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# This Week

**TED HEATH:  
A PROFILE**



**THE ALL IRELAND  
AT CHEQUERS**



## COVER STORY

### Where honour is due



THE BRITISH PRESS, (and the Irish Independent), branded the Heath-Lynch talks a failure almost from the moment the Taoiseach left Chequers.

"He got nothing from Heath," was the verdict. The verdict was wrong. Mr. Lynch, by his dignified and statesmanlike attitude during and after the talks, and his report to the press thereon, offset all the doubts about his ability to act as a leader.

He did not go to Heath, hat in hand, to seek concessions although that was what the British expected him to do. Neither did he go to receive instructions from Mr. Heath as to how to run his country, although Mr. Heath seemed to have looked on the meeting as if that were the object of the exercise.

As a preparatory step to any discussion affecting the future of Ireland the Taoiseach made his position quite clear. He represented the majority of opinion in all Ireland. The Northern problem could not be solved solely in the context of Faulkner's "Ulster" but in the context of all Ireland.

Mr. Lynch did not appear merely as the interested leader of a neighbouring state, the status to which the British Tory Government would like to give him. Mr. Heath may have got this impression all along. At Chequers he met the adamant, politely reasonable yet stubbornly insistent leader of the Irish Republic. And he didn't like it.

It was Mr. Heath who had issued the invitation

for the meeting. Mr. Lynch had accepted it on condition that the October meeting would still be on. When the British Premier rejected the Irish Premier's insistence on his right to be involved in any proposed changes in the Ulster area Mr. Lynch's forbearance must have been strained to the utmost in that he did not bluntly ask "then why am I here?"

What Mr. Heath had forgotten to lay down were the terms of reference. To his surprise he found himself admitting that the reunification of Ireland was a legitimate aspiration!

When he produced his 'concessions,' a tentative proposal of proportional representation, a suggestion that Mr. Maudling might go and "talk to the Catholics," he found that he and his guest were not speaking the same language.

To use a sectarian two-in-one majority in any form, with the emphasis on sectarianism, would not solve any problem. Where there was no interplay of social or economic policies, proportional representation would be merely a bluff. "We do not contemplate the use of force; remove your presence and we will effect reconciliation" was what Mr. de Valera had told Lloyd George. Mr. Lynch was in effect repeating the offer.

For fifty years "Ulster" had struggled on with its British-made problem. Only one remedy had not been tried. Reunification. Ultimate maybe, but certain.

A confrontation such as this had to be adjourned. But any yielding on the principle would have been a surrender. Ireland, internally, and

the world externally, would learn that at last we had conceded that Ulster was British.

The two leaders of the opposition parties in Ireland, asked for their comments, rather mealy-mouthedly suggested that nothing had been won.

Neither of them had the generosity to add that nothing had been conceded. Mr. Lynch, at least until it is proved otherwise, was dealing in fact when he said that he represented the viewpoint of the majority of the Irish people on the simple issue that Ireland is an entity. When an Irish Government secures the opportunity to govern all its citizens it must be responsible in the first instance to all its citizens, and to none other.

How best it can carry out such responsibility is its own affair. However or whenever the Northern problem is tackled now the operation must begin from there.

But apart from explaining to Mr. Heath that majorities, especially artificially contrived ones, have no right to wrong, Mr. Lynch must now follow through. Having made it clear that his own

status is not to be compromised he is in a position to sit down at any conference table to hammer out solutions, admitting that sensible compromises have to be made.

He is free to discuss new methods of governing the troubled area be they proposals of governmental committees, area commissions, federal alignments or even transfer of populations. He will have his right to participate not only as spokesman of the minority in the Six Counties but as spokesman for the majority in Ireland.

