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Christopher Stanley is the Domestic and International Human Rights Advocate with Relatives for Justice. He is a Times Lawyer of the Week and a LALY/LAPG Public Law Lawyer of the Year Nominee. The views expressed in the article are his own.

An analysis of the British Labour government Troubles Bill.

This Bill was introduced as a response to the Conservative government Legacy Act 2023 and following the Joint Framework Agreement 2025 between Ireland and Britain.

This analysis is an assessment of the progress of the Bill in the context of the influence of the UK veterans lobby at the expense of the interests of the families of the legacy.

It is work in progress and this analysis will be subject to further revision – and amendment – as the Bill reaches the Committee Stage of the House of Commons. That date is yet to ‘TBC’  by the British government.

The Irish government has introduced to the Houses of the Oireachtas a General Scheme of the Legacy of the Troubles Bill 2026.  The progress of the Leinster House Bill will in part depend on the Westminster Bill.

In addition to the Joint Framework Agreement 2025 between the two governments and an application to the European Court of Human Rights by the Irish government regarding the UK Legacy Act 2023, the other key determinant factor to progress the legislative will of the UK Labour government is the British veterans lobby.

Meanwhile, families who are relatives of the victims of the conflict, are forced again to wait and wait, as the politics of legislation determines the fate of truth.

A note on language: throughout this analysis I use conflict as opposed to Conflict and legacy as opposed to Legacy. I do this with a mind to the writing of history and to the sensitivities of families who lost loved ones.

I avoid the use of the description Troubles which is a word imposed upon the conflict and serves to diminish the impact of violent death and marginalises to a ‘little local difficulty – over there’ – a geographical morality – the bereavement of families.

Introduction

(a)

The continued out-workings of the violent legacy of the conflict in the North of Ireland are being addressed by the British Labour government in its Troubles Bill (the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill  (hereafter the Troubles Bill).

The Troubles Bill was introduced to the House of Commons in September 2025. It was Carried Over in April 2026 to the new session of Parliament. The Bill may be timetabled for the Committee Stage of the House of Commons following the summer recess. 

This is obviously before any progress toward Royal Assent via the House of Lords.

Over 100 Amendments 15 July 2026  have been laid to the Troubles Bill at the date of recess.

One aspect of the Troubles Bill which has caused controversy is a return to a ‘veterans versus victims’ dichotomy and hierarchy.  This can be broken down to mean that veterans require ‘protections’ from investigation at the expenses of truth being available for  families of victims and that this creates a justice gap.

This justice gap is that between the interests of veterans and the interests of families, which is also a gap in rights. One ‘side’ will suffer because of a deficit created in favour of the other.  Justice for one side will be secured at the cost of injustice for the other side.  Or – the rights of one side can only be secured through the diminution of the rights of the other. Or – our rights to protection can only be guaranteed at the costs of your rights to truth.  Or – our interests are in the ‘public’ interest, your interests are only private to your suffering of bereavement.

These are false hierarchies and dichotomies. But they are the basis of discourse about the Troubles Bill and a dangerous reduction to rhetoric about how much truth costs in a complex post-conflict transitional justice society in the absence of any independent truth-recovery mechanism securing consent of the families of the victims.

Families are relatives of those killed during the conflict in the North of Ireland. They include the families of veterans who were killed.  These are the victims, the Next-of-Kin, the relatives of dead and the survivors of the conflict.

Veterans – an unsettled term – includes those serving under Operation Banner and possibly other British Crown Servants deployed and operating over the course of the conflict in the North of Ireland.

If interests are viewed as an expression of rights, then the right of families are a right to truth, and the rights of veterans is the right to due process and fair trial.

The tension or gap between rights and interests of families and veterans is sadly where the latter, or those appearing to advocate on their behalf, have drawn a battleline.

There is as an attempt being made on behalf of some veterans to impose a hierarchy of victims of the conflict. In terms of the out-workings of the peace and search for reconciliation (however defined) this imposition is viewed by many in the North of Ireland as a dangerous contribution to a corrosive and toxic false narrative representing the truth – the official history – about the conflict from the British perspective. 

This narrative represents the vested interests of those who are intent on securing a (British) state-centric account or narrative of the conflict. This is opposite to the search for truth sought by families, whose search for truth is search as a core element of any process toward ‘reconciliation’.  

In one sense, there can be no imposition of an official narrative, or an absolute truth. In one sense, as this was a violent conflict, there are, in terms of some commentators on post-conflict societal reconciliation, only or sole different stories and no absolute truth,  stories save for that told by the bereaved to their children with the truth known to the best of their knowledge.   

