as a result of the situation that prevailed in Northern Ireland at this time, it may have been discussed verbally. If Wallace may have discussed Kincora with me, I cannot remember any specific detail.*

The lies which Schneider has described as ‘balls’ kept flowing:

*The names McGrath and [John] McKeague mean something to me, although I cannot connect McGrath with any verbal conversation regarding Kincora. I did not know that McGrath worked at Kincora boys home but his assumed association with the Protestant Military Organisation called ‘TARA’ was on record.*



The overarching purpose of the forgery emerges next: an assertion designed to undermine the authenticity of a document entitled “‘TARA’ – Reports Regarding Criminal Offences Associated with the Homosexual Community in Belfast’ dated 8 November 1974 which was written by Wallace. This document, quoted earlier, revealed a deep knowledge of the abuse at Kincora. According to the forged Schneider statement:

*I have been shown a document marked EGM3 by Detective Inspector ... ‘To my knowledge I have never seen this document before’.*

Schneider was never presented with the Brian McDermott Murder Memo by anyone in the RUC – nor anyone else – to ascertain if he had seen it. Had they done so, he would have told them precisely what it was they did not want to hear: that he had seen it. Not only that, he had seen other documents relating to Tara while at Lisburn including a 1973 press briefing which Wallace had shown to a number of reporters.

RESTRICTED STATEMENT OF WITNESS

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] KINCORA

AGE OF WITNESS AS OF 31<sup>st</sup> Dec 1973: 37YR 03M

OCCUPATION OF WITNESS [REDACTED]

ADDRESS [REDACTED]

I declare that this statement consisting of [REDACTED] pages, and I, [REDACTED] make the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it known that it is intended as evidence in a preliminary enquiry or at the trial of any person, and I shall be liable in law if I have wilfully stated in it anything which is false or which I believe to be false.

Dated this 19th day of June 1980

Signed [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Signature of witness as stated in statement was received by me [REDACTED]

I worked as an Information Officer at the Ministry of Defence in Northern Ireland from 1973 until [REDACTED] when I was [REDACTED] years. It may well have been March 1973. I was [REDACTED] in September 1975. On completion of this duty I was posted to [REDACTED] where I worked until September 1979. Whilst at Northern Ireland I [REDACTED] with a chap called Colin Wallace. I knew Colin prior to my [REDACTED] time in Ulster, for about three years prior. I resided in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] from 1962 until I left in 1966. I worked at the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] from 1966 until I went to work with [REDACTED] Colin Wallace and I [REDACTED] serving as officers in the Army Cadet Force and [REDACTED] to meet my [REDACTED] with Wallace was [REDACTED]. Initially Wallace and I were both [REDACTED] same grade but later in my service with [REDACTED] Wallace was [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Senior Information Officer. Wallace was at no time subordinate to me and we were both involved on a level in similar work. I have been asked if I ever heard about Kinross Boys [REDACTED] in my capacity whatsoever. I have never seen any official document, to my knowledge, on Kinross Boys [REDACTED] even although I do recognise as a result of the situation that prevailed in Northern Ireland at this time, it may have been discussed verbally. If Wallace ever knew [REDACTED] Kinross Boys [REDACTED] me, I cannot remember any specific details. The names McHutch and McEwan mean something to me, although I cannot connect McHutch with any verbal conversation regarding Kinross. I did not know that McHutch worked at Kinross Boys [REDACTED] time, but his assumed association with the Protestant Military Organisation called "SAB" was on record. I have

Form 30-38

Signature of witness [REDACTED] Signed [REDACTED]

## 099. THE CASKEY WITNESS STATEMENTS.

A highly successful tactic in the cover-up of the trafficking of Kincora boys to men who were not working at the home, was to take statements from victims who had only been abused by the staff members at Kincora. These statements became the glue that would hold the Kincora lie together for decades to come, at least in so far as official inquiries were concerned.

Caskey and his team traced 104 of the 245 former residents of Kincora, or at least that was what they claimed. According to Caskey's team, 46 boys complained they had been abused, but allegedly only by the staff at the home.



***According to all the inquiries into Kincora, Richard Kerr (bottom left) was in Northern Ireland when this photograph was taken.***

Richard Kerr, a former resident, is dyslectic. He signed a statement without even knowing what was in it. Kerr had been trafficked to Manchester, London and Venice London while at Kincora in the 1970s. In more recent times, Kerr has provided researchers with photographs taken of him in London and Venice.

A string of victims has since told stories about how they were trafficked, i.e., proof of the existence of a ‘vice ring’. Gary Hoy has described how he was trafficked around Belfast. The late Clint Marcy described how visitors came to the home, some of whom had English accents. James Miller told the Hart inquiry how he and a busload of boys had been abused in Bangor. As early as 1982 a boy told the BBC’s Spotlight programme that he had abused by a senior NIO official. The individual was Peter England, a senior NIO official.

Yet, Caskey was only able to find boys who had been abused by the staff

at the home.

At least one boy who had been abused was intimidated by McGrath and a group of men. The boy was told to remain silent. Bearing this fact in mind, it is fair to speculate that others were threatened in order for them to submit misleading statements.

## **100. CASKEY'S GAME**

Caskey, a native of the North, played all sorts of cat and mouse games with the Englishmen from MI5, MI6 and the NIO, over the Kincora scandal.

It seems his aim was twofold: {i} to protect the RUC which had played a role in protecting the paedophile network of which Kincora was a part and {ii} to let the Englishmen know that the RUC had 'kompromat' on them should they ever decide to betray them.

MI5 was suspicious of Caskey and did not let him interview Ian Cameron of MI5, the man who had {i} halted Capt. Gemmell's investigation into McGrath and {ii} destroyed Colin' Wallace's career. Cameron knew the minutes details of the Kincora scandal.


## **101. SIR GEORGE TERRY OF THE SUSSEX POLICE BELIEVED SOME OF THE RAPE VICTIMS HAD DERIVED 'A MEASURE OF SEXUAL SATISFACTION OR PLEASURE' AT KINCORA.**

On 18 February 1982, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, James Prior, told Parliament that the Chief Constable of the RUC, Sir Jack Hermon, has asked 'Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary to appoint the chief constable of another force to investigate allegations about the way in which the police have conducted their inquiries' into the abuses into Kincora. It was absolutely clear from that statement the RUC would, themselves, be under investigation.

The chief constable appointed by HM Inspector of Constabulary was Sir George Terry, Chief Constable of the Sussex Police, and that he was actually 'the preferred choice of Hermon. He was not, therefore, a truly impartial investigator. It was also the Sussex police under Terry who, two years earlier, had investigated the events that led to Colin Wallace's wrongful conviction.

The RUC officer appointed to assist Terry's 'independent' investigation was Caskey.

The alleged purpose of Terry's 1982 investigation was to establish if the RUC or intelligence services had questions to answer about Kinchora. At the time, the press was awash with allegations that the RUC had known about the abuse of the children but had not lifted a finger to help them.



Terry ruled out the existence of a vice ring, trafficking or any knowledge of the abuse on the part of the RUC, MI5 or MI6.

His explanation for the length of time it had taken for the scandal to surface was addressed at paragraphs 30 and 31 of his report. One of the reasons was that the victims had derived pleasure from being raped. He stated:

*In homosexual offences, however, the victim is usually embarrassed and frequently feels some personal guilt or shame, but in a few cases also shares a measure of sexual satisfaction or pleasure.*

*As a consequence victims of homosexual acts are considerably less likely to make a formal complaint and even less inclined to tell others what had occurred; often even close friends of victims will be unaware of the offences committed because the victims will want to conceal from them 'their guilty secret'.*

As the foregoing quote also demonstrates, Terry was unable to distinguish between child rape and homosexuality.

None of this explained why numerous complaints to a variety of agencies – including the RUC – had been ignored.

Terry told one palpable lie: he claimed he had received the full cooperation of the MoD. At the time the MoD was acting as gatekeeper to Ian Cameron. Cameron had ordered one of his subordinates, Capt. Brian Gemmell, who had discovered was going on at Kincora, to drop his inquiries into William McGrath. Yet, when one of Terry's investigators tried to talk to Cameron, the MoD blocked access him. Terry's investigators had wanted to ask Cameron questions about the obstruction of Gemmell's inquiry.

This obstruction cannot be equated with full co-operation.

The fact that Terry lied about the co-operation of the MoD in his report, however, implies that even if he or his investigators had reached Cameron, he would have accepted whatever implausible excuse Cameron might have disgorged.

Significantly, the Hart inquiry of 2017 – for all its many staggering failings – at least managed to criticise this particular part of the Terry Report.

The deceit of Terry became an embarrassment to the people responsible for the ongoing Kincora cover-up, i.e., the Cabinet Office, the NIO, PSNI, MI5 and MI6. Recently, the press was told that all copies of the report had disappeared. A copy of the document, however, can be read and/or downloaded on the Covert History Ireland website.

## **102. TERRY KNEW THE RUC HAD NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO INTERVIEW CAMERON EITHER.**

Terry became aware that MI5 had protected Cameron from Caskey too.

Terry was told what Cameron allegedly would have said to Caskey had

the RUC man managed to reach him. Terry was provided with this account at a secret meeting which took place on 27 January 1983, at the County Police Headquarters at Lewes in Sussex at 12.30 a.m. Three people attended it: Terry; Bernard Sheldon, MI5's solicitor; and Terry's 'Staff Officer', Det. Chief Inspector Flenley.

On 3 February, Sheldon wrote a 'NOTE FOR FILE' in which he recorded that he had explained to Terry why:

*b. CASKEY'S attempts to interview CAMERON and the reasons why he had been unwilling to authorise CAMERON to make a statement. I said that it was my understanding that the RUC had been informed that CAMERON agreed that he had received a report in general terms alleging that McGRATH was a homosexual, that he would have told GEMMEL that he should make no further enquiries in this field and that neither he nor anyone else in that part of the intelligence machine under our control had passed information to the police. CAMERON regarded the information as gossip and the searcher information about Tara as too sensitive to be handled by the Army.*

This process was the rough equivalent of a police officer being asked to investigate a crime involving child abuse, yet being told by the chief suspect that he could not interview him. Instead, the suspect was directing the police to accept the veracity of a hearsay account from the suspect's solicitor. Furthermore, that the account was not going to be tested by even the most elementary line of questioning.

### **103. TERRY AND CASKEY KNEW ABOUT THE 1973 TARA PRESS BRIEFING**

Terry discovered that journalists had been briefed by Wallace about McGrath and Tara.

It surely occurred to him that if Wallace was aware of the activities of McGrath and Tara, MI5 must have know a lot about it too.

Sheldon's 'NOTE TO FILE' recorded that Flenley stated at the meeting held on 27 January 1983 - which Terry attended - that:

*CASKEY had been informed by press sources that Colin Wallace [redacted] had told them many years ago about the homosexual goings on at Kincora. Apart from this there was no actual evidence to establish the involvement of Civil Servants or of any Army cover-up.*

This was a fact of enormous significance that should have been followed up by Terry but was not.

#### **104. TERRY AND JAMES MILLER.**

If Terry discovered anything about the attempt of James Miller, the ex-paratrooper, to spy on Tara, he left it out of his report.

Was the file on Miller and Tara given to him?

If not, why not?

#### **105. TERRY AND CASKEY KNEW ABOUT GEMMELL**

Sheldon's 'NOTE TO FILE' also reveals that Terry knew that Caskey had conducted an 'interview with GEMMEL in July 1982'.

Terry did not pursue this line of enquiry either, or if he did, he left it out of his report.

#### **106. MI5'S DISTRUST OF CASKEY.**

It is clear that MI5 was distrustful of the RUC, especially Caskey. Terry and his team shared this view.

Sheldon noted that Flenley had a hostile opinion of Caskey. He recorded that

*d. CASKEY was in his view a very ambitious officer who took care to mix with the right people. He thought he was solely motivated by his own self-interest and by his desire to get on. He did not think that he was influenced by any anti-British or anti-intelligence sentiment. This might now be true of some other RUC officers.*

## **107. INFORMATION ‘TOO ‘SENSITIVE’ EVEN FOR THE BRITISH ARMY. WHY THEN CALL IT ‘GOSSIP’?**

At the meeting with Terry in Lewes, Sheldon told Terry that Ian Cameron regarded the information Capt. Gemmell had passed to him as ‘as gossip’. Yet he then said that it was ‘too sensitive to be handled by the Army’.

Gemmell had reported that McGrath was engaged in sexual activities with minors. Yet, if it was just tittle tattle, why was MI5 also maintaining that it was ‘too sensitive’ for the ears of British military intelligence?

This does not make sense.

It makes more sense to treat this part of the discussion as one where the group was talking in a code they understood, and Sheldon was being careful about what he was recording in the file.



A more realistic reading of this part of Sheldon’s ‘NOTE TO FILE’ is that the information was not in fact gossip and was highly ‘sensitive’ because it related to MI5’s ‘kompromat’ operations and the recruitment of Loyalist paramilitaries such as the serial killer and paedophile, John McKeague.

Unfortunately, Sheldon did not elaborate on the ‘too sensitive’ nature of the information.

There is yet another dimension to the sensitivity of the data: Tara was importing guns from Holland for Loyalist gunmen with the assistance of an ‘undersecretary’ at the NIO. This will be discussed in a later section of this book.

Why did Sheldon of MI5 feel at ease in discussing the fact that there were some secrets that were ‘too sensitive’ for the Army with Terry if Terry was truly an independent investigator?

## **108. MI5 AND THE DOCUMENTS THAT CONCERNED WILLIAM MCGRATH, TARA AND THE MURDER OF BRIAN MCDERMOTT.**

Elsewhere in his ‘NOTE TO FILE’, Sheldon told Terry that:

*... c. CASKEY was being given a surprising degree of access to members of the Army some of whom had actually produced classified files for his inspection.*



The implication of this is that Caskey might find out secrets which could embarrass MI5.

Sheldon must have had {i} the 1973 press briefing on McGrath and {ii} the Brian McDermott Murder Memo of November 1974, in mind among others.

## **109. WHO WAS ALLEGING A ‘SECURITY SERVICE’ (I.E. MI5) COVER-UP?**

MI5 was concerned that Caskey had spoken to a witness who had claimed that an MI5 cover-up was in progress. MI5 is referred to as the

‘Security Service’ in this part of the Sheldon’s ‘NOTE TO FILE’

Why would this concern an institution with nothing to hide?

Why was this discussed at a secret meeting with a so-called ‘independent’ investigator?

Did MI5 not fear that Terry might take up this lead?

Surely, if Terry was a truly independent investigator, this is what he would have done.

Yet, he did nothing.

All of this raises the probability that Terry real assignment was to protect MI5, especially if it came to a show down with the RUC.

Sheldon’s note recalls that:

*i. CASKEY’S interview with [redacted] on 11 January and his references to a Security Service cover up. I said that I understood that there had now been a further interview with Lt Col WATSON at which CASKEY had made similar remarks,*

There is no indication that Terry followed up these leads.

It is not known who was alleging a cover up as the ‘NOTE TO FILE’ released to the Hart/HIA inquiry is redacted.

The Hart (HIA) inquiry which reported in 2017 did not follow up this matter either.

## **110. CASKEY’S EXPLANATION FOR THE SIN OF CARRYING OUT A ‘FULL’ INQUIRY.**

One of the oddest entries in Sheldon’s note relates to a discussion by the parties at the meeting on 27 January about why Caskey was carrying

out a thorough inquiry. It is as if it was deemed strange that a policeman wanted to do his job. The bizarre discussion was recorded by Sheldon as follows:

b. In making his enquiries Supt CASKEY had been influenced by the fact that the successful prosecution of McGRATH and others in connection with KINCORA had been stimulated by allegations in the press. As the press had made similar allegations about the involvement of the UK Civil Servants and about an Army cover up CASKEY did not wish to appear before any judicial enquiry without having carried out a full investigation. CASKEY had been informed by press sources that Colin Wallace [redacted] had told them many years ago about the homosexual goings on at Kincora. Apart from this there was no actual evidence to establish the involvement of Civil Servants or of any Army cover-up.




It is more likely that Caskey was gathering information on behalf of the RUC to {i} find out the extent of the exposure of the RUC; {ii} to gather information which could be used as an insurance policy, i.e., if the

RUC ever needed to force the hand of MI5 or the British government, it was useful to know what had really happened at Kincora; and {iii} collect material which could be released to an inquiry in a selective and self-serving manner on behalf of the RUC and, if there was no falling out, for the benefit of MI5 as well.

Caskey certainly found out a lot about what had happened about Kincora and covered it up, as described earlier.

### **III. THE HUGHES INQUIRY OF 1984, TERMS OF REFERENCE CHANGED BEHIND PARLIAMENT'S BACK.**



The worthless witness statements taken by Caskey and his team were relied upon by yet another investigation, one undertaken by Judge Hughes. He produced a report in 1984 which failed to get to the truth.

Hughes was originally assigned to investigate media reports of links between British Intelligence and Kincora. James Prior, NI Secretary of State, stated as much in the Commons. Secretly however, Hughes' terms of reference were changed to prevent him from doing this. Prior hid this from Parliament.

On 18 January 1984, Prior told the House of Commons that the next step in the Kincora scandal would be an enquiry led by a judge which would look at the failure of the RUC:

**I believe that it would be within the inquiry's terms of reference to examine why no inquiry was instigated before 1980. This goes to the heart of much of the concern expressed in Northern Ireland. (Ref: Hansard House of Commons Debate 18 January 1984 vol 52 cc319-26.)**



W. Boys Smith of the NIO drew up a memo on 30 June 1983, which was copied to several individuals including Sir Philip Woodfield, the permanent undersecretary at the NIO, and the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence (DCI) at the NIO, Hal Doyne-Ditmas, a member of MI5. It stated at para 2 that Doyne-Ditmas was 'worried about the likely intrusion of the inquiry into intelligence matters if the terms of reference were as wide as those we had in mind....'

Crucially, there was a reference to 'secret work very close to politicians'. At paragraph Para 3, Boys Smith revealed that:

Mr Sheldon (MI5's legal adviser) echoed the DCI's concern about

information being given to the tribunal which would not be in the interests of the intelligence services. He was also concerned about what would be said about secret work very close to politicians. If these activities were to be revealed – through leak if not through public session of the inquiry – there could be a brisk reaction. He pointed out the political embarrassment to be caused to the Secretary of State by any such revelations, quite apart from the difficulties they might cause those engaged in secret work.

What ‘secret work very close to politicians’ was taking place that could have been of interest to an inquiry into child sex abuse?



The most likely answer is that this was a reference to MI5 and MI6’s secret files on members of the DUP (such as the ‘Wife Beater’) and the Official Unionist Party members (such as James Molyneaux MP and Knox Cunningham) not to mention

Enoch Powell, all of whom were child abusers.

At paragraph 5 (ii) Boys revealed that ‘The Security Service would prefer a GB judge’. (The Security Service is another name for MI5.)

Prior did the bidding of MI5 and Judge William Hughes, an English judge, was asked to conduct the inquiry. Was Prior so depraved that he was prepared to protect a paedophile network which would continue to rape children for decades to save MI5/6 from censure? Alternatively, did MI5 have blackmail material on him?

Para 6 of the Boys’ memo revealed an assumption on the part of Boys that MI5’s unethical lawyer, Bernard Sheldon, ‘might want to suggest [an] inquiry limited to the child-care aspects (presumably therefore under the NI Powers, not the 1921 Act) or a 1921 Act inquiry with terms of references limited in the way suggested above.’

At no time did Prior make it clear either to Parliament or to the public that the Hughes Inquiry was neither required nor empowered to inquire into the performance of the police and intelligence services in relation to the scandal.

When Judge Hughes set out the terms of reference for his inquiry at a public meeting on 3 May 1984, he made no reference to any such restrictions.

Put simply, the desired outcome of MI5 prevailed. Prior's sleight of hand produced a castrated probe under the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Act Order 1972. Even the terms of reference for it were subsequently watered down to the extent that it became impotent.

If, as the intelligence services claimed, they had no involvement with William McGrath of Kincora, the paramilitary organisation he commanded (Tara), Kincora itself, or with abuse at other homes, why would a 1921-type Tribunal 'not [have been] in the interests of the Intelligence Services'?

Finally, what 'political embarrassment' could be caused to 'the Secretary of State by any such revelations.'?

Surely, if the intelligence services had no connections with the individuals involved in the sexual abuse, the concerns listed by MI5 were groundless and would not, therefore, have materialised at a 1921 Tribunal?

A number of key questions yet need to be answered: who authorised the changes in the Hughes Inquiry's terms of reference? Why was Parliament not informed of those changes? What was the justification for those changes? Aside from John McKeague and his ally and fellow paedophile Alan Campbell, who were the 'extreme Protestants' that MI5 was protecting?

When Hughes reported, nothing about the role of MI5 was uncovered despite a mountain of evidence that would have been available to him otherwise.

The following men were complicit in this deception: Sir James Prior, Sir Jack Jones, the Director-General of MI5; Hal Doyle-Ditmas the DCI at the NIO; Philip Woodfield the Permanent Undersecretary at the NIO and his counterpart at the Home Office. There were many others in London

such as Lord Robert Armstrong, Brian Cubbon and David Goodall, Thatcher's Cabinet Intelligence Coordinator who share the guilt.

## **112. CASKEY PLAYS CAT AND MOUSE WITH MI5.**

Chris Ryder was the best friend the RUC had in the media. He wrote a book about the force, praising its professionalism and integrity. He and Caskey were friends.



MI5 and the Terry investigation were suspicious about links between Ryder and the RUC. At the meeting attended by Sheldon, Terry and Henley, it was noted by Sheldon that:

**f. FLENLEY had interviewed Chris RYDER after the article in The Sunday Times of 5 December 1982. Although RYDER made no admissions that CASKEY had been a source, FLENLEY had little doubt that this was the position. He had learned that RYDER had had a meeting with CASKEY in the week before publication (I gathered that meetings between these two were either unknown or very rare).**

That story was about Kincora. It reads like a warning shot across the bows of MI5 that it had a lot to be concerned about. It was entitled: 'Ulster how homosexuals were used.'