Mr. Lynch, by virtue of the circumstances of today, has time on his side. The British and the Unionists have created their own Frankenstein. It is because they cannot control it that they have called on Mr. Lynch to take a hand. He has made his own terms of reference. He holds that a settlement can be worked out by peaceful means. The onus is on him to clarify his statement. But it must be agreed that in his recent confrontation he has acquitted himself well. ●

L. MacG.

## Wilson plan well reasoned



THE WILSON PLAN, were it now to operate, would provide a short-term solution to the Northern problem through some of its clauses, and a long-term solution through the others. Devised for party advantage or not, it shows that the Labour leader has intensely studied the old "ifs" and "buts" and cut through them incisively.

His proposed parliamentary commission may hurt Unionist pride and privilege, but Wilson has roundly condemned their half-century of misbehaviour and frankly bases his remedies on the strength of Westminster and the power it wields over the subsidiary government.

Bluntly he proposes that the British government will shadow them no matter where they try to escape their responsibilities and ruthlessly check every expenditure to the penny.

He proposes that a British Minister of cabinet rank will police the Stormont state to nullify any effort at discriminatory practices. His plan proposes to spangle the puppet state with the Westminster purse-strings.

The hardliners may not like it but the Westminster that Wilson visualises will wield the financial whip and they must obey. Obviously the

Labourman visions a reunited Ireland. He sees 'Ulster' using the same type of parliamentary franchise, proportional representation, as that of the Republic.

His conclusion that reunification is now seen as the final remedy is clear and he therefore puts forward the idea of a Council of Ireland.

Almost callously Wilson shows up Stormont as an errant institution that must now be curbed by the parent body as Westminster. through the Commission, is charged with rejecting or endorsing any legislation that has to do with every aspect of human rights.

The Northern problem is one that admittedly cannot be submitted to any quick solution. Wilson's plan is no quick solution but if it were to be followed the end would always be in sight.

There is nothing in it to which any rational minded person on the "Irish" side could object. There is nothing in it that would deprive the Unionist-minded people of anything to which they are justly entitled, though it would deprive them of undemocratic privileges.

Even if Ireland has to wait until the Labour Party comes to power in Britain, with its leader committed to this line of policy, the dawn of reason is breaking.

L. MacG.

## A unique politician

EDWARD HEATH is a unique politician in the professional world of compromise and half truth which centres on most West European parliaments. As the *Economist* said in March, "The great thing about Mr. Heath is that he has done pretty much what many people hoped for and expected of him." Heath actually has put into effect what he has promised over the years and continues on such a course despite remarkable, unanimous evidence that a majority of

his electorate do not like what he is doing.

Mr. Heath has pursued a single minded course in government which anyone who knew him would have predicted. He has confounded political pundits in Britain who expected a slightly paler version of the Wilson era from him. His policies have had profound repercussions in industry in Britain and his government has affected Ireland more than any other government since the last War.

Already a great deal of Ireland's future has been determined by Mr. Heath's brand of government. We are almost in the EEC thanks to Mr. Heath and our involvement in

Northern Ireland has been precipitated by the Tories reversal of the Softly Softly policies of the Wilson era.

From his early years Ted Heath has been a determined self centred selfassured personality. Coming from traditional Tory stock — the small craftsman who is hostile to unions and works long and hard to make good, Ted Heath reflects and embodies the philosophy of his background.

His father William worked as a carpenter after graduating from the job as a dairy man and according to his son Ted rarely had much leisure time with his family because of the need to earn money. Such hard work brought its re-

wards and William purchased his own house and then sent Ted to Oxford which cost him £130 a year quite a sum in the 1930's. Ted Heath then comes from a family which came up the hard way, although it was never poor, and its method of self fulfillment is the basis of Heath's present day philosophy of society and politics.

### Hard philosophy

In university, for instance, Heath joined the Tory party much to the delight of his family and soon began to climb the ladder of political advancement within its ranks. In Oxford he spoke against a motion favouring equality of education "because equality of education meant equality of wealth, and equality of wealth meant Communism."