The imposition of an official narrative is one which will seek to mythologise the tragedy of conflict as between ‘right and wrong’ where there are just ‘victims’ and unjust ‘perpetrators’ and where the complex and uncomfortable edges are erased in the triumph moral certainty at the expense of ethical ambiguity and, for families, who not seek absolute truth or morality certainty save, beyond their own internal reckoning and accounting according, denial of the answers to the questions of Why?

What happens after truth has been established (and this is the point of contest for the British state) is for the institutions and mechanisms of a democratic-liberal society be whether be they retributive or restorative or within a consensual frame of reconciliation.

(b)

In short, a family-based search for their truth contests a British state-centric imposition of a truth when truth to families has been consistently contested, delayed and denied.

The hierarchy of victims (veterans versus victim) imposition (and when a veteran cannot also be a victim),  and its associated narrative of a truth, is, regarding the Troubles Bill, being choreographed and articulated by and through former British military senior officers in a coalition with those politicians and civil servants in opposition to it and in favour of retention of the Legacy Act 2023.

Those in ‘official’ opposition include MPs of the Conservative and also Unionist (DUP and TUV) parties who maintain support for the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023 (hereafter the Legacy Act 2023) which remains law (no matter no in tatters) absent the Royal Assent of the Troubles Bill and its associated Remedial Order.

This opposition also includes the Liberal Democrats whose oppose both the Legacy Act 2023 and the Troubles Bill (voting against a Carry Over Motion) in favour of a ‘fresh’ approach through new legislation as yet neither proposed nor formulated.

The loose alliance of Conservative-Unionist Parliamentarians is also exploiting an increasing anxiety within the Labour government.

This is an anxiety around the ‘veterans issue’ and alleged ‘vexatious’ litigation, including prosecutions.

The allegations of vexatiousness contend that conflict-related legacy criminal justice lead investigations and prosecutions (out-with contentious civil litigation) are being secured through harassment of veterans who becomes persecuted victims

There is an anxiety around the maintenance of military morale in a complex global security environment and the maintenance of British  ‘security’.

There is anxiety around encroaching reputational damage limitation exacerbated by ‘lawfare’ taken against the British military and its paymaster the Ministry of Defence (MOD).

There is a lack of understanding or interest about the legacy of the conflict in the North of Ireland amongst new intake Labour MPs. These MPs have constituents who are veterans and many of them represent constituencies with marginal majorities. For some of these MPs the issue of the ‘Troubles’ is resolved and the ‘province’ devolved to being a political side-show and a footnote to BREXIT and the muscle flexing of the right against the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The naivety of Labour MPs on the complex out-workings of the conflict in the North of Ireland was recently worryingly expressed in a speech by the new Prime Minister Andy Burnham speech to the Alliance Party  14 March 2026 (last accessed 15 July 2026)).

Burnham proposed to introduce a written constitution ‘so that no citizen anywhere, in Northern Ireland or in the North-West, can be treated any more as a second-class citizen’.

Burnham is ignorant of the  provision already within the Good Friday Agreement 1998 (hereafter GFA98)  at page 17 at paragraph 4 proposing a Bill of Rights reflecting the particular circumstances of the North of Ireland:

“The new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission will be invited to consult and to advise on the scope for defining, in Westminster legislation, rights supplementary to those in the European Convention on Human Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, drawing as appropriate on international instruments and experience. These additional rights to reflect the principles of mutual respect for the identity and ethos of both communities and parity of esteem, and – taken together with the ECHR – to constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.“

The arguments articulated in the debates to date on the Troubles Bill by those who oppose it, at Second Reading, during the Carry Over Motion debate and in Select Committee (both the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee (NIAC) and the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) have scrutinized the Troubles Bill) rehearse the following:

• the  apparent overreach of the extent of ECHR and the invasive jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) into UK domestic law
• the responsibilities apparently incumbent on the Republic of Ireland on the issue of the legacy of the conflict
• the post-BREXIT border arrangements via the Windsor Framework Agreement in the shadow of ‘Am don Aontacht /Time for Unity’
• the persistent scab of paramilitarism expressed as gangsterism and exploited as sectarian violence, now targeted against migrants, fuelled by fake/false news media manipulation

The ‘arguments’ revisit tensions about immunity from (‘vexatious’) prosecution of veterans versus amnesties for combatants tethered to rights to truth, justice and accountability in the post-conflict transitional justice society of the North of Ireland and to complex post-BREXIT political arrangements and movement toward unification. 

The Troubles Bill is ‘good’ whilst the deplored and derided Legacy Act 2023 is ‘bad’. 