The first paragraph must have been alarming for MI5: backspace. It read as follows:

*British intelligence officers in Ulster used homosexual politicians in the early Seventies to gather information about extreme Protestant groups because they did not trust the integrity of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.*

Ryder returned to the subject five years later in a bizarre story about Sir Maurice Oldfield, the Chief of MI6, 1973-78, and Co-Ordinator of

Intelligence, 1979-80. It appeared in The Sunday Times, on 26 April 1987. Oldfield was dead at the time. At this juncture, pressure was mounting at Westminster for a full judicial inquiry into Kincore. Ryder's piece claimed that a drunken Oldfield had been involved in 'an incident' in the toilets of The Highwayman, a public house in Comber, Co. Down, in 1980. It was alleged that the victim of his attention had complained about his behaviour.

## Ulster: how homosexuals were used

by Chris Ryder

BRITISH intelligence officers in Ulster used homosexual loyalist politicians in the early Seventies to gather information about extreme Protestant groups because they did not trust the integrity of the Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch.

At that time male homosexuality was still a criminal offence in the province and the politicians were easily compromised. One politician used in this way was William McGrath, founder and leader of an extreme loyalist group called 'The IRA'. McGrath is now serving four years in jail for a series of homosexual assaults on boys in his care while he was housemaster of Kincore boys home in East Belfast.

But, despite knowing of his homosexuality and his employment, the intelligence community attached to the Northern Ireland Office from the security service and military intelligence did not alert the welfare authorities or the RUC.

This is one of the findings in reports for the Northern Ireland secretary, James Prior,

which are now being compiled by the police. Even by Northern Ireland standards, it will make bizarre reading.

The scandal takes its name from a bleak public-run boys home called Kincore in East Belfast. A year ago, three male staff members were jailed for homosexual assault.

Sentencing them to terms of between four and six years, the Lord Chief Justice, Sir Robert Lowry, spoke of the "loathsome and perverted" behaviour of the staff. McGrath was known as the "beast of Kincore" to the RUC officers investigating the affair, which had gone on for 20 years.

Prior asked for the RUC to extend its criminal investigation of the homosexual allegations and agreed with the RUC chief constable, Sir John Hermon, to call in an English police team led by Sir George Terry, chief constable of Sussex, to examine the way the affair developed and why nothing was done about it for so long. Terry was also asked to examine allegations that police files on the affair had disappeared.

The RUC traced more than 300 of the 400 former inmates of Kincore and other homes where homosexual abuses had taken place. Detectives travelled to mainland Britain, Europe, and Canada to interview witnesses.

During these interviews two political figures were mentioned. One of them was John McKeague who played a prominent part in the sectarian disturbances in Belfast in 1968.

But soon after he was interviewed by the RUC and reported that he would be warned to the DPP for alleged homosexual offences, McKeague was murdered on 29 January last. Last evening a call to Downtown Radio claimed that the killing was the work of the Republican Irish National Liberation Army.

This claim is doubted, however, and detectives believe McKeague was murdered to keep him quiet.

In the period before his death McKeague, a bachelor

had frequently threatened to expose others. But he never acted on what he had intended.

The other politician interviewed by the police was a 70-year-old bachelor, Joss Cardwell, a former Stormont MP and a long-serving member of Belfast city council. On April 29 this year, Cardwell was found dead on the front seats of his car in the garage at his Belfast home.

At an inquest in July the coroner decided he had died from carbon monoxide poisoning caused by car fumes and said the death was "inexcusable".

But Cardwell had also been mentioned during the Kincore investigation and his role as chairman of the council welfare committee, responsible at one time for running the Kincore home, had come under scrutiny.

But the most controversial exposure in the reports will concern the private wars between the RUC special branch and military intelligence in the early 70s and the parallel war within the Army HQ at Lisburn between the "Psychological Operations" team, and the


Army Information Service, which ran the press desk.

In the private intelligence war, the Army and the security services ran their own operations because they distrusted the RUC special branch information about loyalist activities. The "Propps" team had access to this intelligence and used some of it, through leaks to journalists, to discredit certain figures.

But such tactics were causing friction within the Army HQ, where an influential group of senior officers argued for a straightforward release of information and for an end to black propaganda which they believed was doing serious harm to the credibility of the Army and the government in its efforts to find a political solution to the Ulster problem.

Some politicians fear that Prior will now come under pressure to close the affair without holding the promised judicial inquiry, which could reopen scantly-healed wounds within the security forces and give the Provisional IRA a propaganda field day.

Ryder did not speak to a single person who had worked at the pub at the time.



Bob Parker of Channel 4 News, however, tracked down each and every person who had, and they all denied any knowledge of the alleged incident.

The police at a local and national level also denied it had happened.

While Oldfield's sexual preference was for younger boys, the article by Ryder was a piece of fiction. Caskey was probably using Ryder to send the spooks a warning: they had as much to hide as the RUC if the real truth were ever to merge. Moreover, Oldfield was an MI6 officer who had been despised by MI5 before his death in 1981, hence an attack on him was not a declaration of war. (MI6 is attached to the Foreign Office. MI5 is part of the Home Office.)

Ryder looked like a clown after the Channel 4 expose. The embarrassment he suffered can only have deterred other journalists from looking at the squalid story of spies and paedophiles.

A judicial inquiry was not commissioned into Kincora, the anti-Wilson plot, or other linked issues, despite the best efforts of an array of British Labour party MPs including Kevin McNamara, Chris Mullin and Ken Livingstone. Why did MPs in Labour and other parties lack their courage? Were they gullible? Compromised? Did misplaced patriotism spark a desire to protect MI5's reputation? Did they lack courage? Were some of them simply opportunists who were concerned about their career prospects?

The events described up to this point take this story to 1987. In the meantime, the life of Colin Wallace had collapsed into ruination. The dirty tricks that lay behind this development will be described in the next instalment of 'An Orchard of Bad Apples'.

## CHAPTER 8.

# FRAMING COLIN WALLACE FOR MANSLAUGHTER.

### 113. THE HOME SECRETARY (FORMER NI SECRETARY) AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER.



*William Whitelaw.*

On 7 July 1980, Jeff Edwards of London's Evening News, revealed the Metropolitan police had passed files to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). Twelve men faced up to 350 sexual offences including allegations that they had 'obtained young boys for politicians, prominent lawyers and film stars'. The youngest victim was six-years of age.

A few days later, Edwards was summoned by the police to an interview and threatened with prosecution under the Official Secrets Act.

Mysteriously, the prosecution of the twelve men did not proceed.



Edwards' source, a serving Metropolitan police officer, was disciplined and fined for leaking the story.

It is believed that the then Home Secretary and de facto Deputy Prime Minister, William Whitelaw, ordered a senior Metropolitan Police officer to quash the investigation. Whitelaw was the political master of MI5 at this time and must have acted in concert with them in quashing the prosecution.



Whitelaw was very close to the intelligence services. He had served as NI Secretary of State in Belfast, 1972-73, where he had worked cheek by jowl with them. MI5 and MI6 worked in the same building as him, Stormont Castle. He spent much of his time drinking late into the night with Allan Rowley of MI6, the first DCI (overarching NI spymaster) after the introduction of Direct Rule. Whitelaw used MI6 to arrange face to face truce negotiations with the IRA in 1972.

It is inconceivable that DCI Rowley did not know all about the Kincora operation. The odds are high that Whitelaw learnt about it as a component of Operation Clockwork Orange too as he was central to the Sunningdale negotiations and was in receipt of frequent briefings from Rowley about the opposition to the Power Sharing Executive by Loyalists. Whitelaw left NI in December 1973, shortly after the agreement was signed.

## **114. MEN WITH A LOT TO LOSE.**

Whitelaw's deputy in 1972-73 was William Van Straubenze MP. It has since emerged that he was a paedophile.



In the early 1970s, the orphans and abandoned children at Kincora, Williamson House and Bawnmore stood no chance of rescue from their sexual enslavement with the likes of Heath (a paedophile) as prime minister, Whitelaw (a protector of abusers) as NI Secretary and Van Straubenze

as his deputy, aided and abetted by MI5 and MI6.

Two of the most senior NIO officers in the 1970s, Peter England and John Imrie, were abusers too. Peter England abused boys ensnared by the paedophile ring that MI5 and MI6 was protecting. One of them, JLB, described his ordeal to the BBC. England had a conviction for exposing himself in a toilet in London, as did Imrie.

A lot of very powerful people had – and continued to have – a vested interest in concealing the truth about Kincora.

## **115. WALLACE TALKS TO THE IRISH TIMES SHORTLY AFTER THE KINCORA SCANDAL ERUPTS.**

Colin Wallace was about to walk into the lion's den.

In January 1980, three members of the staff at Kincora, William McGrath, Joe Mains and Raymond Semple, were suspended after The Irish Independent exposed the abuse at Kincora on the front page of the newspaper on 24 January 1980.

Mains, McGrath and Semple were charged on 3 April 1980.

Wallace was unaware of the Kincora shock waves that were reverberating around Northern Ireland as he had taken up residence in England after his dismissal from the British Army in 1975.

He did not become aware of the development until February 1982 when he was named in Parliament by Gerry Fitt as someone with information about the scandal.

In March 1980, David McKittrick, the Northern editor of The Irish Times, contacted Wallace. He was one of those who knew about McGrath:

*A British Army Intelligence operative told me in 1975 [sic] that William McGrath, one of the figures in the Kincora boys' Home case, was a homosexual. He and other sources also told me that McGrath was the head of Tara, a shadowy extreme Loyalist organisation. .. My information came from Colin Wallace, who was at that time chief civilian, press officer at Army headquarters in Lisburn, Co Antrim, and who had links with Military Intelligence. ... My notes of a conversation with Wallace in army headquarters in 1975 show that he said McGrath was head of Tara, and organisation of evangelical Protestants which had called for the banning of the Catholic Church and for all education to be carried out by evangelical Protestants. He also gave me McGrath's East Belfast Address and his telephone number. [Irish Times 17 December 1981]*

[Wallace actually provided the information in 1974.]

When he contacted Wallace in March 1980, McKittrick said he wanted to come over to London to talk about the contents of a book written by Colonel Robin Eveleigh who had served with the Army in NI. Wallace met him at the Washington Hotel in London.



McKittrick did not mention Tara or Kincora.

McGrath, Mains and Semple were charged on 3 April 1980.

McKittrick called Wallace again in early April 1980 and said that he wanted to come back to meet him for a further discussion on the Eveleigh material.

During the April 1980 discussion, Wallace provided McKittrick with some information about intelligence rivalries in NI and the plotting against Harold Wilson in the 1970s which McKittrick included in an article on British intelligence in the Irish Times on 22 April.

It would not have been difficult for MI5 to have figured out that Wallace was one of McKittrick's sources. They routinely tapped journalists' phones and had access to flight records. They now knew Wallace was prepared to talk to the media about intelligence matters, including the anti-Wilson plotting. In their eyes, Wallace stood as a lethal threat to their reputation, especially as suspicion about an intelligence dimension to Kincora was gaining traction with the press.

Wallace could talk to a journalist about Kincora at any given moment.

The worst case scenario was that one of the journalists who knew about the 1973 Tara press briefing, would contact him about the Kincora scandal.

MI5 was blessed with luck that McGrath was not on McKittrick's horizon. Nonetheless, they must have feared that McGrath's name might yet ring a bell with McKittrick, especially with forthcoming court appearances.

## **116. WILLIE WHITELAW AND HOWARD SMITH, THE FORMER UK REPRESENTATIVE TO NI, 1971-72, WHO WAS NOW THE D-G OF MI5.**

Unfortunately for Wallace, MI5 was now commanded by two individuals who were as ruthless as any of their predecessors: Howard Smith, the Director-General of MI5, 1978-81, and his deputy, John Jones.



**Howard Smith of MI5. He reported to Home Secretary Willie Whitelaw, seen here with Margaret Thatcher.**

Space does not permit a thorough review of Smith's career. For present purposes, it is worth noting that in the 1960s, while in the Foreign Office, he had recommended the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the Prime Minister of the Congo to the British government. Ted Heath was a minister at the department at the time, and on the distribution list of Smith's assassination recommendation. Lumumba was murdered in 1961 in a joint CIA-MI6 plot.

Smith spent most of 1971 and some of 1972 as the British government's envoy, or UKREP, to NI, and was undoubtedly aware of what had taken place at Kincora. His neck was now on the line in a very real way. As luck would have it, his political boss in 1980 was William Whitelaw, the Home Secretary, whom he knew well from Belfast where the pair had worked together during 1972. Smith was the first man Whitelaw met in NI as Secretary of State. Smith had collected Whitelaw from the airport on his first trip in his new proconsular capacity.

Whitelaw is an overlooked figure in the Kincora scandal. Thatcher appreciated his ability to fix difficult problems. He was her 'Minister for Banana Skins'. 'Every prime minister needs a Willie', she once said. Whitelaw's main task was to scan the political horizon for problems that could blow up into crises and recommend early action to avoid them. He had developed this skill as Tory chief whip in the 1960s when he had exploited the Whip's 'Dirt Book' to blackmail MPs who were refusing to

toe the party line. (See section 007.) Some of those in the dossier were paedophile MPs.

Is it likely that MI5 withheld their strategy for dealing with Kincora from Whitelaw?

## **117. JOHN JONES, THE MAN WHO TOOK CARE OF MI5'S DIRTY WORK.**

John 'Jack' Jones was the man who took care of MI5's dirty work at this time.



*MI5 was based at 140 Gower Street (on the left, now demolished) 1976-94. John Jones, D-G of MI5 1981-85, occupied an office on the 6th floor.*

According to Christopher Andrew – the official historian of MI5 – Howard Smith, was perceived inside MI5 as someone who had a ‘distaste’ for some of the operations MI5 were carrying out. One of his senior officers told Andrew that Smith was resented for the manner in which ‘he kept far away from A Branch and left it all’ to his deputy, John Jones, who was a former Director of A Branch. According to this source,

Smith regarded 'it all as dirty work'.

A Branch was responsible for surveillance. It had been involved in the observation and sexual blackmail of a Soviet diplomat called Oleg Lyalin.

Jones undoubtedly knew about the various 'kompromat' operations in NI. They had been conducted in the early 1970s while he had been stationed there. Jones and Peter Wright were probably responsible for the surveillance of the Clockwork Orange paedophiles, including the bugging of the bedrooms in the Park Avenue Hotel in Belfast where Joe Mains and John McKeague lured surveillance targets to bedrooms where they had sent boys.

## **118. FRAMING WALLACE FOR THE DEATH OF JONATHAN LEWIS.**

Wallace might have been murdered by one of the Loyalist assassins at MI5's beck and call – such as McKeague – but for an opportunity that arose, apparently out of the blue, to demolish his credibility: Jonathan Lewis, one of his friends, went missing on 5 August 1980. His body was recovered from the river Arun three days later.

Wallace had nothing to do with the death of Lewis, yet he ended up on trial for it.

Dirty tricks were used to secure his conviction.

When Lewis' body was found in the Arun, his skull was damaged. At least some, if not all, of the injuries were inflicted by the propeller of a boat which had become entangled with the corpse. Dr Ian West, a Home Office pathologist, performed the initial post mortem on 8 August and failed to detect anything untoward. The post mortem reported: 'No foul play suspected'.

On 12 August West changed his mind. He now discovered an injury to Lewis' nose which he had apparently missed despite the fact it was – quite literally – staring him in the face.



*Dr Ian West (left) and Jonathan Lewis (right).*

On 18 September Wallace was charged with murder by the Sussex Police.

His trial opened on 3 March 1981. The key piece of evidence against Wallace was provided by Dr West. He now alleged that the blow which had killed Lewis had been administered by a martial arts technique Wallace had learnt as part of his military training. West later confessed that an American security source had fed the notion to him. Yet, in Court he presented it to the jury as if he had expert knowledge of the topic.

MI5 is a department of the Home Office, the same parent body which employed West.

The American 'security' official was undoubtedly an American intelligence officer. US intelligence works hand in glove with British intelligence. American intelligence officers had been involved in the anti-Wilson plot back in the mid-1970s, and this would account for their interest in Wallace.

## **119. AMANDA METCALFE.**



Amanda Metcalfe saw Jonathan Lewis in the pub where she worked on the day he died. Lewis was in the company of a man, but he was definitely not Wallace. Crucially, this meeting took place after the time the police claimed Wallace had killed Lewis. She was able

to describe perfectly the clothing Lewis had worn.

On 20 March 1981, the jury, however, was persuaded that while Wallace was not guilty of murder, he had committed manslaughter.

## **120. THE MYSTERIOUS FIGURES FROM KAYMAR.**



Wallace was portrayed in the press as the ‘Karate Chop Killer’. Photographs of him in military attire were furnished to the press. The mystery about these photographs has never been resolved. In 1979 Wallace had been asked to pose for a series of photographs in his parachute uniform and equipment for Kaymar Studios. The photographs

surfaced at his trial to reinforce the image of him as a soldier and martial arts expert. The people who commissioned the photographs had disappeared. No one knows who they truly were.


## **121. PAUL FOOT.**

In June 1998, a former Special Branch officer who was familiar with the Wallace case wrote to Paul Foot, author of the book, 'Who Framed Colin Wallace', saying:

*I sincerely believe that Colin Wallace was 'fitted up' by members of the*

*Establishment embarrassed by the events*

*described in the early part of your book [i.e., Kincora and smear campaigns]. I do not suggest for a moment that any Sussex Police officer involved in this enquiry was corrupt, because I do not believe they were, but I feel there was a hidden agenda, and that the senior officers knew a lot more about the matter than they would ever care to reveal.*



The most senior of these officers was Sir George Terry. A few months later, he was asked to conduct an 'independent' inquiry into Kincora.

## **122. RIVALS IN THE ANTIQUES TRADE.**

If Lewis was murdered, as it appears he was, his slaying might have been perpetrated by rivals in the antiques trade. Evidence which pointed in this direction was suppressed by Terry's officers.

If Lewis truly died due to foul play, it follows that Sussex Special Branch and MI5 helped his killer, or killers, get away with murder by diverting the police in the direction of an innocent man.

## **123. DET. SUPERINTENDENT GORDON HARRISON.**

Det. Superintendent George Harrison was one of the senior Sussex Police officers who investigated Wallace during the Jonathan Lewis inquiry. He was subsequently asked by Terry to help him carry out his inquiry into Kincora.

As noted earlier, Terry and his team had asked the MoD to let them talk to Cameron but were rebuffed. In his written report, Terry claimed that he had received the full cooperation of the MoD during his investigation. His exact words were that the military had ‘been very frank’ with his inquiry. That lie was exposed in 2017 by the Hart Report.

Harrison does not seem to have made any protest about the misleading allegation about the MoD in his superior’s report.

It is not known what Chief Inspector Dick Flenley, another Sussex police officer on Terry’s team, made of the lie.

## **124. THE MAN AT FORT MONCKTON.**



*Fort Monckton.*

The operation to frame Wallace for the death of Lewis was probably overseen by Ian Cameron with the assistance of the Deputy D-G of MI5, John Jones.

D-G Smith was undoubtedly aware of what was afoot but, if he remained true to character, left it to Jones and his subordinates to carry out the dirty work.

Cameron was stationed at MI6's training school, Fort Monckton, in 1980, and available to help, if not direct the anti-Wallace campaign.

## **125. IN MI5, CRIME PAYS.**

In 1981, Thatcher and Whitelaw chose John Jones to become Director-General of MI5.

As D-G, Jones once extended a slimy invitation to a senior Garda officer to go on a 'tour' of the red light district of Soho in London. Thankfully the invitee, an assistant garda commissioner, declined. Had the Irishman accepted the invitation, it is likely that Jones would have given the green light to an operation to lure him into the clutches of prostitutes with photographers on standby. This is exactly what the Garda officer believed was afoot. He felt that Jones was sleazy and untrustworthy. The experience reinforced the Irishman's preference for dealing with Scotland Yard which had responsibility for countering the IRA in Britain.

This was hardly the first time Jones extended such an invitation to a visiting VIP.

## CHAPTER 9.

# NO MUZZLES ON THE DUBLIN MEDIA

### 126. FRANK DOHERTY VISITS WALLACE IN PRISON.

The Kincora scandal was broken by The Irish Independent, a newspaper in the Republic of Ireland in January 1980.

A cover-up was designed by the NIO, MI5, MI6 and the RUC to plug the leaking Kincora dam. One of the aims was to hoodwink the public into believing that the boys at Kincora had been abused by the staff – and exclusively the staff - who had worked there and never fed out to a wider ring.



Chris Moore, author of The Kincora Scandal, learnt that the State's paramount concern was that the links between Kincora and Britain would be exposed. Allegations that Lord Louis Mountbatten was involved in the abuse of boys in NI have since emerged. Other VIPs such as Sir Anthony Blunt, Keeper of the Queen's Pictures, and Peter England and John Imrie, both senior officers at the NIO, were implicated too.


Moore discovered a document about personal security which linked Peter England to Kincora.

Frank Doherty wrote for the Sunday World, Magill magazine, the Phoenix and the Sunday Business Post. He was one of a number of journalists who dug beneath the surface of the story. Others included Ed Moloney, Andy Pollock, Paul Foot and, of course, Chris Moore.

Doherty reported in The Phoenix on 16 September 1983 that:

*The Karate Chop killing seems more like fiction than fact. Capt. Colin Wallace, as a key figure in the British intelligence Psy Ops (psychological warfare) unit, was responsible for much of the black propaganda passed to newsmen in the Seventies. Among those who have admitted that he was a source for their material are Irish Times former Northern Editor David McKittrick (Wallace was the source for his lengthy Irish Times series, 'British Spies in Ireland', April 1980) and former Daily Mirror man in Belfast, Kevin Dowling, now with the Daily Mail in Fleet Street. Wallace told both that a homosexual vice ring was operating at Kincora and of its links with the Orange Order and the Unionist Party in 1975. It was the final piece of information he passed on. Sacked from his intelligence job in Lisburn, he moved to England.*

## 127. WALLACE IS ACCUSED OF A SECOND MURDER.



No 1 September 1983 50p

1. **KINCORAGATE**

It is clear that there is a continuing cover-up of the unsavoury activities that took place at the Kincora Boys Home in East Belfast during the early seventies. After studying a Royal Ulster Constabulary file, the Director of Public Prosecutions recently decided that there are to be no further prosecutions in connection with allegations of homosexuality involving civil servants, military officers and Ulster politicians. (1)

As with most cover-ups, the Kincora affair is multi-layered. In 1982 when charges of indecency were laid after admitting charges of sodomy, indecent assault, and gross indecency with the boys in their care, reports appeared in the press that Kincora was the source of an 'establishment' vice ring that this had been known by certain Ulster politicians for nearly ten years, and that they had been part of the cover-up. This may well be the case, but a closer examination suggests that Kincora is the link to a murky world of black propaganda, blackmail and assassination.