Heath's was a hard philosophy common to independent craftsmen and his stock. It was not the philosophy of the traditional Tory leader who looked on the status quo as a good thing but rather the tough outlook that the independent, the clever and the wary got in the world and it was not their task to do more than make life tolerable for those who failed. Encouragement of competition and initiative rather than the old Tory virtues of loyalty, social harmony and Empire were Ted Heath's basic creeds.

Ted Heath distinguished himself in the Tory party from the beginning by his industry and rather narrow minded capability. His tutor in Oxford said of him: "He had no special intellectual vice. His essays were full of detail and very conscientiously worked out." This was Mr. Heath's pattern throughout his career in the Tory party. He worked far harder than most of his colleagues who revelled in the pleasures of office and he displayed few of the spectacular ideological vices such as Empire, race and welfare which other Tory champions fell for. In university he never did exceedingly well and his tutor said he "was good but not brilliant."

### Quoted Palmerston

In an essay on Reality in British Foreign Policy, Heath quotes Palmerston, the Victorian Prime Minister and statesman, to illustrate his own position: "We have no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual and those interests it is our duty to follow." Such a philosophy allowed Mr. Heath to develop quietly as the Tory leader who examined the issues with a minimum of histrionics and who knew what he was talking about.



A tough skipper . . . says a fellow officer during the war.

He was a ruthless and strong Chief Whip just as he had been a tough leader of a bomber crew during the war. A fellow officer during the war spoke of him thus: "He was a tough skipper. If he said the battery was going to do it this way that was it."

Heath's capture of the leadership of the party in 1965 is a clear example of the difference in the life style of the traditional Tory and of Heath. The main runners in the election for leader were Reginald Maudling, a lazy, good nat-

## Another case o

DURING THE War of Independence, Seamus Robinson the commander of the IRA's Third Tipperary Brigade and Countess Markievicz were discussing the inclusion of a report on an engagement with British Forces in the Republican newspaper, *An t-Oglach*. Although the engagement was a relatively minor one, the Countess immediately began inflating the casualties of the British to make it look more serious than it was.

Robinson protested. "You can't put that in," he said, "it's not true."

"Oh, that's alright, Seamus," the Countess said, "you see, it's propaganda."

"Propaganda?" Seamus Robinson said. "As far as I can see it's most impropaganda."

That phrase aptly describes the happenings at a press conference organised by the Provisional IRA last week when they produced a British Army deserter for questioning by the world's press.

### 'Was shocked'

The ex-soldier was an 18-year-old private from the Royal Irish Rangers, who is a Catholic and comes from the village of Augher in Co. Tyrone. According to a prepared statement issued by the Provisionals, he left his unit on August 21st because the "sight of the internees pitiful conditions sickened me — and I was shocked that the British Army could be capable of such treatment to prisoners."

Pearson was young, nervous and hardly articulate during the course of the press conference. As the questioning went on, his story became confusing and contradictory and it was only the interventions of the Provisional's David O'Connell and John Kelly, of arms trial fame, which prevented the session from degenerating into farce.

The first and most ominous dis-

ured Tory, and Heath. The race was extraordinarily close and according to a Tory front bencher "Ted's camp left nothing to chance. Everybody was canvassed."

Maudling on the other hand followed the hallowed Tory principle which believed that to canvass was somehow unmanly and unsporting. When the final vote was announced — which gave Heath a bare 17 vote margin over Maudling of 150 votes to 133—Mr. Maudling could only be found after an hour. He was lunching in the City

# propaganda



Pearson during the press conference . . . young, nervous and hardly articulate. John Kelly is seated on the right.

crepancy that appeared in the press conference was the huge difference between the story outlined in the press release given out to reporters and the words of Pearson.

The statement issued was purportedly made in full by Pearson to Peace Commissioner, for Cavan and Monaghan, Kevin McDonnell, on September 2nd. In 400 words, it covers his past military record in detail, his experience during internment raids, the reasons why he decided to desert, the manner in which he carried out his desertion, his call to his fellow soldiers to join him, his profuse thanks to the Provisionals for their help and courtesy and his denial that any pressure was put upon him to make his statement. In all, it was a formidable statement and would have taken a very well-organised mind to deliver it in such limited prose.