This is correct in the sense of the absolute failure of the latter to establish consensus save in its opposition to it.

However, the Legacy Act 2023 remains law, no matter how battered by the Courts in the North of Ireland and subject to an extant inter-state application to the ECtHR by the Irish government against the UK, so long as the political will of politicians in Dublin is held fast and there is no obvious bad faith displayed by politicians in London based on prior agreements and back-channel deals.

Both the judicial activism of the senior courts in Belfast and the political leverage sought by Dublin focus on the failure by design of the Legacy Act 2023 to comply with the ECHR. 

The ECHR remains core to the foundations of GF98 and the Stormont House Agreement 2014 (hereafter SHA14) between Ireland and Britain. 

The Irish government maintains its application to the ECtHR in Strasbourg despite the apparent good faith commitment of the British government by way of the introduction of the Troubles Bill and the cross-border agreement by way The Legacy of the Troubles: A Joint Framework Agreement (September 2025) (hereafter JFA25).

The arguments martialled against the Troubles Bill seek to make political capital out both an international peace agreement – the GFA98 – and the cross-border JFA25.

The opposition arguments seek to undermine the political and legal authority of both of these agreements in terms of their commitment to human rights and cross-border co-operation seared now by the post-BREXIT ‘soft border’ between the two jurisdictions:

“In a spectacular act of political self-harm between 2016 and 2019, it tried to use Brexit to roll back the Good Friday Agreement by re-establishing a ‘hard border’, enforced by police and customs officials, between the North – which as part of the UK was to exit the EU – and the Irish Republic, which would stay in the EU. In the event, something like the opposite occurred: the UK left the EU, but the North stayed in the EU single market, with a new trade border running down the Irish Sea. Instead of strengthening the union with Britain, the DUP had managed to weaken it.”  Patrick Cockburn · Leap in the Dark: Irish Unity LRB 9 July 2026

The JFA25 between Ireland and Britain is being leveraged by the Irish government by way of its application to the ECtHR regarding the ECHR compatibility of the Legacy Act 2023.

This makes the ‘positives’ of the JFA25 reliant in part on testing the good faith of the British government to the expected obligations within the JFA25 – upon both parties – by way of a third-party adjudicator (the ECtHR).

Those opposed to the Troubles Bill interpret both the JFA25 and the inter-state application as  interferences in domestic sovereignty, an imposition of contested ECRH-rights and a pointed reference to post-BREXIT ‘soft’ border arrangements, bitterly now opposed by the DUP and the remaining rump Conservative opposition who both now seethe with betrayal by the Boris Johnson frontbench and the soft approaches by the Labour government back to the EU.

[1]

This analysis of the Troubles Bill seeks to unpack some of the contested narratives which are stalling its progress toward enacted as legislation which, if amended in accordance with ECHR-standards of compliance standards, could introduce investigative mechanisms and processes commanding the confidence and support of all families who are relatives of those killed during the conflict and the survivors of criminal acts and human rights violations, and offer opportunities for truth, justice and accountability as a core part of any state-sponsored reconciliation process. 

Such mechanisms and such processes, together with consensual reconciliation initiatives centred upon the families of the victims, and the fulfilment of the right to truth through securing the positive obligations demanded pursuant to breaches of Article 2 and 3 of the ECHR and the related jurisprudence of the ECtHR (reflecting international human rights law standards), would uphold the Rule of Law and secure Common Law principles in accordance and in compliance with ECHR standards, as already agreed in the SHA14 between Ireland and Britain and now glimpsed with the JFA25.

The ECHR is embedded in both the spirit and letter of the GFA98 (and the SHA14) which is the underpinning of the peace in process in the North of Ireland, a jurisdiction looking to its post-BREXIT future with its sovereign neighbour in the Republic of Ireland.

The implementation of consensual processes and initiatives could occur before the 30^th  anniversary of the GFA98 and will be an example to other post-conflict transitional justice societies (a fact not lost on international observers: see for example the remarks of the UN Special Rapporteur on Truth 20 April 2026.

The risks of not achieving consensus in terms of the enactment of Westminster legislation securing the support of families – in the context of the legacy of the conflict in the North of Ireland – is a destructive legislative sclerosis (characteristic of the devolved administration at Stormont), the triumph of both fake news and the of the turn toward a dangerous human rights revisionism through the manipulation of combatant perpetrators, at the expense of all families seeking truth, justice and accountability.