A second report on the affair has been prepared by Sir George Terry who retired as Chief Constable of Essex this year. (2) It was due for release immediately after the general election, but has yet to appear. Andrew Pollack (3) of the Irish Times has said that police enquiries have been frustrated by the silence of a former military officer, Colin Wallace, currently serving a ten year sentence in Lower, Swansea, for the murder of Dr. Michaela's husband in 1980.

Wallace told both the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Swansea police that he would be in breach of the Official Secrets Act if he talked to them. Major Wallace is probably wise to stay silent. There is a great deal to do, and as Kenneth Little, John and John Black discovered, the British intelligence services are as ruthless as any other country's when it comes to eliminating potential sources of embarrassment. (4)

Wallace came originally from County Antrim and was working as a PR man for the Royal Ulster

Most of the reports about Wallace in the early 1980s were hostile. The first edition of Lobster magazine appeared in England in September 1983. It accused Wallace of an earlier killing. The purported victim was a school teacher called Ron Horn with whose wife Wallace had supposedly conducted an affair. Not a word of this was true. According to Lobster, Wallace had set Horn up by pretending the teacher had written inflammatory leaflets in the hope the UDA would murder him. The article alleged that:

*In 1974 Wallace was involved in another black propaganda exercise producing a series of leaflets from the socialist grouping 'The Ulster Citizen's Army'. One stated that a secret faction existed within the UDA. They sent a communique to the press stating: 'The Ulster Freedom Fighters operate under the control of the SAS. Numerous sectarian killings have been perpetrated by the SAS using the name of the UFF. Consequently the UCA threatens to launch retaliatory actions against British interests if this state of things does not cease.'*

*The UCA was largely disregarded by local newsmen who rightly attributed the leaflets to Army Intelligence, as they carried both the Loyalist red hand symbol and the plough and stars of the Official IRA. But it was difficult to ignore totally since some of the facts produced were true. The SAS were operating through and within these pseudogangs. The leaflets named up to 20 Loyalist politicians allegedly involved in these activities. The targets were those Loyalist politicians who seemed to be turning away from paramilitary activity towards a political role, and in some cases thought to be talking to the Republican side. They were thinking of people like Andy Tyrie, the UDA's senior spokesman, who was extremely annoyed by the leaflets. He informed some reporters that he knew the name of the leaflets' author and there was pressure on him to order the assassination of the alleged author.*

*What Tyrie didn't know was that the alleged author, a school teacher named Horn, had been set up by Wallace, the real author of the leaflets. Wallace was having an affair with Horn's wife, and may have hoped that this propaganda effort would lead to the death of the innocent Mr Horn. Tyrie had been given Horn's name by another English journalist who worked in the Army's Press Office and who was a friend of Wallace.*

The article then proceeded to reinforce the myth that Wallace had been dismissed on account of his relationship with Fisk. There was no suggestion in the Lobster article that this had been a set-up by MI5.

*By 1975 Wallace had gone too far with his black propaganda operations and was losing his value to the Army. He was drummed out after being revealed as Times reporter Robert Fisk's informant at the Lisburn barracks. (He posted a batch of classified documents through Fisk's door, and Fisk's cleaning lady, whose husband was in the RUC, handed them over to the authorities.) Fisk fled to Dublin and Wallace was taken to Preston for an extensive debriefing before being dismissed. One of his last acts was to give an Irish Times reporter the names of four men he considered leaders of Tara. Two of them are now prominent Unionists, one in Paisley's D.U.P and the fourth has been an editor of Paisley's Protestant Telegraph.*

In later years the editors of Lobster realised their mistake and became supportive of Wallace. In 1987 they produced a special edition about the campaign against Harold Wilson in the 1970s.

## **128. WALLACE WRITES TO THATCHER IN 1984.**

In 1984 Wallace delivered a package of documents about PSYOPS in NI to Downing Street for the attention of Thatcher.



Downing Street allegedly 'lost' the documents and nothing was done about them.

## **129. MORE REPORTS FROM DUBLIN.**

The British Embassy in Dublin monitored the stories appearing in The Phoenix. Diplomats purchased copies of the magazine and sent photocopies to London. One of the articles sent to London was a 4 July 1985, report by Frank Doherty entitled 'DIRTY TRICKS':

*THERE HAS BEEN a deafening silence from the British Sunday papers which specialise in investigating scandal in the*


*CIA and the KGB about claims that a dossier shows a dirty tricks unit in British intelligence tried to destabilise Jack Lynch's Government and had been involved in the Dublin bombing of 1972.*

*Such claims have been made before, of course, and are usually dismissed as outrageous. When they are made, as they have been in this case, by the former Senior Information Officer at British Army HQ in Lisburn, Captain Colin Wallace, they are at least deserving of a passing mention. This they have been denied, even though Wallace claims to have documentary evidence, copies of which have been passed to Mrs Thatcher.*

### **130. CLOCKWORK ORANGE IS EXPOSED IN DUBLIN.**

Captain Fred Holroyd, a former Special Military Intelligence Unit (SMIU) officer, who had worked with MI6, assisted Wallace in his campaign to clear his name.

On 14 February 1986, The Phoenix published a story which featured Wallace and Holroyd. It was entitled 'EPILOGUE ON KINCORA?'



*THE BRITISH intelligence community has high hopes that, with the publication of the Hughes inquiry report [into Kincora], the epilogue has been written on its sordid activities in the Kincora scandal. Their hopes may be dashed, however, now that erstwhile Special Military Intelligence Unit officer and spy-about-Dublin, Capt. Fred Holroyd, has linked up with another man who knows where the skeletons in the Kincora cupboard are hidden, Capt. Colin Wallace. Wallace, late of the Information Policy Unit (Black Propaganda) Unit at Lisburn, is presently a guest of her majesty in Lewes Jail after his conviction for an SAS-style*

*karate killing.*

*The Kincora saga is a tortuous one. Superficially about sexual abuse of boys in a Belfast council hostel over a period of ten years, and a subsequent cover-up by the RUC Special Branch and British Intelligence after it became known, the scandal goes much, much deeper.*

#### **CLOCKWORK ORANGE**

*.... CLOCKWORK ORANGE was a massive scheme for re-directing Irish politics, North and South. Details of the operation have already been supplied to The Irish Times, The Guardian and Mrs Thatcher's office by two of those indoctrinated in it – Capts Holroyd and Wallace- but now some new facts are emerging. Papers sent to Thatcher's office late last year on CLOCKWORK ORANGE are missing, according to a letter to Capt. Holroyd by Lord Trefarne, Under Secretary of State for Defence. The papers were originals relating to black propaganda and other dirty tricks carried out on both sides of the Border during the 1970s. ...*

#### **VICE RING**

*CLOCKWORK ORANGE was the final phase of a long-running intelligence involvement with the Kincora Boys' Home. Initially, the discovery of an extensive vice ring which involved leading loyalist figures was regarded as a windfall by British Intelligence when it came to their notice in 1970. Among those involved were: the late Sir Knox Cunningham, South Antrim MP and mentor of James Molyneaux, who as a bachelor provided Sir Knox with unstinting service as his constituency agent; Rev Robert Bradford, later South Belfast MP; Joss Cardwell, a key figure in the Unionist Party; and Belfast councillor, John McKeague, founder of the UDA and later leader of the bogus Red Hand Commando (setup as a pseudo-gang by British intelligence); William McGrath, Orange Leader and founder of the mysterious Tara loyalist paramilitary group and father-in-law of Paisley's deputy, Peter Robinson; and various others of greater and lesser importance. [This was an error. McGrath was not the father-in-law of Robinson.]*

## STRANGE DEATHS

*Since the first details of Kincora were given to Gerry Fitt [MP] by a Catholic police superintendent (name and address with editor) and later leaked to the Irish Independent's Belfast hack, Peter McKenna, by the same RUC man, a number of those concerned have met strange ends. McKeague was shot dead at home [in 1982] the night before he was to be interviewed by the RUC about Kincora, Rev Bradford was shot dead, Joss Cardwell was found dead in a fume-filled garage, Sir Knox died from what is believed to have been natural causes, and one of the boys who made allegations to uniformed police in Liverpool about the affair was put on a boat for Belfast, from which he disappeared overboard and drowned [This was a reference to the legal action the British government was taking against Peter Wright, a former MI5 officer, who was trying to publish his memoirs, Spycatcher.] After the early phase of using Kincora to gather information on Unionists, British Intelligence moved, just before the strike which brought down the power-sharing Stormont executive, into the CLOCKWORK ORANGE scheme, which was to be used to break loyalist unity by unmasking the pederasts who led them. However, intelligence bosses liked Harold Wilson's Labour Government less than the Unionists, and saw the downfall of Stormont power-sharing as a chance to give him another headache.*



*Knox Cunningham MP (left) and Jim Molyneaux.*

## **131. CLIVE PONTING REVEALS THE CONCERNS INSIDE THE MOD.**

In 1987, a former senior Ministry of Defence official, Clive Ponting, revealed that he had attended meetings with MI5 mandarins at which Wallace was discussed.

*There was never any suspicion that Wallace was making these stories up or that it was totally unfounded and very easy to rubbish. It was very much a matter that, okay the story was being*



*contained at the moment because he was in jail, but that in a few years' time he would be back out again and could be expected to start making the allegations again and that would be a serious problem.*

## **132. ENOCH POWELL VISITS COLIN WALLACE'S SOLICITOR**

Enoch Powell MP was a paedophile. See: <https://villagemagazine.ie/suffer-little-children/>

The officials at the MoD were not the only people concerned about Wallace. On 29 October 1986, Powell wrote to Wallace's solicitor, James Morgan-Harris, on headed House of Commons notepaper, with a request to see him. Wallace was still in prison at this time. Powell could have spoken to the solicitor on the phone if he had wanted to. Instead, he journeyed all the way to West Sussex a while later for a face-to-face meeting. At it, Powell sought general information about Wallace and his case. He appeared most interested in learning about Operation Clockwork Orange. Part of Clockwork Orange had concerned the gathering of information about the private sexual activities of MPs. Wallace was not released until 5 December 1986, after the meeting between Powell and

Morgan-Harris. Was Powell trying to find out what Wallace might have learnt about him and might yet pass to the press? As it transpired, Wallace knew nothing about his private life. Powell was defeated in the June 1987 British general election. He died in 1998.



### **133. WALLACE IS RELEASED FROM PRISON AND THE PHOENIX MAGAZINE IN DUBLIN RELEASES DETAILS OF A SLEW OF DIRTY TRICKS.**

The fears about Wallace talking to the media were realised upon his release at the end of 1986. The Phoenix magazine in Dublin ran a report on 19 December 1986, entitled 'MI5 – THE IRISH FILE'. It highlighted the fact that Wallace was claiming he was innocent.

*ANOTHER CASUALTY OF MI5's by now legendary activities has emerged from prison with a litany of tales about that organisation's doings in Ireland, North and South. Colin Wallace, serving 10 years for a murder he says he did not commit, was recently released on parole from Lewes Jail, Sussex, and one of his first initiatives was to unburden his knowledge on Goldhawk [i.e. the Phoenix]. In an interview with Phoenix, Wallace has drawn up a list of 13 specific affairs which he claims resulted from the MI5 (Security Service) feud with MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service) in Ireland in the*

*1974 – 1976 period, which is partly responsible for the distressing washing of British intelligence dirty linen which has been going on recently in an Australian court.*

This was a reference to the legal action the British government was taking against Peter Wright in Australia, a former MI5 officer, who was trying to publish his memoirs, *Spycatcher*. It will be discussed later in this book.



*Wallace upon his release from Lewes Prison.*

## **134. COVER-UP AT THE BBC.**

Long before December 1986, the BBC knew that Jimmy Saville was interfering with children. Yet, they continued to let Saville host programmes for children.

The Deputy Director-General of the BBC in the 1980s was Alan Protheroe. He not only tolerated Saville but helped MI5 safeguard the truth about Kincorea.



When Wallace was released from prison in 1987, Protheroe moved to shut down a report on his case which was due to appear on *Newsnight*. Protheroe actually knew Wallace and was familiar with his role in Northern Ireland. Protheroe had done his National Service in the mid-1950s after which he was commissioned into the Welsh Regiment. After his National Service he joined the

Territorial Army. Within the BBC he was referred to as 'The Colonel'. He was promoted to full colonel in the Territorial Army in 1984. He was awarded a military MBE in 1980 and appointed CBE (military) in 1991. In 1988, he became Managing Director of the Services Sound and Vision Corporation, which provides the Forces and MoD with radio and television broadcasting. He had also served as part of the MoD's Information Pool of officers.

It is believed that he was also responsible for having a script for a television drama about Colin Wallace shelved. The script was an adaptation of Paul Foot's book, 'Who Framed Colin Wallace'.



At the time one of the directors of the BBC was Dame Daphne Park, a former MI6 officer. She had participated in the MI6-CIA plot to murder Patrice Lumumba in the Congo. She was no slouch when it came to dirty tricks. She admitted on camera to the BBC that while she had been in MI6 she had engaged in dirty trick operations. 'Once you get really good intelligence about any group, you are able to learn where the levers of power are, and what one man fears of another. .. You set people discreetly against one another. .. They destroy each other, we [Intelligence] don't destroy them.'

MI5 also maintained an office at the BBC's HQ in London where it monitored and controlled executives and reporters.

It is not clear why Protheroe was prepared to intervene with Newsnight to protect child rapists. Nor is it clear what relationship he had with Jimmy Saville.

## CHAPTER 10.

# MI5 FINDS ITSELF UNDER SIEGE FROM COLIN WALLACE, PETER WRIGHT AND ANTHONY CAVENDISH.

### 135. ELEMENTS OF THE TRUTH BEGIN TO EMERGE.

The British government responded to Wallace's claims by portraying him as a fantasist.

MI5 gave ministers assurances that Wallace was not telling the truth. This in turn prompted some of those ministers to mislead Parliament in pronouncements about the Wallace case.

Then, in July 1989, a number of secret files turned up out of the blue when an official at the MoD was allegedly searching ministry archives for old job-application records. He stumbled on a document relating to 'Clockwork Orange'. This led to further digging, during which additional linked documents with references to Clockwork Orange, came to light.

The files presented a problem for Thatcher as she was an ardent supporter of MI5. They were merely the latest in a series of blows she, MI5 and MI6 had sustained in 1987 and 1988. The blows were administered by Wallace and Peter Wright.




Defence Secretary Tom King, a former NI Secretary, now faced a most unpleasant task: how could he contain a scandal which was gaining such momentum?

Capt. Wallace was beginning to look like the British equivalent to Capt. Dreyfus.

The files found in the MoD will be examined in detail after first looking at the trouble Wallace and Wright were causing Thatcher and Whitelaw.

### **136. THE SECRETS PETER WRIGHT CHOSE TO INCLUDE AND EXCLUDE FROM HIS MULTI-MILLION SELLING BOOK.**



*Malcolm Turnbull and Peter Wright. Turnbull later became Prime Minister of Australia.*

In 1987, Peter Wright CBE, now a retired MI5 officer, wrote a book called ‘Spycatcher’ which confirmed the plot against Wilson and a lot more besides.

Thatcher tried to injunct the book but the move boomeranged on her spectacularly. ‘Spycatcher’ eventually went on to sell millions of copies, due in no small part to the publicity generated by the legal action against Wright. The case was heard in Australia. Wright’s lawyer, Malcolm Turnbull, humiliated Britain’s cabinet secretary, Robert Armstrong during it. Armstrong had to admit that he had been ‘economical with the

truth' in the witness box. Turnbull became famous. He went into politics and rose to become prime minister of Australia, 2015-18.

'Spycatcher' cast MI5 and MI6 in a deplorable light: little more than organisations riddled with traitors and immersed in criminality.



When Turnbull published his own account of the affair, 'The Spycatcher Trial', he recounted how he had asked Wright at their first meeting if he thought the British government feared he might reveal other secrets. 'They might,' Wright replied adding mysteriously: 'I spent a lot of time in Northern Ireland, you know. But I won't reveal anything about that. Malcolm, it would be easy for me to make this book very sensational indeed.'


Wright had also cautioned Turnbull that: 'I may never be able to tell you the truth about some things.' When Turnbull asked him what he meant, Wright responded: 'My work in Northern Ireland, for example. Satellite surveillance. A lot of things. This is a safe book compared to what I could write.'

## **137. THREATS, COUNTER-THREATS AND A SPY'S LIFE INSURANCE POLICY.**

Wright had retired from MI5 in 1976 a disgruntled man. He and his wife Lois emigrated to Australia to live near one of their daughters, Jennifer, in Tasmania to raise horses. By the 1980s, he had decided to put pen to paper.

Wright had diabetes, was frail and generally in poor health. Before the Australian courtroom drama began, Turnbull visited London where he met with a senior legal figure acting on behalf of Thatcher's government. Turnbull's arm was seized by the lawyer and held in a 'hard' grip at it.

‘Well you tell [Wright] from me,’ the lawyer said ‘that he’d better seek some medical advice before he comes to court. He’ll get no quarter in the witness box on account of his ill-health.’ While this was clearly not a death threat, if this was how the occupant of one of the UK’s loftiest legal perches was prepared to conduct himself, what was to be expected from the more robust operatives in MI5? Wright had participated in at least one – if not multiple – MI5 assassination operations and knew perfectly well of what his former colleagues were capable. It probably crossed his mind that given half the chance they might, for example, arrange a road traffic accident along a dusty Tasmanian dirt track. To avoid this, he took out a life assurance policy, one that involved a threat to reveal his unpublished secrets if he was murdered.



The legal wrangling dragged on for a year. On 14 June 1988, while an injunction restraining British newspapers from publishing the contents of the book still in place but crumbling in the House of Lords in London, Wright made his threat public: ‘There are 10 major stories which I have not put in [‘Spycatcher’] and there are probably others if I thought about it. I may put them into a secret report or I may do nothing. I just haven’t thought it out yet.’ The next day, The Times of London reported that HMG had ‘always been aware that Mr Wright knew a lot more than he revealed in ‘Spycatcher’, particularly concerning his service as an MI5 officer in Northern Ireland’.

From his home in Australia, Wright promoted the story by proclaiming that the real reason Thatcher had gone to such lengths to muzzle him was ‘because of the other things I know. But I said in the beginning I wouldn’t publish them and I haven’t done it. They have always been frightened of what I know...’ Just in case the message wasn’t clear, he told the BBC

that his future course of action would depend on how Thatcher and her government ‘behaved themselves’.

Not a single British journalist pressed Wright to be more forthcoming.

Not a single British journalist asked him about Kincora or the 1974 Dublin and Monaghan bombings.

The international media was equally uninterested.


## **138. ‘I SPENT A LOT OF TIME IN IRELAND, AND IT WAS NOT PLEASANT.’**

‘Spycatcher’ became an international bestseller shifting over two million copies and earned Wright a fortune. His ghost writer, Paul Greengrass, went on to great success as a film director. His credits include the Jason Bourne film series.

After his publishing success, Wright retreated into virtual seclusion on his small farm near the apple-growing centre of Cygnet. Whereas he had once courted the media, requests for interviews were now batted out-of-court by his wife Lois. ‘Sorry. He won’t talk to journalists or anyone else like that,’ she was quoted as saying. ‘He has nothing left to say’.

It was too late to follow up the ‘ten’ concealed secrets story.

What Wright now divulged was largely innocuous. On 12 August 1990, the Sunday Times reported that he was writing another book provisionally entitled ‘Tomorrow Is Another Day’ about ‘a tamer topic that should unsettle no government’, the rearing of pedigree animals. But at least the proposed publication provided Wright with an opportunity to remind the British government to leave him in peace. ‘Peter does talk occasionally about writing down some post-Spycatcher reflections, but I



fear they may never come to fruition,’ Sandy Grant, the managing director of Heinemann in Australia, was quoted as saying.

In 1991, he published a second spy book but it was a limp offering, little more than an A-Z of espionage terminology with a few stories thrown in for good measure. It was entitled the Spycatcher’s Encyclopaedia of Espionage. There was, however, a hint in it at the Irish secrets he intended to carry to his grave if the government in London behaved itself. ‘I spent a lot of time in Ireland’, he intoned, ‘and it was not pleasant. We also did a lot of things there which I am never going to talk about, because it would just cause more trouble.’ [Wright (1991), p. 114].

There is a possibility, albeit a wafer thin one, that Wright may have eventually let Turnbull have a peep inside his box of secrets. In his book, Turnbull was able to describe how Wright ‘had been privy to some of the weightiest secrets of the free world, he had spied on presidents and prime ministers, he was at the very centre of the fight against the ... IRA...’ [Turnbull, p.19.] Perhaps one day Turnbull will clarify what – if anything – he learnt about Wright’s activities in Ireland and whether he knows anything about a secret dossier.

### **139. MI5’S PEEPING TOM SUPREME.**

When one considers what Wright included in ‘Spycatcher’, one shudders to think what was so volatile, he had to leave it out of the book.

By the 1960s, Wright had become MI5’s Witch-Finder General, a position he exploited to accumulate mountains of dossiers containing embarrassing secrets about the British Establishment. During the incessant mole hunts Wright undertook, he was granted access to any file he required in his search for treachery, real or imagined. His meddles ranged across universities, government departments – especially the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Home Office – Buckingham Palace, and anywhere else that took his fancy. He even interviewed Airey Neave MP, who had escaped from Colditz, about the political leanings of his fellow non-British prisoners. According to Wright, MI5’s D-G, Roger Hollis, instructed ‘that I myself had to conduct any interview deemed sensitive, which normally meant it was with a lord, a knight, politician, top civil servant, or spy suspect.’