Pearson, at the prompting of O'Connell and Kelly, said that the

statement was his exact words to the Peace Commissioner. Yet when the press conference got down to business, reporters found him unable to articulate more than two sentences at a time and even then he was prone to trail off into an embarrassed silence.

Explaining how he arrived in Dublin, Pearson said he hitched a lift over the Border and then met a Garda sergeant on the streets of Monaghan who brought him to the police station and then put him on the bus to Dublin where he was met at the bus station by two members of the Provisional organisation who apparently had no difficulty in recognising him.

Yet in his witnessed statement made in Monaghan on the day he arrived there, he thanked Sinn Fein for securing food, shelter, transport and accommodation for him, so presumably they must have been involved with him during his stay in Monaghan.

John Kelly stepped in to explain

away the contradiction between the statement and the spoken word at the conference by saying that the policeman brought Pearson to a known Provisional area and left him to his own devices there.

Pearson hastily agreed with this after prompting by both O'Connell and Kelly who both showed concern at Pearson's loss of words under hard questioning.

On the crucial matter of the conditions of internees, the ex-soldiers evidence was not strong. He said that he saw the faces of some of the internees through the windows of a hut from a distance of around 20 feet. He was in a moving truck at the time. He did not talk to any of those detained but said he saw marks on their faces.

## Several questions

This statement of Pearson's raises several questions. How much could you see from a moving truck at twenty feet? How many internees were likely to be standing at windows when Pearson's truck passed? How clearly would you recognise damage on the faces of individuals you don't know? Presumably, the windows of huts holding internees would be closed and covered by some kind of protective mesh or bars if security in Magilligan is to have any meaning.

On this basis, Seamus Robinson's definition of im-propaganda would seem to cover Kevin Street's attempt to gain a publicity coup. It might also cover the stories which appeared in the different Irish news media covering the event who quoted sentences from the printed release as though they were verbatim statements made by Pearson at the press conference.

It is said that truth is the first casualty of war. The Provisionals, it would appear, now seem set to join the British Army and the Unionist Party in confirming that adage. ●

Joseph MacAnthony

while Heath was waiting near the party rooms in the House of Commons to hear the result.

On his election his capacities were immediately recognised by those organs of public opinion which broadly favoured the Tory cause but which were convinced that only a firm capable hand would save the Tory party.

The *Financial Times*, for instance, said editorially on Heath's election that "They have chosen their leading radical . . . he is most unusual among Conservative lead-

ers and his election should convince even the most sceptical." The *Times* was similarly convinced.

Heath set about moulding the Tory party after his own image. He set up an extensive research apparatus for the party a task which many of its leaders regarded with extreme boredom. He himself became Chairman of the party's Economics Policy Group and a team of experts of whom the most prominent were Ernest Marples and Denis Howell reported person-

ally on every branch of party policy to Heath.

Heath spent little time cultivating a new image and remained particularly unpopular with the British public.

In the new Tory policies the thinking exhibited a policy memorandum drawn up by Heath in 1963 was evident. One point in this memorandum stated: "We must open up new opportunities for merit, talent and individual enterprise, and we must change the tax system to provide new incentives."

Another stated, "We need fresh policies to create a more competitive climate in industry and commerce, to speed up the reform of management at all levels and to re-adjust our agricultural support system. Another returned to Heath's favourite policy over the years: "We must pursue a policy which will enable Britain to become a member of an enlarged European Community. Technical advance is making nonsense of national boundaries. Britain's future lies in a larger grouping and that grouping should be the Europe of the Common Market which is already the nucleus."

### Two years before

These policy statements drawn up two years before he assumed the leadership of the party show how much Conservative policy has reflected his views.