One of those Wright interrogated was the arch MI5 traitor, Sir Anthony Blunt. Blunt was prepared to betray many of his friends to preserve his position:

*Blunt, too, loved to discuss the scandalous side of Cambridge life in the 1930s. .. I soon realised that the [Cambridge] Ring of Five stood at the centre of a series of other connecting rings, each pledged to silence, each anxious to protect secrets from outsiders. There was the secret ring of homosexuals, where loyalty to their kind overrode all other obligations; there was the secret world of the Apostles [a group of Cambridge intellectuals], where ties to fellow Apostles remain strong throughout life; and then there was the ring of those friends of Blunt and [Guy] Burgess who were not themselves spies, but who knew or guessed what was going on. Each ring supported the others, and made the task of identifying the inner core that much more difficult.*

Wright personally interviewed and re-interviewed more than 100 people over a period of six years. By the end of it he could boast:

*I had seen into the secret heart of the present Establishment at*

*a time when they had been young and careless. I knew their scandals and their intrigues. I knew too much, and they knew it.*

One of these was the former prime minister, Anthony Eden. All of this gave MI5 a power over the political establishment and provides one clue – among many – as to why successive governments have mangled their reputations by covering up the criminal activities of MI5.

Many others had powerful Irish connections such as Blunt and Cunningham.

## **140. FORMULATING MI5'S POLICY FOR IRELAND.**

By the early 1970s, Wright had clawed his way to the top of MI5. He was close to its D-G, Sir Martin Furnival Jones. When Michael Hanley, the Deputy D-G of MI5 became D-G in 1972, he appointed Wright as his special adviser. Hanley asked Wright to formulate proposals about how MI5 should deal with NI after which he spent 'a lot of time in Ireland' and did the mysterious things which would have caused 'more trouble' if they were ever exposed.



*Martin Furnival-Jones and Michael Hanley.*

The odds are overwhelming that Operation Clockwork Orange was a product of Wright's earlier probes into the sex lives of men such as Cunningham and Blunt.

As MI5's surveillance expert, Wright was probably directly involved in the bugging of the Park Avenue Hotel where Kincora boys were trafficked. In Spycatcher he described how he personally tapped the phones of Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus. Incriminating conversations between Makarios and his male lovers was later used to blackmail him.

## **141. NERVE GAS AND POISON.**

What Wright divulged in Spycatcher was hair raising enough. He described how he and an Irishman called Bill Magan had plotted to 'neutralise' General Grivas during Britain's struggle against EOKA in Cyprus in the late 1950s.

He also disclosed the treasonous plot against PM Harold Wilson.

Then there was a description of how at the start of the Suez Crisis, MI6 had:

*developed a plan, through the London Station, to assassinate [Egypt's President] Nasser using nerve gas. [British PM Anthony] Eden initially gave his approval to the operation, but later rescinded it when he got agreement from the French and Israelis to engage in joint military action. When this course failed, and he was forced to withdraw [from Suez], Eden reactivated the assassination option a second time. By this time virtually all MI6 assets in Egypt's had been rounded up by Nasser, and a new operation, using renegade Egyptian officers, was drawn up, but it failed lamentably, principally because the cache of weapons which had been hidden on the outskirts of Cairo was found to be defective'. [Wright p. 160.]*

Had the nerve gas plot proceeded, the collateral damage to Nasser's secretarial and domestic staff, not to mention anyone happening to visit him would have been devastating. The gas would have asphyxiated the victims while melting their vital organs.

The gas MI6 had in mind to assassinate Nasser was undoubtedly developed by the British government at Porton Down. Wright described

how he once visited it for a demonstration of a cigarette packet which had been fitted with a poison tipped dart by the staff of the Explosives Research and Development Establishment:

*We solemnly put on white coats and were taken out to one of the animal compounds behind Porton by Dr Ladell, the scientist there who handled all MI5 and MI6 work. A sheep on a lead was led into the centre of the ring. One flank had been shaved to reveal the course pink skin. Ladell's assistant pulled out the cigarette packet and stepped forward. The sheep started, and was restrained by the lead, and I thought perhaps the device had misfired. But then the sheep's knees began to buckle, and it started rolling its eyes and frothing at the mouth. Slowly the animal sank to the ground, life draining away, as the white-coated professionals discussed the advantages of the modern new toxin around the corpse. [Wright p. 160.]*

The ten secrets that Wright withheld from 'Spycatcher' must include MI5's role in supporting the UWC anti-Sunningdale strike, the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, and the Kincora scandal.

## **142. ANTHONY CAVENDISH: 'LIES, MUTILATION AND EVEN MURDER' AND PHOTOGRAPHING 'SMALL BOYS' IN BED WITH MEN.**



*Thatcher and Anthony Cavendish who served with both MI5 and*

## **MI6.**

Yet another whistle-blower came out of the shadows, Anthony Cavendish. He had served with MI5 and MI6. He proposed to publish his memoirs. They eventually emerged in 1990 entitled 'Inside Intelligence'. According to Cavendish, deceit was the starting point of an officer's career since he was destined to lie 'from his first day in the Service'.

Overall, Cavendish's experience convinced him that as:

*the years go by, the lies take over from the truth and morality accepts the other demands which are made on an officer to get the job done.*

Cavendish also described the use of blackmail to control MI6 agents along with the use of 'threats to the family of valuable informants'.

Worse still, according to him:

*theft, deception, lies, mutilation and even murder are considered if and when necessary.*



Cavendish confessed that MI6 used children in sexual entrapment operations:

*Then there is the [foreign] agent who is set up for blackmail from the beginning. The groundwork having been laid and the agent having been photographed in bed with a small boy or his boss's wife, is then forced to provide information.*

## **143. MORE NEGATIVE PRESS FOR WALLACE.**

While the media tide turned in favour of Wallace and Fred Holroyd, they still received criticism in some quarters. The most prominent critic was David McKittrick who was now writing for the Independent. (This was

the UK Independent, not to be mixed up with the Irish Independent, both of which were owned by Sir Tony O'Reilly.)

Although McKittrick had relied upon Wallace for material for his April 1980 Irish Times articles, he now began to attack Wallace. He had a meeting with Brian Blackwell, a former soldier, of the Law and Order Division of the NIO in March of 1987. Blackwell reported:

*I had lunch today – with David McKittrick, Northern Ireland correspondent of the Independent newspaper. Our conversation ranged over the whole field of security and political issues related to Northern Ireland. However, I was not surprised when the conversation turned to Wallace and Holroyd and their revelations. I think you and (redacted – an MI5 officer) will be interested to know that in McKittrick's view Wallace is a Walter Mitty fantasist who is clearly telling lies, embellishing them with any other 'intelligence' stories that are current such as the Peter Wright allegations. Holroyd, on the other hand, he sees as a more complex character who is almost certainly a clinical paranoid who therefore cannot distinguish fact from fiction and may believe what he says is true. McKittrick has advised his newspaper not to run with the hounds, and to leave this story alone.*

On 4 August 1987, Blackwell sent a 'CONFIDENTIAL' memo to a certain Mr Wood and to an MI5 officer stating that they would be:

*interested to know that I had one of my regular meetings yesterday with David McKittrick. He tells me he has written a major piece rubbishing the revelations of Wallace and Holroyd. He hopes that it will be published in the Independent on Wednesday 12 August.*

McKittrick had not entertained such doubts about Wallace after he had reported his revelations in the Irish Times in April 1980.

McKittrick's article appeared on 3 September 1988. It made a number of allegations against Wallace which did not hold water and were demolished by Paul Foot in his book, 'Who Framed Colin Wallace'.

However, the Independent article had the immediate effect of undermining Wallace and thereby dampening the interest of a number of journalists who were interested in his story.

One example will suffice to demonstrate how Foot eventually undid the damage. McKittrick had suggested that Wallace was jumping on Peter Wright's bandwagon insofar as allegations about an MI5 plot against Harold Wilson were concerned. Yet, long before Peter Wright made his claims in 1987, Wallace had disclosed some of the anti-Wilson plotting to McKittrick. McKittrick had reported in the Irish Times on 23 April 1980 that:

*Intelligence sources have now said that MI5 personnel in Northern Ireland were working against Wilson. MI5 objected both to Wilson being Prime Minister and to his government's Northern Ireland police. They regarded him as being soft on the Provisional IRA ... 'It would be an exaggeration to say that 5 [MI5] saw Wilson as coming to power on the back of a Communist revolution,' said a high-placed source. 'But the exaggeration is only slight.'*

Blackwell's office was part of the Security and International Liaison Division of the NIO that co-ordinated the work of the security agencies in NI. This explains why his McKittrick memos were copied to MI5.

Blackwell had served as a major in the Royal Signals. He took over command of 233 Signal Squadron at Army HQNI at about the time of 'Bloody Sunday' (1972). He was posted from NI to the MoD in London and then became the Commanding Officer of 11 Signal Regiment two years later and was promoted to Lt Colonel in 1975.

He left the Army joined the NIO at about the time Sir Maurice Oldfield, the former Chief of MI6, was appointed Intelligence Co-ordinator at the NIO.

Back in the 1970s, Wallace played cricket with Blackwell on number occasions. Blackwell left the NIO in 2000. He died in 2018.

## 144. QUINLAN PUTS THE CABINET SECRETARY ON THE SPOT.

Sir Michael Quinlan, the Permanent Under Secretary at the MoD, was a rare example of a high-level official who possessed a moral compass that still functioned, at least intermittently. Quinlan was advised about the discovery of certain Clockwork Orange files in 1989, and took the view that they merited further investigation. As a result, the issue was referred to the Cabinet Secretary, Robin Butler, 1988-98. The files had been created in 1975.



On 14 September 1989, Butler held a meeting with senior representatives of the MoD, NIO, Home Office and MI5 to consider the MoD files. The participants now realised that documents existed which proved that the advice furnished to ministers in 1987 and 1988 about Wallace was wrong.

A memo marked ‘SECRET AND PERSONAL’ dated 14 September 1989, from T. A. Woolley, the Personal Secretary to Sir Robin Butler, Cabinet Secretary recorded the details for the meeting. It reads as follows:

*Sir Robin Butler held a meeting at 9:30 am today with Michael Quinlan, Sir John Bletloch, Mr (redacted) Mr (redacted) and Mr Lyon (Home Office) to consider the case of Mr Colin Wallace*

*2. Sir Michael Quinlan said that, as he had explained in his letter to Sir Robin Butler of 6 September, it had recently come to light that advice to Ministers from the Ministry of Defence (MOD) on the case of Mr Colin Wallace in 1987 and 1988 had not taken account of certain material originating in 1975. As a result, a letter from the Prime Minister to the Chairman of the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee (TCSC) in 1987 had been inaccurate in certain respects. Michael said that he would set up an internal enquiry in the MoD to seek to establish how this had*

*happened. The immediate requirement, however, was to decide whether or not it was necessary to set the record straight, and if so how. His own view was that it was necessary publicly to correct the inaccuracies, and that the best way forward might be to appoint an outsider to advise his Secretary of State whether, had the information which had recently been uncovered been available to the Civil Service Appeals Board (CSAB) when it considered Mr Wallace's appeal against dismissal in 1975, it would reached a different view.*

*3. In discussion, the following main points were made:*

*(a) A public correction of the inaccuracies in the Prime Minister's letter should be made as soon as possible, in order to demonstrate that Ministers had acted with despatch as soon as the new information had been uncovered.*

*(b) At the same time, any public statement would have to be based on the comprehensive analysis of the files of Departments with papers relating to Mr Wallace, in case further relevant but previously unconsidered material was discovered.*

*(c) The timing of any announcement was complicated by the fact that the Home Secretary was proposing to answer an inspired all Parliamentary Question after the summer recess in which he would announce that the book 'The Framing of Colin Wallace' by Mr Paul Foot contains no new evidence to justify reviewing the conviction of Mr Wallace for manslaughter.*

*(d) Any outsider (such as a retired civil servant) appointed to advise the Secretary of State on the Colin Wallace case would be unlikely to be regarded by the Government's critics as genuinely 'independent'. This pointed towards submitting the new material direct to the CSAB [Civil Service Appeals Board] and asking it to review its 1975 decision [about Wallace's dismissal].*

*(e) A public announcement along the lines proposed would be particularly untimely in Northern Ireland, where it was likely to be used, however posterously, to support allegations of*

*collusion between the Security Forces and Loyalist Paramilitaries.*

*(f) Legal advice will be necessary to protect the Government against any risk of legal action by Mr Wallace or his supporters, possibly involving claims for the discovery of documents.*

*4. Summing up the discussion, Sir Robin Butler said that the Home Secretary and the Secretaries of State for Defence and Northern Ireland should now be alerted by their respective Permanent Secretaries of this latest development in the Wallace case. The Secretary of State for Defence should be advised subsequently to minute the Prime Minister with the background, proposing that a public statement should be made correcting the inaccuracies contained in previous Ministerial statements as soon as such a statement could be made with confidence that all new material relevant to the case had been uncovered. (This need not necessarily postpone the Home Secretary's separate announcement.) The proposed statement would indicate that the Government passed all relevant new material to the CSAB with the request that it consider whether it would have affected the outcome of Mr Wallace's appeal against dismissal without compensation in 1975. Meanwhile, officials in each of the Departments represented should now examine in detail all files relating to the case with a view to uncovering any documentation casting doubt on the accuracy of the Prime Minister's letter to the Chairman of the TCSC, or of other Ministerial statements on the case, or on the evidence put by the government to the CSAB in 1975. This exercise will be co-ordination by the MoD.*

## **145. THE BUCK IS PASSED TO TOM KING.**

The key points to note from the 14 September meeting were {i} a resolution was passed that that Tom King, Thatcher's Defence Secretary, should furnish Thatcher with a minute setting out the relevant background to the issue, and {ii} a public statement correcting the inaccuracies contained in previous ministerial statements should be released. The meeting also resolved that the statement should be made

‘as soon as the Government could be confident that all new material relevant to the case had been uncovered’.

In addition, it was agreed that officials in each of the departments represented at the meeting would examine all of the files in their



possession relating to the Wallace case with a view to uncovering any further records.

Thatcher had sent a letter about Wallace to Terence Higgins MP, the Chairman of the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee. The newly discovered files at the MoD now exposed her letter as misleading. Thatcher would become vulnerable to attack by the Labour Party in the Commons if she failed to correct herself.

Other ministers had made misleading statements about Wallace to the House of Commons.

## **146. THATCHER IS KEPT IN THE LOOP.**

Tom King wrote a ‘minute’ to Thatcher on 25 September 1989.

Thatcher noted King’s ‘minute’.

She was not outraged that Parliament had been misled.

Instead, she made a rather bizarre comment to the effect that it would be better if her government took ‘no responsibility in things done under previous [Labour] administrations’.

No doubt the files that had been discovered by the MoD sparked many discussions between Thatcher and her spymasters about what to do. None of MI5's files have emerged to reveal what D-G Patrick Walker of MI5 was telling her at his regular meetings at 10 Downing Street.



## CHAPTER 11.

### MISLEADING PARLIAMENT.

#### 147. THE SCHEME TO CORRAL THE CALCUTT INQUIRY.




In the circumstances that prevailed, Tom King, Secretary of State for Defence, had no choice but to establish an inquiry, i.e., the one that would ultimately be conducted by David Calcutt QC. In the background, King was plotting to rig Calcutt's terms of reference. Damage

limitation had become the order of the day.

King's arrangement – if successful – would conceal the full extent of what Wallace knew about lawbreaking, treachery and dirty tricks.

#### 148. A KEY DOCUMENT IS WITHHELD FROM THE CALCUTT INQUIRY.

There was proof that Wallace had been engaged in PSYOPS. The proof was contained in a 'Job Justification' document which had been approved by the Army Establishments Board at HQ Northern Ireland in Lisburn but it was too inflammatory to reveal, even to Calcutt.



Hence, it was withheld from him.

Instead, Calcutt was shown a one paragraph summary of the ‘Job Justification’ (referred to as the ‘job specification’) which excluded a description of the darker side of PSYOPS activities.

The ‘job justification’ document was four pages in length. The ‘job specification’ contained only one paragraph.

Suffice it to say, it would be easy to confuse the phrases being deployed here. The use of the term ‘job specification’ has all the appearances of a sleight of hand designed to mislead inquiring parties into thinking that it was the same document as the ‘job justification’. This ruse enabled the MoD to hide the four-page document which was packed with embarrassing information, yet which indicated that Wallace had been telling the truth about his knowledge of and involvement in PSYOPS all along.

## **149. KING RECOMMENDS A COVER-UP TO THATCHER.**

On 12 December 1989, King submitted a nine-page ‘SECRET’ report to Thatcher. (This report is not to be mixed up with the ‘minute’ King sent to Thatcher on 25 September 1989.)

On this occasion, King conceded that Wallace had indeed been a PSYOPS officer. At paragraph 4 (I), King pointed out that Wallace:

*claimed that there was a supplementary SECRET job specification for his post, setting out his undercover psychological operations responsibilities. He had no formal directive of that kind, so far as can be seen. But such a job specification was drafted to justify the establishment of his post and it is reasonable to assume that Mr Wallace was told what it contained, even though it was never endorsed at Ministerial level. MOD did not contest Mr Wallace’s evidence that such a*



*job specification had been prepared; but nor did MOD acknowledge it or make a copy available.*

Another part of paragraph 4 (1) is misleading; there was a written document setting out the parameters of his PSYOPS role. It was concealed from all and sundry by the MoD because it described the sensitive nature of the work Wallace had performed and, by extension, that of his colleagues. This was the four-page 'job justification' referred to earlier.

## **150. UNFAIR DISMISSAL.**

Since King was communicating with Thatcher in secret, he did not have to pull too many punches, i.e., he could acknowledge frankly to her that Wallace had been unfairly dismissed. At paragraph 4 (ii) he explained that:

*It is therefore arguable that the proceedings, which led the Appeal Board to conclude that Mr Wallace's services should be terminated, but that he should be allowed to resign, were flawed. It seems extremely likely that, even if the Appeal Board had found in Mr Wallace's favour, the Department would still have terminated his services, but then it would have been obliged to pay him compensation for doing so. We should consider whether this situation requires us to take action to remedy any injustice to Mr Wallace.*

## **151. THE ERRORS WHICH KING TOLD THATCHER HAD TO BE CORRECTED.**

King did not comment on the fact that countless people should have come forward to correct the misleading picture which had been presented to Parliament. They included people serving in the Cabinet Office, NIO, MoD, MI5, MI6, IRD and IPU.

King did not suggest that this army of mute officials be hauled over the coals, let alone receive a slap on the wrist.

His advice was merely that:

*(b) We need to correct some misstatements made, both by Ministers and in official correspondence, concerning the Wallace case. In particular: –*

*(i) Misleading information has been given about the nature of Mr Wallace's duties in Northern Ireland;*

*(ii) It has been stated incorrectly that all his allegations have been fully and carefully investigated and that none has been substantiated; and*

*(iii) It has been stated that Ministers are aware of no evidence that a plan by the name of 'Clockwork Orange' ever, existed. Evidence of preparatory work on a plan by this name has now come to light; although it is clear that it was not approved and there is no evidence that it ever had the scope alleged by Mr Wallace.*

## **152. KING STILL GETS IT WRONG: CLOCKWORK ORANGE HAD BEEN ACTIVATED.**



Yet, Operation 'Clockwork Orange' had been activated. Vast amounts of 'kompromat' had been accumulated about a variety of Unionist and other targets. This was achieved at an extremely high price: the pain and suffering inflicted on boys and underage teenagers in care

homes such as Williamson House, Bawnmore and Kincora. A number of the victims were so devastated by the physical and psychological trauma they suffered, they later committed suicide.

Overall, various operations involving disinformation had taken place. Charles Haughey, John Hume and Ian Paisley had been smeared by the

IRD. A forged bank account in the name of John Hume had been brought into existence. Another forged bank account was manufactured to vilify the Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, Edward Short. William Craig was portrayed as the moving force behind the kidnap of a German industrialist with whose wife he was conducting an illicit affair. (The story was entirely untrue.) Various Labour MPs were linked to Sinn Fein and communist groups.

A bank account was also forged in the name of Ian Paisley. Rumours were circulated that he had misappropriated money which he had invested for his own benefit. It was whispered that he owned farm lands in Canada.

### **153. TWO POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION.**

Returning to the King's 'SECRET' 1989 report, King proceeded to say to Thatcher:

*I therefore see two possible courses of action: –*

*I could pay [Wallace] compensation without any further investigation; or*

*I could appoint an independent arbitrator to review the papers relating to [Wallace's] case, to hear representations from him (if necessary in person), to interview any witnesses that the arbitrator considered necessary to see and to make recommendations to me on what remedial action should be taken I doubt if the first of these courses would be regarded as satisfactory, once we had admitted that errors had been made. I therefore recommend the second.*

King had someone in mind to run the inquiry: At paragraph 6:

*The members of the Civil Service Appeal Board who heard the original case [in 1975] are no longer available and I do not think that a further hearing before the Appeal Board is the right way to handle this matter. But Mr David Calcutt QC, the*

*Master of Magdalene College Cambridge, has carried out a previous sensitive inquiry most satisfactorily and, if you agree, I would propose to approach him to see if he would be willing to undertake this investigation. I am confident that we could rely on him to approach these very sensitive issues with complete discretion.*

## **154. KING WANTED AN ENQUIRY HE COULD HOLD BY A LEASH.**

King was determined that the inquiry would not look at allegations that MI5 and MI6 had run a ‘honey trap’ at Kincora, or were involved in smear campaigns, or collusive murder programmes. Hence, he next advised:

*It would be important to restrict [David Calcutt’s] terms of reference to the handling of Mr Wallace’s appeal [against his dismissal], so that he could avoid getting drawn into Kincora, ‘Clockwork Orange’ alleged assassinations, etc.*

This indicates – at the very least – that King was concerned about allegations that MI5 had been involved in {i} the Kincora scandal and {ii} assassination and {iii} various smear campaigns – otherwise why exclude them from the terms of reference?



Why was it ‘important’ to halt an enquiry into child rape, vilification and murder if there was nothing to hide?

## **155. ASSUMED KNOWLEDGE.**

It is also noteworthy that King did not have to explain to Thatcher what ‘Clockwork Orange’ was about. If this had been a figment of Wallace’s

imagination, why did King assume that Thatcher would know anything about it? One possible answer to this is that King and Thatcher had discussed Clockwork Orange before and knew full well that it was not a figment of Wallace's imagination.

## **156. KING DONS BELT AND BRACES: 'MR CALCUTT SHOULD NOT MAKE A PUBLISHED REPORT.'**



King wasn't going to take any chance that David Calcutt QC might provide an insightful report, even within the restrictive terms of

reference that King was planning to use to hem him in. In anticipation of this unappetising vista, King went on to say:

*I envisage that [Calcutt's] recommendations and my subsequent decision should be published; but that Mr Calcutt should not make a published report.*

## **157. CONTEMPT OF PARLIAMENT.**

No one disputes that the House of Commons was misled by the statements made by ministers in 1987 and 1988. Furthermore, Mrs Thatcher had misled Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee. Rather than allow a wide-ranging and transparent enquiry to establish the full extent to which Parliament and its emanations had been misled, King curtailed the probe as best he could.

It is arguable that King and Thatcher's engagement of Calcutt to carry

out a modified inquiry to cover-up the original findings of the MoD investigation, initiated by Michael Quinlan, was contempt of Parliament.

Contempt of Parliament comprises, inter alia, of

*any conduct (including words) which improperly interferes, or is intended or likely improperly to interfere, with the performance by either House of its functions.*

This includes:

*– deliberately attempting to mislead the House or a committee (by way of statement, evidence, or petition)*

## **158. KING WANTED TO ENSURE THE FUTURE USE OF DIRTY TRICKS.**

At paragraph 9, King not only admitted that disinformation had been part of the armoury of Her Majesty's spies, but that he wanted to ensure that it would remain available as a tool which they could continue to use:

*A particular difficulty arises over your [i.e., Thatcher's] statement in your letter of 10 March 1987 to Mr Terence Higgins that it was not part of Mr Wallace's job to spread, false information. Although the draft covert job description does not confirm that Mr Wallace had such a responsibility, it is now apparent that he was engaged in various disinformation projects; and the available records suggest that some, although not all, of these were authorised within the Army Headquarters in Northern Ireland. Any correction of your statement will inevitably prompt further questions about the use of disinformation in Northern Ireland, both in the 1970s and today: some of these questions will not be at all easy to answer; since information about activities in the 1970s is sparse; and since it would be wrong to commit ourselves not to use disinformation in all circumstances today.*

## 159. KING'S FEAR OF A 'WIDE-RANGING PUBLIC INQUIRY'.

King was afraid that the Calcutt inquiry might lead to:

*... renewed pressure for a wide-ranging public inquiry into Mr Wallace's allegations about activities in Northern Ireland during the time that he was stationed there.*

What was there to fear about 'pressure' to expose criminality?



If the allegations about child abuse and 'assassinations' were little more than a puff of smoke, surely it would have been desirable to put the minds of those troubled by these allegations at ease by establishing precisely what had gone on.

It is a shame that a wide-ranging public enquiry did not take place as it might have revealed the truth about {i} the role of RUC Special Branch agents in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings; {ii} the Anglo-Irish Vice Ring; {iii} the smear campaign against British and Irish politicians; and, {iv} the treacherous plot against Harold Wilson.

## 160. KING'S PUZZLING STATEMENT.

King knew full well that Wallace was alleging criminal activity on the part of MI5 and other State actors. What could be more criminal than the rape of children or the murder of thirty-three people in the Republic of Ireland? It is difficult therefore to understand precisely what was going through King's mind when he added the following:

*Unless there is reason to believe that criminal offences have been committed, or that there has been serious wrong-doing by Government servants, or that the Government has done substantial injustice to an individual, I do not consider that any purpose would be served by investigating operational activities*

*which (it is fair to point out) allegedly occurred over ten years ago (for much of the time under a Labour Administration). [Paragraph 10.]*

Surely the only way to reach a conclusion as to whether or not there was a ‘reason to believe that criminal offences [had] been committed’ was to carry out an honest and thorough enquiry.

## **161. KINGS SENDS THE ‘SECRET’ REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF MI5, THE MAN IN CHARGE OF MI5 DURING THE MURDER OF PAT FINUCANE.**

At paragraph 13, King informed Thatcher that:

*I am sending copies of this minute to the Home Secretary, and the Northern Ireland Secretary, and to Sir Robin Butler, the Director General of the Security Service (MI5) and the Treasury Solicitor.*



Patrick Walker served as director general of MI5, 1988-92

Patrick Walker was in command of MI5 during the murder of Patrick Finucane. He was one of those in receipt of King’s letter proposing to ensure the Calcutt Inquiry did not investigate ‘assassinations’.

Walker must have been reassured by the tone of King’s report, i.e., that the Secretary of State for Defence was prepared to go to such lengths to prevent Calcutt inquiring into ‘assassinations’. This was because Walker was the only person inside MI5 who could have given the green light for the assassination of Patrick Finucane, an event that took place ten months earlier. It is inconceivable that junior MI5 officers plotted the murder behind his back.

Finucane was murdered by MI5-RUC Special Branch agents in the UDA including William Stobie and Ken Barret.



*Ken Barret and William Stobie, part of the gang which murdered Patrick Finucane. Both men were RUC Special Branch (i.e. MI5) agents.*

## CHAPTER 12.

### DAMAGE LIMITATION

#### 162. ARCHIE HAMILTON'S STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT.



On 30 January 1990, the Minister for the Armed Forces, Archie Hamilton, admitted in Parliament that disinformation had been disseminated in NI, albeit only in the 1970s: 'It has not since the 1970s been the policy to disseminate disinformation in Northern Ireland in ways designed to denigrate individuals and/or organisations for propaganda purposes'.

He next conceded that:

*Papers which have now come to light indicate that, when the case was made to establish Mr Wallace's post, it was proposed that his duties should include responsibilities for providing unattributable covert briefing briefings for the press; and it was stated that the incumbent would be required to make on-the-spot decisions on matters of national security during such interviews. It seems that, in the event, the arguments for including these responsibilities in Mr Wallace's job description were made orally rather than in writing to those who approved the establishment of the SIO post. But presumably Mr. Wallace was told what duties he was expected to carry out; and indeed it would appear that he had already been undertaking unattributable briefing activities of this kind, which may have included disinformation*

There was a sting in the tail. Hamilton added that a project named Clockwork Orange had been drawn up and that it 'contemplated' the dissemination of an account of the organisation of the IRA. However, he claimed that no evidence had been found that it had been extended to

cover Protestant organisations and individuals or to include Northern Irish and British politicians, throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

### **163. DISINFORMATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MID-1970S.**

Hamilton was wrong. Disinformation had been deployed from the early 1970s right up to the murder of Patrick Finucane ten months earlier.

A document disclosed to the ‘Bloody Sunday Inquiry’ shows that Major General Leng was the ‘Director of Psychological Operations’ and that ‘all operations will normally be approved by him’.



In his report to Parliament in 2012 regarding the murder of Belfast solicitor, Pat Finucane, Sir Desmond de Silva QC, stated that MI5 officers had continued to engage in PSYOPs in NI until at least the 1980s. One of the aims was to unnerve Republicans:

*15.14 Security Service [i.e., MI5] officers later referred to the dissemination of information within the loyalist community, in such a way that it would be likely to become known by PIRA figures, as having the potential to make an impact on the republican target’. However, whilst the focus of the propaganda was aimed at PIRA, it is also clear that the initiatives were not particularly focused or controlled. The initiatives certainly came to include within their scope individuals who were not members of terrorist organisations but prominent figures in the broader nationalist and republican communities.*

### **164. THE FINUCANE MURDER.**

At paragraph 15.30 de Silva stated that

*The precise methods used by the Security Service [MI5] as part of their propaganda initiatives (in the 1980s) remain sensitive.*

*I accept that many of the technical details of such operations cannot be publicly disclosed in view of the normal requirements relating to the protection of this type of information. However, I have come to the view that an outline of this issue has to be published as part of this Report.*

And at 15. 54:

*I am satisfied that the dissemination of this propaganda could have served to further legitimise Patrick Finucane as a target for loyalist paramilitaries. Whilst the aim of these initiatives was to ‘unnerve’ people such as Mr Finucane (rather than to incite loyalists to attack them), the fact that the propaganda could have such an effect was, in my view, a consequence that should have been foreseeable to the Security Service at the time.*



De Silva gave MI5 too much credit. If true to form, they would have withheld documents and lied to him. Finucane was murdered in February 1989 after propaganda was put into circulation that endangered his life. It is more likely that the propaganda was designed to create an atmosphere in which the public would not be surprised when a Loyalist gang murdered him.

**165. HAMILTON’S STATEMENT HAS NEVER BEEN CORRECTED.**



What is not in doubt is that in January 1990 – less than a year after Finucane’s death – Archie Hamilton told the Commons that propaganda had not been deployed ‘since the 1970s .. in ways designed to denigrate individuals and/or organisations for propaganda purposes’.

Hamilton’s erroneous statement has never been corrected.

## **166. AN APPARENTLY WIDE-RANGING ENQUIRY IS ANNOUNCED.**

Tom King announced the Calcutt Inquiry in the House of Commons on 1 February 1990. Hansard shows the following exchange took place between King and Dale Campbell-Savours MP:

*Mr. D. N. Campbell-Savours (Workington) Will the inquiry deal with the question whether Colin Wallace had a written job description classified ‘secret’, relating to his undercover operations? If it were possible to establish the existence of a job description in one form or another, would the inquiry be able to examine the nature of the activities involved?*

*Mr. King. The hon. Gentleman knew the answer to his question before he rose to his feet. He has indulged once again his interest in parading all kinds of rumour and innuendo. .. Let me deal with the hon. Gentleman’s first question, about the job description. Let me make it clear – this is what I have come to speak to the House about – that I would expect it to be for Mr. [David] Calcutt [QC] to make the decision, within his terms of reference. I have absolute confidence in Mr. Calcutt: I am confident that he will seek to discharge his terms of reference to the full, and will take into account any relevant matter.’ [Hansard 1 February 1990 (Vol 166 cc446-68.)]*

The House could only have assumed from this exchange that David Calcutt would get to see the four page job ‘justification’ document and that his inquiry would be thorough and wide-ranging in its ability to deal with ‘any relevant matter’. This is something that would not happen.


Thatcher, King, Walker of MI5, and others now hoped that Calcutt’s report would put an end to the haemorrhage of secrets from MI5.

## **167. THE CABINET OFFICE KNEW THE REPORT INTO THE SEX ABUSE AT KINCORA BOYS’ HOME BY SIR GEORGE TERRY CONTAINED A LIE.**

While David Calcutt QC was conducting his inquiry, the BBC was uncovering unpleasant secrets about the child sex abuse at Kincora. The Cabinet Office became concerned.

The revelations were made by Peter Taylor on a ‘Public Eye’ documentary about Kincora and MI5. It was broadcast by the BBC on 1 June 1990.

David Gowan of the Cabinet Office became involved in monitoring the documentary in conjunction with the NIO, MI5 and the MoD.



A ‘SECRET’ letter written by Gowan to Stephen Rickard of MI5 reveals that the Cabinet Office was aware that Ian Cameron of MI5 had not co-

operated with the RUC and the Terry Inquiry when they had probed the scandal. (The letter is reproduced in full below.)

Cameron was an employee of MI5, a part of the Home Office. However, he was being concealed inside the MoD at this time to disguise his role as an MI5 officer.

MI5 had refused to let anyone talk to Cameron while he was masquerading as an official of the MoD.

Yet, Terry had stated in his report that the MoD had co-operated with him.

The officials of the Cabinet Office who were dealing with Kincora must have read the Terry Report.

Gowan's letter to Rickard establishes that the Cabinet Office knew the truth, i.e., that MI5 and the MoD had denied the police access to Cameron.

The Cabinet Office did nothing to rectify the lie contained in Terry's report.

Terry was not asked why he had lied by anyone in Whitehall.

Why?

## **168. WAS MI5 SPYING ON THE BBC?**

Gowan's letter was marked 'SECRET'. It was circulated to a group that included Brian Blackwell of MI5 who was stationed at the NIO.

It also went to MI5's legal adviser, Bernard Sheldon.

According to Gowan, there had been an 'unexpected problem' with the BBC's broadcast: it had described failure of 'the RUC in 1982 to take evidence from Mr Cameron'.

Why was this 'unexpected'?

Did MI5 have eyes and ears inside the BBC who had failed to report this to their handlers?

Was MI5 tapping Taylor's phone?

## **169. THE CABINET OFFICE FAILED TO DISPUTE A LIE BY THE RUC.**

According to Gowan's letter, the RUC had asserted that it did not believe Ian Cameron had any useful knowledge. This was not true.

So, why did the RUC say as much?

The Cabinet Office also knew this was a lie.

Cameron was a key figure in the Kincora scandal.

Cameron had been told by Capt. Brian Gemmell that William McGrath was abusing boys in Belfast. Gemmell had been ordered by Cameron not to pursue the matter.



Peter Taylor and Brian Gemmell

The Cabinet Office knew about this incident, not the least because the BBC broadcast had described the event.

Significantly, the BBC had not named Gemmell during the Public Eye broadcast. Yet, the Cabinet Office did not question the veracity of what the anonymous guest – Gemmell – was saying.

The only conclusion to draw is that MI5 and the Cabinet Office not only

knew the contributor was Gemmell but that what he was saying was true.

## **170. THE CABINET OFFICE FELT IT WAS ‘FORTUNATE’ THAT THE PRESS WAS NOT FOLLOWING UP THE BBC’S EVIDENCE ABOUT STATE COLLUSION IN CHILD RAPE.**

Public Eye had secured an interview with Gemmell. He told them that MI5 had developed an interest in using sexual blackmail to recruit John McKeague of the Red Hand Commando as an ‘informant’.

McKeague was a notorious terrorist. He had been interned in 1973. The NIO was aware of his sexual proclivities. Declassified records show that NIO officials made ‘ribald’ jokes about his sexuality at a meeting with UDA leaders. [See Urwin, *A State in Denial*.]

During the Public Eye broadcast, Peter Taylor speculated that MI5 had been aware of what was going on at Kincora but had exploited it for intelligence purposes.

Gowan stated that it was ‘fortunate that the press have not so far shown much interest in the BBC programme’.

If Peter Taylor’s speculation was wide of the mark, how could it have been ‘fortunate’ that the media was not following the story?

Why would it bother the Cabinet Office if the media investigated something that would turn out to be untrue?

## **171. THE ‘SECRET’ GOWAN LETTER IN FULL.**

The recipients of the ‘SECRET’ Cabinet Office letter included: Miss J Wheldon, Law Officers’ Department; Bernard Sheldon, MI5’s legal adviser; P. Cassell Esq, HD GS Sec, of the MoD; and D Auckland, F6, Home Office, and Miss S Phippard, Cabinet Office.

It is marked as having been read by Brian Blackwell of MI5.

Gowan's letter reads as follows

***KINCORA BBC "PUBLIC EYE" PROGRAMME OF 1 JUNE***

***1. Thank you for sending me a copy of your submission of 1 June to Mr Blackwall.***

***2. The programme was very much as expected. The one unexpected problem (which we discussed earlier today), is that after describing the steps taken by the RUC in 1982 to take evidence from Mr Cameron (who was not named by the BBC), the presenter said that the Northern Ireland Office had made the following statements during the previous week:***

***a. The RUC did approach the Security Service in 1982 with a request that the senior officer would give evidence. The RUC did not however regard the Security Service officer as being central to their investigation. In fact he had no information which would have been relevant to the inquiry into Kincora.***

***b. There were no operations or source protection reasons which would have prevented the senior officer from giving evidence to the police.***

***c. There was, however, a general principle at stake: the risk that such an interview might have led the officer to reveal information about the structure, organisation and modus operandi of the intelligence services.***

***3. You told me at the weekend that the Northern Ireland office did in fact make these points on a strictly unattributable basis to the presenter of the programme, Mr Taylor. You said that the line was cleared with the Security Service.***

***4. The programme concluded by alleging that the Security Service had not been prepared to cooperate with the McGonagle, Terry and Hughes Inquiries. The presenter asked***

*whether it might have been the case that the Security Service had been aware in the mid-70s of what was taking place at Kincora, but had not wished to intervene because their knowledge of homosexual activity by McGrath and others was useful to them for intelligence purposes. Mr Taylor implied that this interpretation was borne out by interest which (according to the former Army intelligence officer involved in the programme) the Security Service had shown in the 1970s in using the suspicion that the loyalist paramilitary, John McKeague, was homosexual as a means of putting pressure on him to become an informant.*

*5. It is fortunate that the press have not so far shown much interest in the BBC programme. It is, however, likely that Mr Tam Dalyell MP will pick up the statement which the BBC attributed to the Northern Ireland Office and try to build on this in future Parliamentary questions*

*6. We imagine that you will now be working on a defensive line which can be used as a basis for answers to PQs and for use by News Department. We should be grateful if you could consult us about the draft.*

## **172. AN HONEST MAN PROVIDES A GLIMPSE AT THE TRUTH DESPITE THE GAGS RESTRICTING WHAT HE COULD SAY.**

David Calcutt QC recognised that the terms of reference handed to him by Defence Secretary Tom King MP were too restrictive and stretched them a little. He completed his report on 10 August 1990. It was short and is quoted in full below:

*1. The Secretary of State for Defence has asked me to advise him 'Whether an injustice was done to Mr Colin Wallace as a result of the manner in which his case was presented to the Civil Service Appeal Board when on 17 October 1975 it considered the decision of the Ministry of Defence to terminate his employment on disciplinary grounds; and, if so, to*

*recommend whether compensation should be paid to him.*

*2. My terms of reference are precise, and, strictly construed, would require me to limit myself to a consideration of the manner in which Mr Wallace's case was presented at the hearing which took place before the Civil Service Appeal Board (CSAB) on 17 October 1975 (and whether that resulted in an injustice). Having, however, considered the relevant material, I take the view that a slightly wider approach is called for, and that I should also take into account what took place shortly before and in anticipation of the hearing.*

*3. The Secretary of State has specifically asked me not to prepare a Report, but simply to express my conclusions. I nevertheless take the view that a bare expression of my conclusions, without more, would possibly be open to misinterpretation, and that some reason, however brief, is needed.*

*4. After wide reading and consultation, I have reached the clear conclusion that the hearing which took place before the Civil Service Appeal Board on 17 October 1975 was unsatisfactory in two material respects.*



*5. First, I am satisfied that shortly before the hearing took place representatives of the Ministry of Defence were in private*

*communication with the chairman of the hearing with regard to Mr Wallace's appeal. Such communications should not have happened; and I believe that what occurred probably affected the outcome of the appeal.*

*6. Secondly, Mr Wallace's work, as an information officer, was wide-ranging in its nature. I am satisfied that the full range of Mr Wallace's work was not made plain to the CSAB. In my view that CSAB needed to know the full range of his work if it was to adjudicate justly on his appeal.*

*7. The Ministry of Defence had decided to terminate Mr Wallace's employment. The CSAB recommended that if Mr Wallace wished to offer his resignation, the Department should accept this as an alternative to dismissal. In my view neither dismissal nor resignation (as an alternative to dismissal) was within the range of penalties which would have been reasonable for the isolated incident which gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings. In attempting to pass a restricted document to a journalist, at a time when and in the circumstances in which he did, Mr Wallace erred; but if this incident had been considered in the overall context of Mr Wallace's work, neither dismissal nor resignation (as an alternative to dismissal) was a reasonable penalty. To this extent, I am of the opinion that an injustice was done to Mr Wallace; and I so advise.*


*8. In the circumstances I am asked to recommend whether compensation should be paid to Mr Wallace, and, by implication, the amount of such compensation. In my view compensation should be paid. Precise calculations are not possible; but I have had regard principally to the amount of compensation which Mr Wallace might have received had compensation been paid to him in about 1975, to the fall in the value of money since 1975, and to the difficulty which Mr Wallace has experienced in obtaining alternative employment. In my view an appropriate amount of compensation would be £30,000 and I recommend that such sum should now be paid to Mr Wallace.*

## 173. COVERING UP THE MURDER OF A CHILD.

While Calcutt was researching, considering and finalising his report, Labour's Northern Ireland spokesman, Kevin McNamara MP, had been attempting to raise the Brian McDermott Murder Memo of November 1974 in the House of Commons. He placed a question about in the House in February 1990. This was the memo which Wallace had handwritten before sending it to be typed up at HQNI in November 1974.

It was the one which addressed the abuse of children at Kincora and the child murder of Brian McDermott in 1973.

The RUC always suspected that McDermott had been murdered by Alan Campbell. Campbell was part of the paedophile gang that swirled around Kincora. He was almost certainly an MI5 agent. Wallace had written about the gruesome McDermott murder in his November 1974 memo.



In 2021, the BBC suppressed a broadcast which cast more light on Campbell's role in the murder. (This will be discussed in more detail in a later section.)

The Cabinet Office, MI5 and the RUC knew of Campbell's involvement when McNamara placed his question. They agonised for months about how to deal with it.

George Caskey, the architect of the Kincora cover-up, was consulted. Caskey had already tried to discredit the 1974 memo. As noted in an earlier section, Wallace had kept a photocopy of the original handwritten version of the memo. It had been typed up in his solicitor's office for ease of reading. Caskey had pretended in the early 1980s that he believed that the typed up was the original submitted by Wallace. He had then pretended that two typing machines had been used to complete it, thereby asserting that it was a forgery.

McNamara wanted the RUC to deposit their forensic report of the memo in the House of Commons. If, e.g., it showed that the RUC knew about the handwritten version, it would reveal Caskey's sleight of hand.

Documentary proof has since emerged that the RUC knew full well that the memorandum had been handwritten. See the note sent by Det Inspector Cooke of the RUC below:

**RESULT OF ACTION**  
Please write clearly or print

---

21 February 12.MD. telephoned Dion Roberts. re. documents. He stated with ref to GCSO. that Holroyd had produced a photocopy stating that this had been retyped from the original document and photocopied. Various things had been crossed out by Holroyd to protect the source. Holroyd stated he got the document from a "very high up well placed source". Dic Roberts believes that Wallace indicated to Holroyd where this document could be obtained. He also believes that Wallace was aware that Holroyd was producing these documents to the police.