In Government, Heath has merely put into effect what he said he believed. He has ruthlessly followed his policies and his Ministers clearly bear the stamp of Heath's personal ideology. The Tory onslaught in the trade unions was forseen by Heath, as were their taxation policies and their firm commitment to the EEC.

Similarly the stamp of Heath can be seen in Northern Ireland. Mr. Maudling, Heath's erstwhile rival and now Minister of Home Affairs, is by all accounts a comparative dove on the North. Heath on the other hand shows characteristic impatience at the state of affairs in the North and a desire to tidy the matter up in as short a time as possible. Mr. Heath, for instance, according to the Sunday Times Insight team was the one who forced the internment decision against the advice of General Tuzo and the wishes of Maudling.

### No interest

On the other hand Mr. Heath's statement of personal policy earlier in this article to the effect that Britain has no eternal enemies or allies means that Mr. Heath could as ruthlessly disown the Ulster Unionists as he has interned the IRA.

Throughout his career he has shown no interest in the Northern Question. In Oxford there is no record of him having spoken on it and there is no party speech extant which dwells on the North. From the beginning Mr. Heath looked towards Europe and on Ulster as on other Empire-Commonwealth issues he has no subconscious rooted bias.

Two of the most sycophantic



Ted Heath . . . an unusually self-sufficient person.

statements on Heath include references to his character which amply illustrate how a ruthless Prime Minister could turn on his former allies in the North if it was expedient for him to do so.

Mr. Heath's special biographer Hutchinson remarks rightly, "As I see him Heath is an unusually self sufficient person. He does not depend on others, even close friends; while he is glad to see them they are not essential to him."

*The Economist* in a leading editorial last March entitled "Trusting Ted" remarks: "In any clash now it is beginning to be known that it is not he who backs down." Before long either Mr. Lynch or Mr. Faulkner may learn this at first hand depending on what final policy decision Mr. Heath takes on the North — a subject which bores him but to which no doubt he will soon apply his particular brand of political decision making. •

John Feeney

## The Labour meetings

*JACK DOWLING was in London last week covering the day-long meetings between the Labour parties of the Republic, Northern Ireland and Britain. Here he reveals some of the background difficulties the labour parties had to overcome before they could issue their joint statement.*

WHEN IVAN COOPER, Austin Currie, John Hume and Paddy Devlin arrived in the Irish Club in London on Wednesday week last

they were tired, unshaven and anxious. They were not at all clear why they had been asked by the Irish Labour Party to come. A "working luncheon" had been arranged between the Northern Ireland Labour Party, the Irish Labour Party and Mr. Harold Wilson's. True, it was not a secret and everyone knew that Ian Mikardo had visited Dublin the previous week. The least well-informed amongst us in the Labour Party knew that something was afoot.

Strangely enough, there were no other journalists at the Irish Club nor did the invitation to the "working luncheon" include the members of the Social Democratic and Labour Party. Yet here they were.

### Desultory way

We spoke in a desultory way about the civil disobedience campaign. Cooper told me: "It's about 95% effective. The real problem is not the participation of the minority-population but the very few of our people available at representative political level of leadership. We average three meetings a night and innumerable private meetings and negotiations. It's a problem of sheer physical stamina. Gerry Fitt's in hospital and it's a question of how long we can stick it. But we'll do it."

They thought that the Provisionals had shot their political bolt; there was still a frightful amount of sheer political, physical and moral damage they could do. But they were alienating the mass of the Catholics and clarifying the essential sanity of the civil disobedience campaign. Even Faulkner was now being forced to woo the "moderate" Catholics — who are resolutely set upon destroying his regime by ignoring it. Heath apparently is being forced into the same position. Lynch has once again jumped on the right bandwagon.

### Relaxed, reticent

Brendan Corish, Conor Cruise O'Brien and Brendan Halligan arrived, relaxed but reticent; they went into conference with their S.D.L.P. colleagues. I spoke briefly to Brendan Halligan. We agreed to meet again in the evening. We did.