*(complete details overleaf)*

The RUC furnished the Hart Inquiry with a copy of the typed version from its archives.

S. Rickard of MI5 wrote to Caskey, Blackwell, and others on 8 February 1990, stating that the report should not be disclosed and seeking advice on what might happen if a Select Committee sought it.



In the wake of the Calcutt Inquiry, the MoD refused to let the Defence Select Committee see the four-page document job 'justification'. In a letter dated 11 February 1991, the MoD stated that it contained 'sensitive information relating to the security and intelligence matters' and that the provision of such papers, even under the conditions relating to the Committee's access to classified information, 'would be inconsistent with the conventions'.

The four-page document has never been released. David Calcutt QC never got to see it.

No copy has ever reached any emanation of Parliament.

## **175. WALLACE REPORTS CALCUTT'S FINDINGS TO THE METROPOLITAN POLICE.**

Wallace's solicitor referred the findings of Calcutt's investigation to the Metropolitan Police. They concluded that the way in which the MoD had handled the case provided prima facie evidence of a conspiracy to defraud.

Was this official report sufficient to prompt the institution of police enquiries?

The Metropolitan Police passed the buck to the DPP, Sir Allan Green QC, for a direction. Green was sent a file to consider on 21 September 1990, but did not reply until March 1991. Green's conclusion was that 'the evidence is not such as to justify the institution of police enquiries'.

Is there reason to suspect something untoward here? Unfortunately, there is.

A few months later, Green was caught kerb crawling, i.e., prowling around London in his car looking for prostitutes. There is no reason to believe that this was a habit he suddenly embarked upon for the first time in late 1991.

It must have occurred to Green that the police – and therefore MI5 –

knew about his nocturnal appetites.

A man like Green would have been foolish to take a gamble that MI5 was oblivious to his sleazy secrets. Green could not dare take a risk by crossing them over the Wallace case.

Irrespective, his luck ran out. He was halted by the police for kerb crawling in the King's Cross district of London in October 1991 and furnished with a formal caution. He was forced to resign as DPP.

## **176. SAVILE, SMITH AND MORRISON RECEIVE KNIGHTHOODS.**



1990 was notable for another reason: Jimmy Savile OBE (since 1972) was awarded a knighthood in the Queen's birthday honours list. This represented a personal triumph for Thatcher who had tried to have the honour bestowed on Savile on four earlier occasions.

She had ennobled the notorious child rapist Cyril Smith in 1988.

Peter Morrison – whom she knew full well was an abuser – received his knighthood in 1991. She had stepped down by then, but the honour was handed out to Morrison at her request. (For details about Morrison, see section 004.)

## CHAPTER 13.

### WALLACE IS VINDICATED

#### **177. CONFIRMATION OF THE ANTI-WILSON PLOT EMERGED. AN INQUIRY DID NOT TAKE PLACE. PARLIAMENT WAS MISLED.**

The Calcutt Inquiry came hot on the heels of revelations about the anti-Wilson plot, an issue Wallace had first raised in an interview in April 1980.

In a functioning democracy, a full judicial inquiry into a treacherous plot of this nature should have taken place. The findings of the Calcutt Inquiry should have added to the pressure for an inquiry. Instead, the Tories persisted in their policy of misleading Parliament and the public

The revelations made by Wallace about the anti-Wilson plot were confirmed by Peter Wright in his book 'Spycatcher' which had finally gone on sale. Wright justified his treachery on the delusion that Wilson was a communist.

Wright revealed at page 369 of *Spycatcher* that he and a number of other MI5 officers plotted to discredit and topple Wilson in 1974:

*The plan was simple. In the run up to the election ... MI5 would arrange for selective details of the intelligence about leading Labour Party figures, but especially Wilson, to be leaked to sympathetic pressmen. Using our contacts in the press and among union officials, word of the material contained in MI5 files, and the fact that Wilson was considered a security risk, would be passed*


*round. Soundings in the office had already been taken and up to thirty officers had given their approval to the scheme. Facsimile copies of some files were to be made and distributed to overseas newspapers, and the matter was to be raised in Parliament for maximum effect.*

By his own admission, in the years that followed, Wright and other MI5 officers engaged in twenty-three criminal conspiracies and committed twelve acts of treason against the elected government of the day. Most of this involved spewing out propaganda that Wilson was a security risk to his 'contacts in the press'. They made good use of *Private Eye* magazine.

These revelations were entirely consistent with Wallace's revelations of Colin Wallace about 'John Shaw' and Operation Clockwork Orange

## **178. THE PAEDOPHILE BLACKMAILER FROM THE MONDAY CLUB.**

One of the problems for some of the MPs who wanted an inquiry into the anti-Wilson plot was that the conspirators kept files on them.



*George Kennedy Younger (left) and in the middle of the group in the*

*picture on the right.*

George Kennedy Young, the former Deputy Chief of MI6, was one of the anti-Wilson plotters. He had participated in the failed bid to topple the government of Syria, *Operation Struggle*. He also plotted the assassination of President Nasser of Egypt, and along with the CIA, was involved in the successful ouster of Prime Minister Mossadeq of Iran in the 1950s.

Young had joined the Conservative Party after he left MI6 miffed that Wilson had not appointed him as its chief. Young was a member of the extremist Monday Club. His intelligence habits never abandoned him. He collected dirt on MPs, including those who were attracted to young males. These undoubtedly included fellow Monday Clubbers such as Jim Molyneux MP and Molyneux's close friend, Harvey Proctor MP. Proctor met at least one young male from NI, presumably through Molyneux.

## **179. MICHAEL MCCAUL OF MI5 AND OTHERS ARE NAMED IN THE COMMONS.**

On 23 November 1988, Labour MP Chris Mullins raised the issue of the plot against Wilson. He denounced Michael McCaul of MI5 and others during a speech he gave in the Commons about the plot:

*I propose to examine [PM Thatcher's] statement of 6 May last year [denying a plot against Wilson] in the light of information which has become available since then. .. The Prime Minister said: 'There have been interviews with officers in post in the relevant parts of the security service at that time, including officers whose names have been made public.'—[Official Report, 6 May 1987; Vol. 115, c. 724.] Students of official statements will note the careful reference to 'officers in post'. The problem is that most of those who were alleged to have been involved in, or were aware of, what was going on departed the service of MI5 and MI6 before the commencement of this alleged inquiry.*



*To name but a few, Arthur Martin retired in or around 1970, Patrick Stewart retired not long after, Barry Russell-Jones left in 1981, Tony Brooks and Jeremy Wetherall left in 1978, Charles Elwell left in 1979, Harry Wharton left in 1980, Harold Doyne Ditus, Michael McCaul, Ray Whitby and Robert Holden have also retired, James Speirs of MI6 left the service in 1986 and Peter Troughton left in or about 1978. The only one who to my knowledge is still serving is Mollie Sugden. All those people could have assisted with inquiries. It would be interesting to know from the Minister how many were interviewed. I suspect that the answer is none.*



Mullins also pointed out that Thatcher had claimed that all of the MI5 officers who had been interviewed had denied they were involved in, or aware of the plot. Mullins was not impressed

*If that is so, one can only conclude that the wrong people were interviewed or that those interviewed were, as the saying goes,*

*economical with the truth. I make no allegation as to who was involved, but most of the 30 or so MI5 and MI6 officers who served with Peter Wright in the K5 branch of the intelligence service at Gower Street in the early 1970s must have at least been aware of what was going on. Indeed, some of them obviously talked frankly to David Leigh [Sunday Observer journalist and author of The Wilson Plot].*

Mullin pointed out that two of them, Jeremy Wetherall and Harry Wharton:

*are said to have had in their possession an entirely innocent picture of Harold Wilson, accompanied by a young woman, taken many years ago in Moscow. Apparently that photograph came from MI6. What were they doing with it, and why was it being circulated?*



Ian Cameron and Denis Payne should be added to the list of treacherous MI5 officers.

## **180. PRIVATE EYE MAGAZINE.**



Chris Mullins has described how the smear campaign was executed with the aid of Private Eye. It hinged on leaking information from MI5's file on Wilson.

In 1974 and 1975, someone in MI5 was clearly feeding Patrick Marnham

of Private Eye very detailed material which seemed to have come from the 'Harry Worthington' [i.e. Harold Wilson] file which was kept locked in a safe in the office of the director-general [of MI5].

## 181. CHAPMAN PINCHER.



Sources in the intelligence service were also spreading lies about Wilson, his ministers and Labour members of parliament to other journalists including Chapman Pincher. It is well known that one of Pincher's sources was Lord Rothschild; the identity of

the others is unclear.

The name of another of Pincher's source became known later, Michael McCaul. The MI5 man had been a source of stories since the early 1960s. In his autobiography, Pincher described how in 1961:

*.. I was approached by McCaul with an exclusive newspaper story which, he explained, would do MI5 and the nation a valuable service. He had a series of cards which were case-records of men and women who, while visiting Moscow, had been suborned by KGB agents into giving them secret information. He then explained that Britain was shortly to stage a big electronics exhibition Moscow and many of those taking part in it worked for firms involved with secret defence contracts and, so, could be prime targets for recruitment, by bribes or blackmail by the KGB, having been induced into blackmailable situations, mainly sexual, which had been surreptitiously photographed. He, therefore, wanted me to issue a warning on MI5's behalf by printing a few of the case-records, allegedly from MI5's files, to publicise what the KGB might try to do. They were so interesting that I did so in a large feature given much prominence. (Pincher, p. 70)*

## **182. WRIGHT REVEALS MICHAEL HANLEY WAS AWARE OF THE PLOT.**



Michael Hanley, the former D-G of MI5, was aware of the anti-Wilson machination.

No fool, Wilson had suspected a plot was afoot in 1975. That summer, he summonsed Maurice Oldfield of MI6 and asked him about the rumours which were in circulation about one. Oldfield replied that he knew about the rumours and pointed to a section of MI5 which he described as being unreliable. Oldfield knew enough about what was happening to contact Wright whom he advised to go to Sir Michael Hanley, the D-G of MI5, and confess his involvement in the plot against Wilson. Wright did this the next morning and wrote in Spycatcher that Hanley:

*went as white as a sheet. He might have suspected that feelings against Wilson ran high in the office, but now he was learning that half of his staff were up to their necks in a plot to get rid of the Prime Minister ... Ironically, his first reaction was anger with Maurice [Oldfield]. 'Bloody Maurice', he raged. 'Poking his nose into our business.' When he calmed down he asked me for the names. I gave them. Having come so far I could not very well refuse.*

Wilson called in Hanley on the afternoon of 7 August, 1975, and confronted him with what Oldfield had revealed to him. Hanley tried to convince Wilson that the plotting had ended.

## **183. WALLACE HAS HIS REPUTATION RESTORED TO HIM.**

In 1996 the Court of Appeal overturned Wallace's conviction for

manslaughter.



*Wallace and Dr West.*

Dr West, the corrupt Home Office pathologist, evaded prosecution for perjury because he was dying of cancer.

The British government did not order a judicial inquiry to find out what had happened behind the scenes in the prosecution of Wallace.

**184. LORD HUNT TELLS THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ANTI-WILSON PLOT. THIS CONFIRMED WHAT WALLACE HAD BEEN SAYING ALL ALONG.**

Wallace's successful appeal was not the only blow MI5 sustained in 1996.

In August 1996, no less a figure than Lord John Hunt, Cabinet Secretary, 1973-79, acknowledged that MI5 had plotted against Harold Wilson. Hunt told a Channel 4 documentary that:

*There is no doubt at all that a few, a very few, malcontents in MI5, people who should not have been there in the first place, a lot of them like Peter Wright who were right-wing, malicious and had serious personal grudges, gave vent to these and spread damaging malicious stories about that Labour government.*



Hunt's revelations were still not enough to bring about a judicial inquiry.

## CHAPTER 14.

### LYING TO PARLIAMENT

#### 185. THE HOUSE OF COMMONS WAS MISLED ON OTHER OCCASIONS.

At 8:45 p.m. on 4 December 1971, a UVF gang bombed a small pub in Belfast called McGurks, a cosy place where Catholics and Protestants from the same neighbourhood – all of whom knew each other well – met for a few drinks.



The British government did not want to have to introduce internment (detention without trial) for Loyalist paramilitaries for a variety of reasons. Hence, the bombing of the bar was blamed on the Provisional IRA.

On 6 December 1971, Stanley McMaster, a Unionist MP for East Belfast, asked Lord Balneil, Edward Heath's Minister of State for Defence, about the attack. The question was a plant. In response, Balneil told Parliament:

*The security forces have not yet been able to establish precisely where the bomb was placed.*

*Investigations by Army ammunition technical officers indicate that the bomb was detonated within the structure, probably just inside the bar on the ground floor. I am afraid that I cannot be more positive than that, because hon. Members will have seen on television the extent of the damage and will realise the difficulty of establishing firmer conclusions. But investigations are continuing.*

Balneil's answer misleading in the extreme. 48 hours before he made his statement in parliament, Army bomb disposal experts had reported the precise spot where the bomb had detonated and that was 'in the entrance

way on the ground floor’.

Documents obtained by Ciarán MacAirt of Paper Trail show that Balneil’s response to McMaster was prepared and ‘approved’ by senior MoD officials in Northern Ireland and at the MoD in London. The declassified documents show that officials were also running a nasty whispering campaign. A script was prepared. One line was that:

***I understand – though this should not be revealed publicly – that two of those killed have been identified as members of the Brady [Provisional] IRA.***

‘Brady’ was a reference to Ruairi O Bradaigh one of the co-founders of the Provisional IRA. (The other faction was the Official IRA.) The allegation about IRA involvement – whether Provisional or Official – was totally false.

Additional scripts were prepared for presentation to Parliament as part of the conspiracy to conceal the true identity of the UVF attackers, and blame the atrocity on the IRA. A question was made ready so it could be fed to a pliable MP who could seek an update about the McGurk’s attack. The following ‘approved’ answer was prepared for Lord Balneil to give as an answer to it in Parliament:

***Investigations are not yet complete, and inquests have not yet been held. However, further investigations by forensic experts and by Army ammunition technical officers have confirmed, on the basis of the pattern of debris and the effect of the explosion on the structure that the bomb exploded within the building. Five of the deaths were as a direct result of the blast, not as a result of the building collapsing. These conclusions are consistent with theories that the bomb went off accidentally, perhaps while in transit.***

In the event, although senior officials at Army HQNI and at the MoD approved the statement, it was not used. It is believed that the initial attempts to blame the IRA for the attack had been so effective that further disinformation was not necessary. Nevertheless, the inescapable fact is that this was yet another deliberate attempt to mislead Parliament.

## **185A. MANIPULATING HAROLD WILSON SO HE MISLEADS THE HOUSE OF COMMONS**

As noted earlier, Harold Wilson became prime minister of the UK again in early 1974. He wanted to embark upon a policy of releasing detainees who had been interned. The security forces were aghast and launched an operation to thwart him.

Two years earlier, the security forces had discovered IRA documents which outlined a plan to defend Belfast in the event of a breakdown in law and order. The plans showed how they hoped to defend Nationalist communities in Belfast from attacks by Loyalist paramilitaries and their supporters.

These plans were dusted down and shown to the new Secretary of State for NI, Merlyn Rees MP of the Labour Party. They were, however, misrepresented to Rees. He was told that they were part of a scheme to create chaos in Belfast. He spoke to Wilson and the pair were diverted from their intended path of releasing internees. Wilson addressed the House of Commons the following morning thus:

**Last night I was informed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who was in conference with senior officers of the RUC and the Army, that in the last few days the security forces in Northern Ireland have come into possession of a quantity of documents, the general purport of which I must disclose to the House.**

**These documents reveal a specific and calculated plan by the IRA, by means of ruthless and indiscriminate violence, to foment inter-sectarian hatred and a degree of chaos with the object of enabling the IRA to achieve a position in which it proceeds to occupy and control certain pre-designated and densely populated areas in the city of Belfast and its suburbs. The plan shows a deliberate intention to manipulate the emotions of large sections of the people by inflicting violence and hardship on them in the hope of creating a situation in which the IRA could present itself as the protector of the Catholic population.**

Ted Heath contributed to the issue saying:

**A The whole House will wish to join the Prime Minister, as it has already demonstrated, in his congratulations to the Services, the security forces, the Army and the RUC on the effective operation that they have carried out. At the same time, the account that he has given of documents which the Services have found confirms what has been known to his previous administration and to ourselves - that it was one of the major objectives of the IRA to find every possible means of creating conflict between the two communities in Northern Ireland. We therefore welcome the fact that the right hon. Gentleman will release all the documentation he can in order to demonstrate this clearly not only to Northern Ireland but to the Republic and to those who take an interest in these proceedings elsewhere in the world. I hope that it will be possible for the right hon. Gentleman, after consultation with the security authorities, to release the documentation as early as possible.**

**We respect the fact that, if any criminal charges are likely to follow, such documentation must be reserved, but the right hon. Gentleman will recognise that the IRA will waste no time in trying to launch a propaganda counter-offensive of accusations that this is the work of the British Government, of British Intelligence or of the Protestant community, and that therefore the publication of documentation should be as complete as possible in order to show everyone exactly what**



**has been worked out as a specific operation by the IRA in order to try to achieve its purposes. [Heath 13 May 1974.]**

## CHAPTER 15.

# COLLUSION: WALLACE IS VINDICATED.

### 186. THE JACKAL, AN AGENT OF RUC SPECIAL BRANCH.

The Historical Enquiries Team (HET), the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, the Barron Inquiry and a string of court cases taken against the NI State have established that a number of Loyalist terrorists who committed murder were agents of the RUC Special Branch. Yet again, the concerns Wallace had expressed about collusion turned out to be justified.

Baroness Nuala O’Loan, NI Police Ombudsman, 1999-2007, was one of those who gained access to RUC files. She was aghast at what she read in them. The excuse given to her to justify the relationship between the RUC Special Branch and the UVF was that it ‘preserved life’. Yet, as O’Loan observed, these men were guilty of multiple murders and their relationship with the RUC seemed to have saved preserved ‘precious little life’. [Interested readers may care to acquire Anne Cadwallader’s book ‘Lethal Allies’ and Margaret Urwin’s ‘A State in Denial’ for a comprehensive overview of these collusive links.]



One of these agents was Robin ‘The Jackal’ Jackson, the leader of the Mid Ulster UVF. In addition to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, he was involved in the Miami Showband massacre and the campaign of sectarian murder of innocent Catholics in what became known as the Murder Triangle.

During 1973 and 1974, Wallace sought clearance to target the principal members of the mid-Ulster UVF. In June 1974, a month after the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, he was denied permission to target Jackson, his superior, Billy Hanna and other UVF men.

Judge Barron stated of Jackson that there he was 'reliably said to have had relationships with British Intelligence and/or RUC Special Branch officers'.

Jackson died from cancer in 1998. He was responsible for approximately fifty murders.



The full truth about Jackson remains buried.

## **187. THE JACKAL AND THE MURDER OF SGT JOE CAMPBELL, AN HONEST MEMBER OF THE RUC.**

The Wallace case is also linked to another scandal, the murder of Sgt Joe Campbell by his colleagues in the RUC. Campbell was murdered by rogue elements in the RUC, some of whom were involved in having Wallace dismissed from his job in 1975, i.e. the RUC's murderous dirty tricks cabal.

Campbell was murdered because he had become aware of State involvement in the importation of Loyalist arms.



Robin Jackson was involved in his murder.

In April 1974, a secret briefing document was prepared for then prime minister, Harold Wilson. It informed him that an Army Intelligence unit, known as the Special Reconnaissance Unit, had replaced the Military Reaction Force (MRF) units which had been created in 1971. The MRF had carried out undercover surveillance and assassinations in NI. The document informed Wilson that the new unit was operating under the cover name 'Northern Ireland Training and Advisory Team' (NITAT)

and was under the control of HQNI.



On 22 July 1974 shots were fired at a police car on the northern outskirts of Ballymena, some 20 miles north of Belfast. Two of the car's three occupants were wounded. It was assumed the attack was the work of the IRA.

Three years later, on the evening of 25 February 1977, Sgt Campbell, a Catholic member of the RUC, was shot and killed as he closed the gates of Cushendall RUC station where he had been based since 1963. Initially, the killing looked like yet another atrocity by the IRA. Sgt Campbell was an immensely popular police officer within the local community and there was a tradition of policing in his family. His father and grandfather had been members of the Garda. He had only joined the RUC as a last resort because there were no vacancies in the Garda in 1963.

Gradually, information began to emerge that the attack on the police car in July 1974 and the murder of Sgt Campbell in 1977 were not the work of the IRA. The chief suspect was a RUC Special Branch officer, Charles McCormick. Even more concerning, it was believed that McCormick and a republican double agent he was running, Anthony O'Doherty, worked for the Army's new 'Special Reconnaissance Unit.'

In 1980, McCormick was charged with Sgt Campbell's murder and 26 other offences, including possession of explosives and firearms and carrying out a series of armed robberies. The chief prosecution witness at the 1982 trial was Anthony O'Doherty, his former partner in crime. At the conclusion of the trial, McCormick was acquitted of the murder of Sgt Campbell, but he was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment on foot of convictions relating to 27 other charges, including possession of explosives and firearms and armed robbery.

Two years later those convictions were overturned.

Four months after McCormick's convictions were quashed, O'Doherty

was informed that James Prior, the Secretary of State for NI, had recommended that the Royal Prerogative be used to remit eight years of his sentence. This meant he regained his freedom.

Researchers who have studied the case believe that McCormick was the killer of Sgt Campbell and that he was assisted by Robin Jackson.

Jackson worked closely with the RUC Special Branch and several Army Intelligence officers during the 1970s. He even had photographs taken of himself at his home socialising with Captain Robert Nairac, a well-known British Army undercover operative.



It is believed that Jackson was recruited by McCormick to kill Sgt Campbell.

A report by the NI Ombudsman, Dr Michael Maguire, in 2014 concluded:

*In considering the allegations that the motive for the murder of Sergeant Campbell included his knowledge that firearms were being imported by loyalist paramilitaries through the Cushendall area and that his murder involved rogue elements of the security forces, members of the UVF including Robin Jackson (now deceased) and others, I am mindful of the limited information available with the passage of time. Whilst my investigation has established some evidence that the security forces were aware of arms being smuggled into Red Bay, near Cushendall and that there is a witness statement alleging direct culpability in this regard, the overall picture is inconclusive. On the basis of the information available I can neither discount nor substantiate the allegations of a wider conspiracy into the murder of Sergeant Campbell.*



Dr Maguire went on to say:

***There is sufficient, reliable evidence that senior police officers throughout the RUC's command structure, including the then Head of Special Branch and quite probably the Chief Constable, were aware of concerns, which had been documented, about a threat to his life and failed to act upon them.***

At the initial hearing at Belfast Coroner's Court in Belfast in June 2022, a barrister for Sgt Campbell's family raised the question about an Army officer being at the murder scene. Karen Quinlivan QC told coroner Patrick McGurgan that the claim emerged during a review exercise into outstanding legacy cases in 2016.

***We identified that there was information that suggests the involvement of a military intelligence liaison officer. .. It appears from the police report that a military intelligence liaison officer was at the scene of the murder on the night of the murder in the company of Robin Jackson.***

Mr McGurgan told the barrister representing the Army that he expected the MoD to comment on the claim later in the inquest process. 'That's something that I will be expecting the MoD to have comment on in due course,' he said.



To date, nothing more has been heard about the alleged presence of the 'military intelligence liaison officer'.

There is a very serious concern that in murdering Sgt Campbell, Charles McCormick was acting with the full knowledge of one of his Special Branch superiors, 'D'.

'D' is the man who was the driving force behind the RUC's involvement in the framing of Colin Wallace for allegedly leaking restricted and classified documents to Robert Fisk.

## CHAPTER 16.

# THE LAMENTABLE HART INQUIRY FIASCO.

### 188. THE CONCERNS OF THE NI COURT OF APPEAL.

In 2016, the Lord Chief Justice of NI, Sir Declan Morgan, commented in a judgement by the Court of Appeal relating to Gary Hoy, a victim of sexual abuse at Kincora, that



*This society has been rocked to its core by the shocking disclosure of the abuse of children in this community over many years. Just as shocking has been the manner in which the institutions to which some of the abusers belonged sought to protect the institution rather than the children. There is a suggestion in this case that children in Kincora were abused and prostituted in order to satisfy the interests of national security. If that is true it must be exposed. As a society we must not repeat the errors of the institutions and should remember our obligations to the children. If the suggestion is not true the rumour and suspicion surrounding this should be allayed.’ [27 May 2016 at paragraph 41.]*

### 189. THE HART REPORT OF 2017

Unfortunately for all concerned, the Hart enquiry, which reported seven months later, failed to allay concerns about Kincora.


Colin Wallace wrote to the Hart Inquiry (also known as the Historical Institutional Abuse, or HIA, inquiry) chaired by Sir Anthony Hart, enclosing an extract from a letter he had written to the Institution of

Professional Civil Servants (IPCS) at the time of his disciplinary hearing in 1975. No one doubted the authenticity of the letter. It referred to 'homosexual prostitution at a children's home in Belfast'. Hart dismissed the document because it did not specifically refer to Kincora by name. Hart was looking at a number of homes, not merely Kincora. If he truly believed that the reference was not to Kincora, he surely should have asked Wallace to identify to which home he was referring.



He did not.

CONFIDENTIAL



**HEADQUARTERS  
NORTH WEST DISTRICT**  
Cueden Hall Bamber Bridge Preston PR5 6AY  
Telephone Bamber Bridge Military  
Preston 35436

RECEIVED  
30 SEP 1975  
IPCS

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Cliff Crook Esq  
The Institution of Professional Civil Servants  
Northumberland Avenue  
London  
WC2N 5ES

Your reference  
Our reference  
Date 29 September 1975


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Dear Cliff,

Thank you very much for your letter of 26 September regarding the Appeal hearing on 6 October.

I am concerned that we have still not received a reply to my letter of 2 July to John Groves requesting access to the various documents listed. You will recall that when I had a brief interview with him on 11 February to seek guidance on what information I could give to the RUC about my work on psychological operations, he said that I should confine my comments to justifiable activities directed at the FIRA and not at Loyalists. My concern now is that there may be an attempt by the Ministry to deny any form of official 'dirty tricks' organisation existed within the Security Forces. For example, in the Ministry's summary of my oral representations made to John Groves and Mr Fairbairn on 10 May reference is made in paragraph 3 to "actions" which I was asked to launch during the UWC strike. The word "actions" appears to have been used by MCD to conceal the fact that I referred to the attempts made by the Security Service to discredit various Loyalist politicians, including the Rev Ian Paisley, by the use of forged documents and by linking the MPs with Loyalist paramilitary figures involved in homosexual prostitution at a children's home in Belfast. I can fully understand why the Ministry would not want to put such information on record, but I wonder if evidence of that nature will be made available to the Board sub rosa. For example, will the Board have access to the statement I gave to Inspector [REDACTED] RUC?

**190. THE BANGOR CONNECTION: HART IGNORED A DOCUMENT WHICH REVEALED: 'JOSEPH MAINS MAY BE EXTENSIVELY INVOLVED IN A PROSTITUTION RING SUPPLYING BOYS TO HOTELS IN BELFAST AND BANGOR.'**



3. Joseph Mains may be extensively involved in a prostitution ring supplying boys to hotels in Belfast and Bangor. The hotels include: Grafton Lodge; Park Avenue; Sturmount; Europa and the Queen Court in Bangor. McKeaghen is said to use the Royal Avenue Hotel for the same purposes. Being in mind that the Belfast LGBT leadership use the Grafton Lodge and the Park Avenue for their meetings, it is highly credible that they do not know what is going on there. Note: Mains has a brother in the RUC. He also has a questionable relationship with the Belfast Corporation Welfare Committee chairman (Cairdwell) and legal adviser (Young)

Hart ignored another crucial document written by Wallace in the mid-1970s which revealed that: 'Joseph Mains may be extensively involved in a prostitution ring supplying boys to hotels in Belfast and Bangor.'

This lapse on the part of Hart was alarming.



Hart heard evidence from James Miller (not to be mixed up with the MI5 agent). Miller described how Mains trafficked him and other Kinvara residents to a hotel in Bangor in a van. He had to wait outside the hotel in a vehicle while, one after another, the boys returned to it. He recalled how they were sobbing after their ordeal inside the building. On this occasion, Miller was lucky not to be sent inside.

Miller's evidence was presented to the Hart Inquiry in 2016. No one doubted he was telling the truth, nor challenged his credibility. Hence, Miller presented a serious problem for Hart as he undermined the narrative Hart had latched onto at an early stage, i.e., that the abuse at Kincora went no further than the home itself. Since there was no way to undermine Miller's credibility, Hart's solution was to ignore him.

Wallace's notes indicate that the hotel was called the Queen's Court. The choice of this hotel was particularly cynical: it was frequented by lots of young teenagers because it had a disco and pop bands performed at it.

## **191. HART AND THE EVIDENCE ABOUT THE PARK AVENUE AND GIRTON LODGE.**


Wallace's note also described how the ring took boys to the Park Avenue Hotel and the Girton Lodge.

MI5 had bedrooms on the first floor of the Park Avenue bugged.

Richard Kerr was abused at the Park Avenue.

All of this was ignored by Hart.

## **192. HART AND THE VISIT OF AN MI5 OFFICER TO KINCORA.**



*Brian Gemmell (left); Chris Moore's book on Kincora; Chris Moore (right).*

Brian Gemmell, the captain in military intelligence who reported to Ian Cameron of MI5, divulged that one of his military colleagues had once

been asked to drive a man in civilian clothing from HQNI to Kincora. At the time MI5 had offices at HQNI alongside those of the British Army.

A similar account had appeared in Chris Moore's book on Kincora. In his report Hart was faced with facts even he could not wish away. He stated that:

*At page 145 of his book **The Kincora Scandal**, Chris Moore refers to an account by a former Military Intelligence Officer he refers to as 'Dennis' driving a civilian to Kincora 'at the end of 1975 or early in 1976'. The Inquiry has been able to identify 'Dennis, and at the Inquiry's request the MoD traced Dennis who provided a witness statement to the Inquiry. In it he described how he was instructed to drive an unnamed visitor to East Belfast. He collected his passenger at HQNI at night, he believes around 7 pm. At his passenger's direction he drove to a house in East Belfast that he now knows to be Kincora. His passenger entered the building where he remained for a period which Dennis describes as not being sufficiently longer or shorter than an hour, i.e., approximately one hour. When this passenger emerged Dennis drove him back to HQNI. [ Hart paragraph 603.]*

Hart did not draw the obvious conclusion from this, namely that Kincora was of interest to the intelligence community.

### **193. HART IGNORES OTHER KEY WITNESSES.**

Hart was also aware that Hugh Mooney of the IRD, Britain's former black propaganda department, had given an interview to The Sunday Correspondent during which he admitted that Wallace had repeatedly mentioned Kincora to him. This made no impression on Hart either. Hart did not call Mooney to testify before his inquiry.

Hart did not secure statements from Peter Broderick, Tony Staughton or Geoffrey Hutton either, let alone call them to give evidence from the witness box.

## **194. HART, THE CHIEF OF MI6 AND KINCORA.**

In 1980 MI5 (which is attached to the Home Office) carried out an inquiry into the conduct of the former Chief of MI6, Sir Maurice Oldfield, 1973-78. (MI6 is attached to the Foreign Office). This happened because Oldfield had been caught lying about his homosexuality and was deemed a security risk. Oldfield was also an abuser of 'rent boys', underage male prostitutes. MI6 reviewed their files relating to the matter in 2011. According to the Hart Report, 'Officer G' of MI6 'examined four ring binders with material relating to Sir Maurice Oldfield, including the 1980 MI5 investigation'. Officer G proceeded to describe a 'relationship' Oldfield had 'had with Kincora boys' home (KBH) in Belfast'. Oldfield was linked to Kincora 'through his friendship of the KBH Head'.



*Friends – Mains and Oldfield.*

Hart concluded that this was not evidence of MI6 knowledge of Kincora because Officer G had made a mistake and was apparently merely referring to allegations about a relationship. However, neither MI6 nor the Hart Report quoted a single contemporaneous report alleging a friendship between Oldfield and Joseph Mains, the only man who fits the description of 'KBH Head'. Indeed, there is no trace anywhere of such a report, nor one about a friendship with any of the other staff at Kincora.

This astonishing revelation was ignored by the British media. It did not prompt Hart to conclude that the intelligence services knew about Kincora before 1980.

## **195. HART AND THE CHIEF OF THE BRITISH SECRET SERVICE: HART CONTRADICTS HIMSELF.**

There is an obvious error at paragraph 607 of Chapter 29 of the Hart Report where it is stated that:

*As we have explained, Richard Kerr has alleged that he was sexually abused by Sir Maurice Oldfield.*

Emphatically, Kerr has never made any such an allegation.

Incredibly, at paragraph 159 of Chapter 26 the following appears:

*Kerr did not know at the time who Oldfield was, he says, and does not suggest that he abused Kincora boys.*

This execrable error has never been corrected.

## **196. OLDFIELD'S VISITS TO NORTHERN IRELAND 'BETWEEN 1974 AND 1979'.**

Throughout his report, Hart refers to MI6 by its alternative acronym, SIS. Like MI6, Oldfield was given a clean bill of health by the Hart Report:

*The Inquiry has examined all the material held by SIS relating to Sir Maurice Oldfield as described by SIS Officer A in his statement of 8 December 2016 and found nothing to indicate that Sir Maurice Oldfield ever visited Northern Ireland before he took up his appointment as Security Coordinator in October 1979. (624)*

This was not so. Michael Schneider (not his real name), an Englishman who worked at Lisburn British Army HQ where MI6 was based in the 1970s, recalls at least one visit to Belfast by Oldfield while he was Chief of MI6.

Hart was aware of his identity of this witness yet failed to call him as a witness.

In addition, a partially declassified MI5 telegram makes reference to the fact – as Hart put it – MI5 was ‘aware of allegations that the police suspect’ that Oldfield was involved in the Kincora scandal. Crucially, the part of the MI5 telegram which Hart published explained that the suspicion was:

*that Sir M. Oldfield was involved in the Kincora boys home affair in the course of occasional visits to Northern Ireland (associated with his job) between 1974 and 1979.*

How can this admission of ‘occasional visits’ be squared with Hart’s conclusion of none at all?

## 197. THE WITNESS WHO SAW BRIAN MCDERMOTT MURDER MEMO WAS NOT CALLED.



Michael Schneider had vital evidence: he had seen the Brian McDermott Child Murder memo of November 1974. It addressed the murder of the boy and the wider Kincora scandal.

Hart dismissed it as a forgery on the part of Wallace.

## **198. MICHAEL SCHNEIDER COULD HAVE EXPOSED THE FORGERY OF A STATEMENT IN HIS NAME.**

Michael Schneider was shocked when he was furnished with a statement which was drafted in his name (described earlier). It contained a number of serious lies, including one about the Brian McDermott murder. The fact that the RUC was prepared to commit forgery casts a doubt over all of the apparent witness statements taken by George Caskey and his team. Hart relied upon them as gospel.

## **199. MI6: 'WE CERTAINLY RAN AT LEAST ONE AGENT WHO WAS AWARE OF SEXUAL MALPRACTICE AT THE HOME'.**

One MI6 file that slipped out of its usually airtight archive in London was furnished to the Hart Inquiry. It addressed 'various allegations surrounding the Kincora Boys' Home' and stated that:


*We certainly ran at least one agent who was aware of sexual malpractice at the home and who may have mentioned this to his SIS (i.e. MI6) or Security Service [i.e. MI5) case officer.*

Richard Kerr is certain that he once burst in upon a meeting between Mains, Oldfield and other men in suits at Kincora once after he returned to the home unexpectedly after his school was shut down during cold weather.

MI6 might have made this admission as part of a damage limitation exercise. They may have been afraid that an MI6 officer was about to become a whistle-blower. In 2015 an anonymous MI6 agent confirmed to the Daily Express that the Kincora whistle-blower Robin Bryans had tried to expose the scandal in the 1970s. The MI6 agent was probably referring to the fact Bryans had informed two former NI ministers about the Anglo-Irish Vice Ring (A-IVR), namely Lord Donaldson and Lord Shackleton.

## 200. HART NEGLECTED THE TYRIE-ORCHIN MEMO.

The NIO and MI6 certainly knew of John McKeague's sexual deviancy. McKeague was an important part of the network that revolved around Kincora. The security departments of the NIO were staffed by MI5 and MI6 officers masquerading as civil servants along with some from the MoD. On 23 May 1975, Andy Tyrie, the Supreme Commander of the UDA – who is still alive – and another UDA commander, John Orchin, held a meeting with James Allan, a senior FCO officer then attached to the NIO but in reality an MI6 officer. According to declassified British files, during the discussion there were 'some ribald discussions of Mr McKeague's proclivities'. (CJ/43734).



The memo was published in Margaret Urwin's book on collusion, 'A State in Denial' at page 139. The book had six entries in its index relating to John McKeague; one for William McGrath and three for Colin Wallace. Urwin works with Justice for the Forgotten, an organisation which campaign, inter alia, for justice for the victims of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.

Hart did not deal with the Tyrie-Orchin document in his report which appeared in January 2017, i.e., after the appearance of Urwin's book. 'A State in Denial' received uniformly favourable reviews and widespread coverage in the print and broadcast media. It would appear Hart was not aware of this important book.

## 201. THE PAPERS RELATING TO COLIN WALLACE WHICH MAURICE OLDFIELD KEPT AT HIS FLAT.

When the police searched Oldfield's flat in 1980, they found papers relating to Wallace. The odds must be high that Oldfield was concerned about what Wallace knew about him and his links to Kincora.

Hart failed to consider this issue.

## **202. HART IGNORED TAM DALYELL.**

Tam Dalyell MP of the Labour Party achieved fame for having roasted Thatcher over the sinking of the Belgrano in 1982. Dalyell was a friend of Oldfield. The pair discussed Wallace's case before the spymaster's death in 1981. Oldfield expressed the view that Wallace had been 'unjustly treated'.

29/07/14

Telephone: 01506-83-4255

Dear David,

In the 1980's and 1990's, I was immersed in the case of Colin Wallace, a cause célèbre at the time.

After all these years, I can recall that one of the reasons I was so sure that Wallace had been unjustly treated was that I had talked to my friend, the late Sir Maurice Oldfield. Tony Cavendish, another senior member of the Intellectual Community was equally uncomfortable, as was Field Marshal Sir John Stanley. (I knew them well, and wrote both their obituaries for the Independent).

I heard you say on TV "I will get to the bottom of this." Actually, I'm very sympathetic to you on these matters, as disentangling events of 30 years ago is exceedingly difficult. I began to think that Ministers such as Archie Hamilton and Tom King acted in good faith.

I endorse Wallace's denial. It might be helpful if you asked a civil servant involved in "getting to the bottom" to see Wallace. He is not unreasonable, and not after money - simply an acknowledgment that he acted honourably in the interests of our country. He went to the Press at the behest of someone Sir Peter Leary. If Leary and Wallace's allegations had been acted upon, many other cases have been opened above. (MP West Lothian 14th Nov 2005) Yours truly  
Tom Dalyell

Perhaps Oldfield's conscience at the harm he had occasioned during his life was eating away at him as his health deteriorated. He died on 11 March 1981.

Dalyell wrote to David Cameron on 29 September 2014, explaining what Oldfield had said to him.

## 203. HART'S CONCLUSION ABOUT OLDFIELD.

Hart's core finding about Oldfield was that:

*Having reviewed all of the evidence we are satisfied that the*

*allegations about Sir Maurice Oldfield's connections with Kincora have no substance. (625)*

## **204. HART AND JAMES MILLER: HART DID NOT READ HIS BRIEF.**

The case of James Miller (the MI5 agent, not the former resident of Kincora) has been described earlier but merits a brief recap here. One of Miller's reports to MI5 in 1972 described McGrath as an abuser. Hart stated that MI5 should have reported this to the RUC but did not.

Hart did not bother to ask MI5 why this was so.

Instead, Hart developed the notion that MI5 had kept silent to protect Miller. Yet, anyone could have reported McGrath to the RUC, especially one of his many victims. The UDA did not like McGrath and one of its members could have blown the whistle. Since McGrath was not in the UDA, there would not have been an internal inquiry had he been arrested. More importantly, Miller fled NI in 1974 when the UDA discovered he was an MI5 agent. Hart, who did not read his brief, was not aware of this. During the period 1974-1980, the abuse at Kincora continued while Miller was safely back in England. Hart's erroneous speculation about MI5's desire to protect Miller's cover could not apply to the period 1974-80 as Miller was no longer an MI5 agent. So, why didn't MI5 report McGrath to the police during 1974-80? The Hart report is a lamentable failure on this issue.

## **205. HART DID NOT READ HIS BRIEF IN RELATION TO THE BRIAN McDERMOTT MURDER MEMO.**


The Hart Archives contain the hand written version of Wallace's Brian McDermott Murder Memo of November 1974. It was typed up for ease of reading by Wallace's solicitor.

Hart claimed that it 'first came to light' in 1984. This was not so. The RUC were given a copy of it in 1982. This is clear from Hart's own

archives.



## 206. HART HAD A COPY OF THE HAND WRITTEN VERSION OF THE MCDERMOTT MURDER MEMO YET CLAIMED THE ORIGINAL WAS THE TYPED VERSION.



George Caskey had pretended the typed version of the Brian McDermott Memo was completed by two typing machines and was therefore a forgery.

Although Hart had a copy of the version written by hand, he erroneously described the ‘original’ as a typed version at paragraph 482 of his report (conclusions section).

Hart should have read Paul Foot’s book which described the true origin of the memo. The two crucial books on Kincora were those of Chris Moore and Paul Foot. If Hart did not

read Foot’s book, it is yet another alarming indictment of his approach to his inquiry.

Had Hart read Foot’s book, he would have discovered that Foot had named the two forensic experts who had examined the typed version of

the Brian McDermott Memo. How did Hart deal with the issue? Foot was dead by the time of the Hart inquiry. So he wrote to Wallace. But Wallace had lost all faith in Hart and did not reply. Hart proceeded to conclude that the memo was not genuine because Wallace was hiding something by not supplying the names of the forensic experts. None of this would have been possible if Hart had bothered to read Foot's book.

## **207. HART IGNORED HUGH MOONEY'S LETTER WHICH CONFIRMED THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE 1973 TARA PRESS BRIEFING ABOUT MCGRATH AND THE FACT THE MOD HAD MISLED PARLIAMENT.**

In the early 1990s the House of Commons Defence Committee investigated some of the claims made by Colin Wallace. Hugh Mooney was aware of what was going on and sent a letter dated 1 December 1992 to the "Information Department of the FCO. It read as follows

*Dear Margaret,*

*Since talking to you about the House of Commons Defence Committee's special report on Colin Wallace, I have had a chance to look at the documents and fear that the Ministry can be accused of misleading the Committee.*

*In his letter dated 14 February, the clerk to the committee asked for a copy of a document relating to TARA reproduced on page 292 of Paul Foot's [book] Who Framed Colin Wallace [i.e. the '73TPB']. In reply, the private secretary said: 'We have not been able to establish whether this is an official document.*

*This is surprising since the MoD has identified the official who originated the document from his distinctive italic note which said 'Some 'off-the-cuff' information on TARA for the Press'. I myself recall passing the document to Wallace. Other manuscript notes on the page show that it was entered as page*

*45 of Information Policy file at Headquarters Northern Ireland. All of this is known to Wallace and his supporters, who can be expected to raise it. The MoD will be found to have lied and Wallace's credibility will have been increased.*

None of this made any impression upon Hart who, as noted earlier, did not ask Hugh Mooney to appear before his tribunal. Had Mooney been asked to testify, he could have told Hart quite a lot about Wallace's concerns about Kincora in the early 1970s, a topic the two men had discussed.

## **208. HART AND THE MEETING HUGH MOONEY ATTENDED ABOUT KINCORA.**

The puzzle about the failure to call Hugh Mooney to testify at the Hart Inquiry is more perplexing when one considers that he knew Mooney knew had useful evidence. At paragraph 6 of Hart Inquiry document KIN-200535 it is recorded that:

*Mr. Mooney said [he] recalled one meeting referring to the Kincora Boys' Home, but no reference to it as a homosexual honey-trap run by MI5. IP [PSYOPS] had only been interested in TARA the alleged Protestant paramilitary group.*

Just what was the meeting about then?