That night in the Irish Club the whole mood had changed. We had a few drinks. Everyone seemed hopeful, even buoyant. A long, hard day . . .

What had it all been about and what was its real significance?

There were fundamentally two

the S.D.L.P., who represented a vast and militant body who were actually affecting the political issues of the moment, were to be ignored in the interests of face-saving protocol.

The first requirement, then, was to work out a formula within which all four Labour Parties with, collectively, a million Irish workers as members, could present a unified Labour case if Heath and Lynch could effect talks between the contending factions. It must be made clear that without British and Irish Labour participation no such talks would stand a snowball's chance in hell.

### Separate meeting

The British Labour Party and the N.I.L.P. began, on Wednesday, on this basis, with a separate meeting.

Corish and his colleagues then went into conference with the British Labour Party. The Irish delegation insisted, and the British agreed, that the S.D.L.P. must be invited, with the N.I.L.P. to the "working luncheon." It was also agreed that the British delegation should hold a separate conference with the S.D.L.P. This was done.

Throughout the long day, these preliminaries moved to a satisfactory conclusion. All four Labour Parties met and worked out a common statement of policy at what must by now have been a very late luncheon indeed.

It would be easy to underestimate the value and potential of this statement and I hope to indicate how it might affect the immediate political future in Northern Ireland.

### Really astonishing

The really astonishing thing is that this massively loyalist N.I.L.P. has agreed with the two other Irish and the British Labour Movements that internment has been a mistake and a failure and has resulted only in alienating the working class from the Northern community and from its own sectarian components. Secondly the N.I.L.P. has also agreed that the system of government in Northern Ireland has broken down and needs to be re-structured internally.

Whatever face-saving formulae may be used, this is an acknowledgement that the "Constitutional position" at least in these internal aspects, must be changed.

Of course it is possible that the membership of the N.I.L.P. may repudiate its leadership. In this event, the N.I.L.P. will simply fade



When Ivan Cooper, Austin Currie, John Hume and Paddy Devlin arrived at the Irish Club they were not at all clear why they had been asked by the Irish Labour Party to go to London.



off the political map. The essential point is that if it does not, this spells the end of internment. Faulkner's position on this issue is now that his own extreme right, including the Paisley wing, are against internment.

The moderate working-class party, loyal to the "Constitution," are against internment.

The S.D.L.P. and the whole Catholic minority are effectively and militantly against internment.

The British military security forces are against internment for technical reasons.

The Irish Labour Party is against it — as Fine Gael is.

Jack Lynch and his two wings of the Fianna Fail Party are against internment, for the North at least.

My guess is that Mr. Heath is now against internment.

### The paradox

The paradox of the "moderate" Unionist Faulkner regime and the Orange Order is that they are the only ones apparently in favour of internment.

The N.I.L.P. have also agreed that the present system of Government in Northern Ireland by a permanent dictatorship, exercised by an artificially created voting majority, has failed.

Reviewing the wreckage, physical and communal, that is now Northern Ireland, the Southern Irish may think this to be self-evident. It is not at all evident to the frightened and deluded Unionists. The agreement of the official Labour Party of N.I., anxious to work within Northern social organs and cherishing its values and traditions, must be quite a blow to Faulkner's "moderates."

### Commission

Wednesday's meeting set up a Commission to prepare a four-Party Irish-British Conference on Northern Ireland. It's suggested solutions will be submitted to the British, Irish and Stormont Governments. Such a report would be difficult for even Tory and Fianna Fail Governments to ignore. They both have their eyes fixed on the mercurial margins of support for their EEC policies.

I see for the first time a gleam of hope in wresting the initiative from the Provisionals and the Unionist extremists in a common Irish-British Labour front. Faulkner has been wooing the Catholics, because it is the financial effects of the S.D.L.P. civil disobedience campaign that will ruin the Northern economy. What he needs



Harold Wilson . . . the political leader of more Irishmen than anyone in the room.