Psychological operations officers did not convene to discuss routine matters. Their operations were usually directed at paramilitary groups such as Tara.

Why would a PSYOPS meeting take place during the relentless and murderous bedlam of 1973 with Kincora Boys' Home on the agenda, if it did not relate to McGrath, TARA, sexual abuse, or all three of these topics?

One thing is certain: Hugh Mooney's account of the PSYOPS meeting is at odds with the Hart Inquiry's conclusion that Kincora was not

referred to by name at Army HQ NI as early as 1973.

## **209. WALLACE ALERTS THE HART INQUIRY TO HIS DEALINGS WITH ROLAND MOYLE MP.**

On 21 February 2017, Wallace wrote to Patrick Butler, Solicitor to the Hart Inquiry, about his contact with Roland Moyle MP in the mid-1970s. Wallace had furnished him with copies of documents about his PSYOP work.

This was the act of a man who was confident about his actions. In the letter, Wallace told Butler that:

*Only a few weeks after my disciplinary hearing (in 1975), I briefed a London solicitor and a Northern Ireland Minister, Roland Moyle, on 'Clockwork Orange'. Moreover, the Inquiry is well aware from the documents I submitted to it that my 'Clockwork Orange' material contained references to prominent political figures including Edward Heath, Jeremy Thorpe, Cyril Smith, William van Straubenzee, the Rev. Ian Paisley, Sir Knox Cunningham, Harold Wilson, etc.*

Sending a letter of this nature to the Hart Inquiry would have been a foolish move if Wallace was making up stories.

The Hart Inquiry published a handwritten note from 1990 in which Moyle confirmed his meeting with Wallace. While his recollection was 'vague', he recalled Wallace had mentioned 'plots against Northern Ireland politicians rather than Harold Wilson etc'.

## **210. HART'S CONCLUSION.**

Having {i} averted his gaze from a mountain range of evidence; {ii} accepted the dubious Caskey statements; {iii} rejected the Brian McDermott Memo as a forgery; {iv} failed to secure the attendance of crucial witnesses; {v} failed to read his brief properly, {vi} plucked erroneous notions from the air rather than ask appropriate questions; {vi} contradicted himself on the facts before him in respect of Maurice

Oldfield, Hart concluded that:

***We are satisfied that it was not until 1980 that the RUC Special Branch, MI5 the [MI6] and Army Intelligence became aware that McGrath had been sexually abusing residents at Kincora, and they learnt of that when it became the subject of public allegations and a police investigation.*** [HIA Inquiry Report – Volume 9 (Part 2). Summary of Conclusions.]

Worse still, Hart portrayed some of the former residents of Kincora as liars, i.e., those who had disclosed that they had been abused by men other than Mains, McGrath and Semple.



*Virtually every serious commentator has found errors in the deeply flawed Hart report. Hart even managed to contradict himself within the pages of the report. He also believed that Richard Kerr was in Belfast when the photographs in the above collage were taken.*

## CHAPTER 17.

# THE RUC HAS A LOT OF QUESTIONS TO ANSWER

### 211. THE FAILURES OF THE RUC.

The failures of the RUC with regard to Kinchora are legion, some of them have been touched upon in the section featuring George Caskey.

There are many more.

Hugh Mooney was never interviewed by the RUC.

As noted earlier, in November 1974, Wallace had submitted a lengthy memorandum on Kinchora – including the murder of Brian McDermott – to Colonel Geoffrey Hutton, his immediate superior in PSYOPS. Hutton was never interviewed by the RUC.



In reality, the RUC knew all about the scandal and was part of the intelligence ‘honey trap’. There is documentary proof of their knowledge: on 23 May 1973, Roy Garland, a former member of Tara, left a message on the RUC’s Confidential telephone about McGrath. Garland advised that McGrath was sexually abusing the boys at the home.

Garland’s message was copied to the RUC Special Branch and MI5, but no action was taken.




## 212. THE RUC, NIO AND TARA GUNRUNNING.

MI5 and MI6 had other compelling motives to protect McGrath.

He was a key figure in State-Loyalist gunrunning, a practice that was conducted with the connivance of the RUC's special branch.

State-Loyalist collusion in the assassination of IRA members was the cornerstone of the counter-insurgency policy implemented by Brigadier (later General Sir) Frank Kitson to suppress the IRA. This strategy lasted throughout the Troubles. McGrath's gunrunning efforts played a part in this endeavour during the 1970s.



Colin Jay Wyatt joined Tara and McGrath's Orange Lodge in 1973. In subsequent years, he and two other Tara members were involved in repeated attempts to smuggle arms for Tara from South Africa via Holland to NI. Disclosed British government documents shows that the RUC Special Branch and MI5 were aware of McGrath's visits to Amsterdam.

In his book on Kincora, former BBC journalist, Chris Moore, recounts an interview he conducted with Jay Wyatt (referred to in his book as 'Adrian') in which Wyatt claimed that after one arms smuggling trip to Holland, he was invited to McGrath's home on the Newtownards Road, Belfast, where he met an older man with long grey hair and wearing a pinstripe suit, and spoke with a very refined English accent.'

The meeting lasted about 90 minutes. McGrath later told Wyatt that the stranger was 'a senior Northern Ireland Office official at Stormont, someone with power and influence and who was a good friend of Tara's who would always be available to us!' McGrath also referred to the official as an 'Under Secretary', a title that denotes seniority.

## **213. THE RUC AND THE NI POLICE OMBUDSMAN, 2015 – 2022.**

In 2022, the Police Ombudsman of NI (PONI) released the latest report about the Kincora scandal. The report was a response to criticisms by seven former Kincora residents about complaints of abuse at the home which, inter-alia, had been ignored by the force. The PONI report confirmed the obvious, namely that former RUC ‘officers failed in their duty to the victims of Kincora because they did not act on the information provided to them during the 1973-1976 period’.

On the surface, therefore, the PONI report could be viewed as a welcome additional piece of the jigsaw. Unfortunately, however, it proceeded to reinforce the myth that the abuse at the home was restricted to three staff members, Mains, McGrath and Raymond Semple. The PONI report emphasised that it was ‘not the role of the Police Ombudsman to establish whether or not there was a ‘vice ring’. Curiously, it later declares that: ‘Although a matter for police, this investigation has not identified any evidence that Kincora Boys’ Home was the centre of a ‘vice’ or ‘prostitution’ ring and therefore the Police Ombudsman has made no finding in respect of police failings in this regard’.



*The staff of Kincora: Raymond Semple, Joe Mains and William McGrath.*

A fatal flaw with the PONI inquiry was that it ‘gathered and reviewed a considerable amount of evidence and material’ including the dubious statements that had been taken by earlier investigations including the George Caskey forgeries.

## **214. THE RUC AND JOSS CARDWELL.**

The PONI's report described how it 'also identified systemic failings which prevented police from being aware of complaints of sexual abuse at Kincora Boys' Home which had been made to the Belfast Welfare Authority and the former Eastern Health and Social Services Board (EHSSB)'.

However, 'systemic failings' were not the root cause of this failure.

Councillor Joshua Cardwell, a former Stormont MP, was chairman of the welfare committee responsible for Kincora. He is not mentioned anywhere in the PONI report. Cardwell's committee directed the management of Kincora and other homes. Cardwell was himself a key member of the vice ring. He organised trips by residents by car ferry to Liverpool and thence to London by train for abuse by Tory MPs and other VIPs including one TV celebrity (and winner of a celebrity contest) now in his '70s who has managed to evade scrutiny. He has been involved in children's charities in the past.



Cardwell committed suicide in 1983 by gassing himself after he was interviewed by the RUC about Kincora.

Wallace's notes about the trafficking of boys by Mains to hotels (discussed earlier) also noted that: 'Mains has a brother in the RUC. He also has a questionable relationship with the Belfast Corporation Welfare Committee chairman (Cardwell) and Legal Adviser (Young).'

## **215. WALLACE'S COMPLAINT TO THE NI POLICE OMBUDSMAN.**

Wallace made a complaint about aspects of his case which involved the RUC to the NI Police Ombudsman who, after a delay of several years,

concluded that it was ‘outside its remit’.

## **216. THE SECRET RUC DOSSIER.**

There have long been rumours that a comprehensive report containing the full truth about the Kincora scandal was compiled by RUC officers as an insurance policy to ensure that they were never rendered scapegoats for the scandal. The odds are overwhelming that any such report was maintained by George Caskey. Caskey died on 24 February 2022, aged 84. Where the dossier is now, is anyone’s guess.



Passmore was a former Justice of the Peace. His appointment was made by the mid-1960s (which was after his rape of Paul Graham).

The file relating to his appointment as a JP must still exist. Who nominated him? Who provided character references?

Thomas Passmore JP, was a senior Loyalist politician and Orangeman who operated at the highest levels of Unionist politics in the 1970s and 1980s. He became County Grand Master of Belfast Loyal Orange Lodge in 1973. He was unmarried and lived in Townsend Street, Belfast.

He was not only an associate of McGrath but purchased the printing press which McGrath's paramilitary group Tara used for its publicity. Passmore published an evangelical magazine with it. Like Paisley, McGrath and Alan Campbell, Passmore believed that the Protestants of



Ireland were descendants of one of the lost tribes of Israel.

He was briefly a member of the Woodvale Defence Association in 1970s. It was set up by Alan Moon who was soon replaced by Charles Harding Smith who later became Chairman of the

UDA. Passmore later became Chairman of the Woodvale Unionist Association. It supported the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike that brought down the 1974 power-sharing Government of 1974.

Passmore continued to serve as a JP and rose in the Orange Order despite his links to Charles Harding Smith of the UDA and William McGrath of Tara.

Roy Garland was a member of Tara but walked out of it in 1971 when he discovered that McGrath was abusing boys. He immediately began trying to put a stop to it by telling the Orange Order of which McGrath was a senior member. Passmore was one of those who blocked the taking of any action against McGrath. He may have done this for any one of three reasons: first, because he wanted to protect a fellow child abuser; second,

because he was being blackmailed by MI5 and MI6 for whom McGrath was an agent; third, because by 1973 he had become an MI5/6 agent. Perhaps it was a combination of all of the foregoing. Roy Garland persisted in his efforts to put an end to McGrath's abuses but met brick walls everywhere he turned.

In 1976, the IRA killed Passmore's father in an attack which he claimed was aimed at him.



When Merlyn Rees was NI Secretary, MI5 smeared him and other Labour politicians as part of what they called Operation Clockwork Orange. One of the smears was that Rees was easy on Republican paramilitaries, especially

his release of internees. Passmore was one of those who circulated this slur. On 3 December 1975 The Belfast Telegraph reported that 'Mr. Thomas Passmore, said the fact that an ex-detainee had been killed while working with a bomb exposed the foolishness of Mr. Rees' security policies...'

Passmore opposed the short-lived and unsuccessful 1977 United Unionist Action Council (UUAC) strike. It was led by Ian Paisley of the DUP and Ernie Baird, then leader of the United Ulster Unionist Movement (UUUM). The strike was disrupted by the release of an anonymous document which bears all the hallmarks of an MI5 dirty trick. It portrayed some of the UUAC leaders as homosexuals, something that was deemed reprehensible in Loyalist circles at that time. On 23 April, 1977, Passmore launched a verbal attack on the strike which was due to commence in early May. One of his allegations was that a member of the UUAC had been involved in discussions with the IRA. A question that now arises is this: did Passmore oppose the strike of his own volition or because he was blackmailed into opposing it by MI5 officers because they knew he was a paedophile? Indeed, might he already have been an MI5 agent? One thing is certain: whatever McGrath knew about him, MI5

knew about him too. By 1977 many of those involved in the paedophile ring which swirled around McGrath were MI5 agents, assets or blackmail victims. They included John McKeague, Alan Campbell and Joe Mains. There were others.

When a political trend involving ‘Ulster nationalism’ raised its head, McGrath – then still a powerful figure in Loyalist and Orange politics while also an MI5 agent – came out and opposed it. On 12 July 1978 the Belfast Telegraph reported that ‘Mr. Thomas Passmore, the Belfast Orange leader, said loyalists talking about Ulster nationalism were playing into their enemies’ hands’.

Like McGrath, Passmore was not trusted by Loyalist paramilitaries. The UVF in particular believed McGrath was an MI5 agent.

In 1982 Passmore was elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly representing Belfast West.

Passmore’s interest in boys was no secret in Northern Ireland. In the 1980s the Northern Ireland writer and Kincora whistle-blower Robin Bryans told Colin Wallace and Fred Holroyd that Passmore was a child abuser. Bryans was a cousin of John Bryans, the Grand Master of the Orange Order.

Passmore died in 1989.

## **218. THE HART INQUIRY WAS NOT INTERESTED IN THOMAS PASSMORE**

An account of the sexual abuse of Paul Graham first appeared in print in The Examiner in 2013, although it did not mention Passmore by name. The article, ‘The Hell of Bethany House, One Man’s Story’ by Danielle McGrane, can be found at <https://www.irishexaminer.com/lifestyle/features/the-hell-of-bethany-house-one-mans-story-238365.html>



As noted earlier, Bethany House was a children's home in Dublin from where Paul Graham was adopted by Edith and William Graham who lived in Belfast. Passmore worked for Mrs Graham at her flower shop. In the piece Graham described

Passmore as 'a strong Protestant' who went 'to his church every day, but that didn't stop him doing what he did to me'.

Colin Wallace discovered that Passmore was the abuser and tried to interest the Hart Inquiry into historical sex abuse in the Belfast part of Graham's story. Wallace wrote to them on 27 October 2016, and received a puzzling reply on 2 November. When he wrote them again on 7 November, he started by pointing out that the Inquiry's response indicated that 'either I did not make myself very clear, or your Inquiry did not read my letter very carefully'. This was because the Inquiry had replied stating that: 'You will appreciate that allegations in respect of the Bethany Home, which was in Dublin, fall outside our Terms of Reference and therefore cannot be considered by this Inquiry.'

Wallace proceeded to state that:

*I fully understand that, but I did not refer to any allegations involving the Bethany Home. My letter referred to a former resident of that Home, Paul Graham ... who claims that he was sexually abused by Thomas Passmore after he left the Home and had been adopted by Edith and William Graham who lived in Belfast. It is further claimed in the press that at the time of the alleged offences, Thomas Passmore worked in a 'flower shop' run by Paul Graham's adopted mother. It should be clear from the foregoing that I was referring to sexual offences that (a) occurred after Paul Graham left Bethany House and (b) that the offences took place in Belfast.*

*What I attempted to highlight in my previous letter was that in*

*my earlier submissions to you there exists credible evidence that, in the 1970s when Roy Garland was attempting to get the Orange Order to take action on his allegations relating to William McGrath's activities, at least two of the most senior figures in the Orange Order had themselves, it is claimed, a track record of unlawful sexual activity. Clearly, if those allegations are true, there could have been a serious conflict of interest within the Orange Order leadership, and that could account for (but not justify) why the Orange Order appeared to be less than enthusiastic about dealing with Roy Garland's allegations. Had Roy Garland's allegations been acted upon at that time, it is likely that years of sexual abuse of children could have been avoided. The thrust of my previous letter was, therefore, to highlight just one of a number of possible reasons why no action was taken against William McGrath until 1980.*

*You will, of course, recall that Thomas Passmore was one of the individuals named in my 1973 press briefing document on McGrath and Tara as being 'aware of' McGrath's activities.*

*As a separate issue, I feel the PSNI should investigate Paul Graham's allegations, if only to bring some form of closure to the issue. I accept, of course, that this is not part of your Inquiry's remit.*

The Hart Inquiry did not look at the case of Thomas Passmore.

Dr Niall Meehan of Griffith College has conducted extensive research into the abuse of children, especially those at Bethany House. He was the first person to reveal in print that Passmore was a paedophile. He did so in The Belfast Telegraph in February 2017. The Orange Order declined to comment on the claim that Passmore was Paul Graham's abuser.

## **219. WALLACE WRITES TO BRITAIN'S CABINET SECRETARY.**



On 1 November 2022, Wallace submitted a written complaint by recorded delivery to the Cabinet Secretary. It was delivered to the Cabinet Office 4 November. It concerned the content of King's 'SECRET' 1989 report.

There has been no acknowledgement of receipt of the letter. It follows that there has been no response to it either.

## **220. THE DUBLIN AND MONAGHAN BOMB FILES ARE STILL BEING WITHHELD.**



The British government has steadfastly refused to share its files on the 1974 bombings with the Irish government despite being asked for them decades ago.

## **221. IGNORING THE SUPREME COURT.**

The British government has persistently rebuffed court recommendations to inquire into the Patrick Finucane assassination.



When David Cameron was in 10 Downing Street he told the Finucane family that he could not order a public inquiry into the scandal. When Finucane's brother Martin asked him why, he turned to Mrs Finucane and said: 'Look, the last administration couldn't deliver an inquiry in your husband's case and neither can we'. According to Cameron this was because 'there are people all around this place, [10 Downing Street], who won't let it happen'. As he was saying this, he raised a finger and made a circular motion in the air.

## **222. THE BBC FAILS TO BROADCAST A PROGRAMME ON THE MURDER OF BRIAN MCDERMOTT BY ALAN CAMPBELL, A MEMBER OF THE KINCORA CHILD RAPE GANG.**

On 25 February 2016, Dame Janet Smith published a 700-page report into sexual abuses by Jimmy Savile at the BBC. ‘The culture of the BBC enabled Savile to go undetected for decades and that the BBC missed at least five opportunities to stop the abuse,’ she wrote. BBC staff members were aware of complaints against Savile, but did not pass the information to senior management due to the ‘culture of not complaining’. Dame Janet described an ‘atmosphere of fear’ which was still evident at the BBC. Some of those interviewed by her did so only after being assured their names would not be published, as they feared reprisal.



Information comes from the mobile police van in operation.

Sadly, little has changed inside the BBC. In 2021, it was due to broadcast a programme about Alan Campbell, the paedophile serial killer and member of Tara. The Corporation in Belfast commissioned an investigation into the disappearance of several young boys during the late ‘60s and early ‘70s. The programme makers discovered potential new links between their disappearance and a number of suspected paedophiles in East Belfast. One of those featured was Alan Campbell, who had been arrested for sexually assaulting a boy in the early 70s. They also uncovered new information about the cover-up of the abuses at Kincora. The programme’s sources included several former police officers who believed their enquiries had been thwarted by MI5.

The programme was scheduled for broadcast on Sunday 9 May 2021, at 10.30 p.m., but some BBC managers reviewed and pulled it. They were shocked by its content, particularly by evidence of MI5’s involvement in covering up the Kincora saga. The basis upon which the programme was halted was that the Hart Report of 2017 did not implicate MI5 in Kincora

wrongdoing. The fact that the Hart report contained a litany of mistakes did not have had any bearing on the managers at the BBC.

One section of the programme reviewed Campbell's sexual assault of a resident from Bawnmore. It had taken place at the home of another paedophile, Ken Larmour (1A Ross House, Shore Road, Belfast) on 3 November 1970. Larmour was a former social worker who at the time of the assault by Campbell was Clerk to Belfast Magistrates Court. The victim was later transferred to Kincora where he was sexually assaulted by William McGrath. Larmour's flat was used by local paedophiles, including the staff from Kincora.



Campbell was put on trial at the court where Larmour was the Clerk. Campbell was acquitted on the basis of perjured evidence and the case file later disappeared.

Campbell was suspected by the RUC of having been involved in the death of Brian McDermott on 2 September 1973. The BBC programme uncovered new information about his murder.

## **223. CHILD ABUSE CONTINUED.**

Kincora was a small part of a much wider network. RUC sources disclosed to journalists that the real fear in Westminster was that the public would realise that the Kincora scandal extended all the way to London. Sadly, the truth was suppressed and rampant child abuse

continued for decades. Had the full truth emerged, the likes of Sir Cyril Smith and Jimmy Saville and many others might have emerged in the early 1970s.

## **224. THE IRISH ‘ARE ALL LIARS’.**

On 10 October 1975, the then new leader of the Tory Party, Margaret Thatcher, addressed the Conservative Party Conference at the Winter Gardens, Blackpool thus:

*The first duty of Government is to uphold the law. If it tries to bob and weave and duck around that duty when it's inconvenient, if Government does that, then so will the governed, and then nothing is safe – not home, not liberty, not life itself.*



Sadly, Thatcher did not live up to these high standards.

There is a celebrated scene in the satirical TV programme, Spitting Image. Thatcher is dining with her cabinet. A waiter asks her

what she will have to eat. She places her order. The waiter then asks her what about the ‘vegetables’. She looks around at colleagues and says they will have the same. At the time, Thatcher was in total control of her party. The old adage that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely is apt. She started out with good intentions – as her speech at the Winter Gardens indicates – but ended up covering-up for paedophile networks that drove children to suicide. She also covered-up for Alan Campbell who murdered Brian McDermott and probably four other boys.

Her treatment of Colin Wallace was reprehensible.

Thatcher may very well be the ‘Cabinet level’ authority for the murder of Patrick Finucane by MI5-RUC special branch agents in Belfast. Who else would have dared to order his assassination behind her back?

Yet, till the end, Margaret Thatcher saw herself a paragon of virtue. In 1999 she told Peter Mandelson MP of the Labour Party that the Irish were ‘all liars’ and not to be trusted.

*She came up to me [on the day of my appointment as Secretary of State for NI by PM Tony Blair] and she said, ‘I’ve got one thing to say to you, my boy ... you can’t trust the Irish, they are all liars’. she said, ‘liars, and that’s what you have to remember, so just don’t forget it. With that she waltzed off and that was my only personal exposure to her.*



**David Burke is the author of three books published by Mercier Press: –**

**‘Deception & Lies, the Hidden History of the Arms Crisis 1970’, and;**

**‘Kitson’s Irish War, Mastermind of the Dirty War in Ireland’ which examines the role of counter-insurgency dirty tricks in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, and;**

**‘An Enemy of the Crown, the British Secret Service Campaign against Charles Haughey’, which was published on 30 September 2022.**

**These books can be purchased here:**

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