Brendan Corish . . . not stunned by Wilson's statement. He knew it.



Reginald Maudling . . . not a stubborn fool like Heath.



Brian Faulkner . . . has had his head.

most desperately is a Constitutional Opposition. He now needs it more than he needs the support of his own ungovernable right-wing. He can only govern them by splitting from them.

Whatever nominal disclaimers the British Labour Party may have to make, it will, as a result of these talks and the agreed statement, be forced into supporting the S.D.L.P.'s civil disobedience campaign. Whatever difficulties the N.I.L.P. may have, it cannot logically oppose the campaign either — since it agrees that internment and the hegemony of the Unionist Party is unworkable.

#### Enormous power

There was one other factor of enormous power that emerged from these discussions: Harold Wilson, at a critical moment bluntly asserted: "I am the political leader of more Irishmen than anybody in this room." The truth and significance of this stunned most of those present.

It didn't stun Corish. He knew it. Heath knows it too. We can only hope that so does Lynch.

Officially, there has been no change in Tory thinking, I was repeatedly told in London. Like hell there hasn't. Heath's reputation for rigidity of mind may or may not be well-earned. I prefer per-

sonally to describe it as an ignorance bordering on incompetence. That there has been a change in Tory attitude is evident from the fact that little more than a week ago, Heath and Lynch were conducting themselves like a pair of fishwives by telegram. Notwithstanding the frightful recurrence of bombing for blood-effect and terror, together with two major Border incidents, the Tories invited Lynch to discuss what they had been at pains up to now to describe as none of his business. There is change because the Faulkner-Heath policy has changed and the choices are stark: a rightwing "militia" revolt, or a Provisional extension of their policy of mayhem, or the continuance of the civil disobedience campaign — or all three together with the exhausted British Army in the middle.

#### Stubborn fool

Heath may be a stubborn fool but Maudling, Douglas-Home and General Tuzo are not. Faulkner and Heath have had their head. It has resulted in chaos. Saner counsels must now prevail or responsibility for a frightful civil war must be borne by Heath. The "militias" are already enlisting and General Tuzo simply cannot cope. He cannot seal the Border, even

if he wanted to. Neither can Lynch, even if his wild men would let him. His call for a UN Border patrol is evidence of this.

Faulkner's dilemma, also, is desperate in its consequences. If the present constitutional position internally were allowed to continue and if Whitehall demands a proportionate and real share of power for the minority, his right-wing will revolt and dispose of him, as it did O'Neill and Chichester-Clark.

#### Permissive role

But if proportional representation in the necessary General Election, that would certainly split the Unionist Party into moderates and die-hards, threw up a joint Labour Opposition, backed by the British Labour Party, Faulkner could hope to retain power, with Labour playing a permissive if not an active role in keeping the extreme Unionists in a permanent minority.

It seems to me that this split is inevitable in the Unionist "monolith" in any case and that Faulkner is sufficiently a realist to face it and exploit it. Real political life would, for the first time, operate in Northern Ireland.

It seems to me, also, to have three further advantages if it came about and, I repeat, it is nothing more than a hope.

First, it would make the Provisional IRA's "heroic" antics irrelevant to the vast majority of the Catholic population, without whose at least passive parliamentary support, Faulkner could not hope to govern.

#### Voting power

Second, a split in the Unionist Party could mean a real accretion of voting power from Protestant loyalists to the N.I.L.P. Many disillusioned Protestant workers could not support the Right and would not support Faulkner.

Third, it would break the Orange Order by depriving it of its present function of deciding what faction of the Unionist Party may be permitted to rule and thus highlighting its true role of leading what would then be an undoubtedly large minority "die-hard" loyalist faction.

The pre-requisite is an Irish-British Labour Movement of four components with a common policy. This was born in London on Wednesday week last. It may be a frail and delicate infant but it is a real hope.

Politics is the realisation of hopes initiated by decisions. ●