These risks are being given succour by the UK Supreme Court (hereafter UKSC) in recent judgments reflecting an English lack of sensibility (and sensitivity) and pointed ignorance about the state of exception of the North of Ireland, the complexities of post-BREXIT ‘UK’ borders, an international peace agreement, and the rights of families of victims post-conflict, who seek reconciliation (and repartition and non-repetition) on their own terms grounded on truth, accountability and acknowledgement: the core elements systemically denied by successive British governments.

[2]

The Labour government Troubles Bill seeks to implement the Labour Party Manifesto 2024 commitment to repeal and reform the Legacy Act 2023 introduced by the previous Conservative government:

‘The Legacy Act denies justice to the families and victims of the Troubles. Labour will repeal and replace it, by returning to the principles of the Stormont House Agreement, and seeking support from all communities in Northern Ireland.’  (page 113)

The Troubles Bill also seeks to restore (or at least revisit) the principles of the SHA14  which, inter alia, had addressed the violent legacy of the conflict in the North of Ireland and which had the endorsement and support of the Irish government and commanded the support of the majority of the political parties in the North of Ireland and, most importantly, cross-community support specifically of families of the victims and survivors.

Those in the minority of dissent against the SHA14 were and are the representatives of a particular Unionist-Loyalist tendency who continue to oppose the GFA98 despite an uncomfortable (and occasional) power-sharing relationship with Sinn Féin at Stormont as the Northern Ireland Executive (NIE)). 

The collapse of power-sharing at Stormont in 2017 was exploited by the then Conservative government to shift its ‘Northern Ireland’ policy toward a harder pro-Unionist entrenchment position and to drip feed the rhetoric in the public consciousness and the media of what would become the Legacy Act 2023.

This shift exploited the delicate consensus achieved by the SHA14. It sought to expose the difficult details of the SHA14 and suggest that legislation along the lines agreed by way of the Northern Ireland (Stormont Agreement and Implementation Plan) Act 2016   would not work. One commentator noted that one arch-NI Conservative SPAD said: “consensus ‘began to evaporate’ when it came to fleshing out the details.” One of the ‘work’ obstacles was that the principles of the SHA14 committed to ECHR-compliance of the proposed investigatory mechanism (an Historical Investigations Unit).

The SHS14 principles were abandoned by the last Conservative government in favour of its own much contested legislation of the Legacy Act 2023 which had wide cross-community and cross-party opposition and not been consulted upon with the either the people – the families of the victims – of the North of Ireland or the Irish government.

In March 2020, in a marked departure from the SHA14, Boris Johnson’s government announced that it planned to end ‘the cycle of reinvestigations … that has failed victims and veterans for too long’. The announcement accompanied the introduction of the Overseas Operations Act, eventually passed in April 2021, which makes it harder to prosecute or sue soldiers for alleged war crimes committed overseas. In 2019, Johnson has signed the ‘veterans pledge’ presented to him by the Sun newspaper. (see the commentary of Daniel Trilling · Slow Waltz: Trouble with the Troubles Act LRB 6 June 2024.

What was also abandoned was the Conservative Party own The New Decade, New Approach Deal  (January 2020) torn up by Command Paper 498 Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland  (July 2021).

This was a ‘policy’ volte face less to do with the North of Ireland than with post-BREXIT arrogance and ignorance (by the Conservative government and their Unionist allies) and an electoral-lead intent to leave the ECHR: Conservatives Announce ECHR Exit Policy.

As the (then) Labour government Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (SSNIO) said regarding the imposition of the Legacy Act 2023 by his predecessor:

“It failed because it has been found in many respects to be incompatible with our human rights obligations; the legislation simply did not work on its own terms. But even more importantly, it failed because it did not command any support in Northern Ireland among victims and survivors or the political parties”  ((Hansard 21 01 2026 Colum 38).

(a)

The Troubles Bill may have a slighter better chance of success than the Legacy Act 2023 in establishing mechanisms to investigate conflict-related deaths and injuries because:

• it has the explicit political support of the Irish government through the UK-Ireland Joint Framework Agreement 2025

• The Labour government has a substantial majority in the House of Commons. 

• It is not the Legacy Act 2023

The success of the Troubles Bill, for families, will depend on the ability of its sponsoring department (the Northern Ireland Office (NIO)) to convince them to engage with the proposed processes for investigation into the killing of their loved ones.

It will be a  process of establishing their trust after the bitter blow of the previous Conservative government abandonment of the SHA14 and its own New Decade, New Approach initiative by way of Command Paper 498 and the Legacy Act 2023.

The success of the Troubles Bill, in terms of the Labour government, will be to steer it through Commons and Lords unscathed by extensive amendments introduced by the Conservative and Unionist (DUP and TUV) opposition (who stand with the Legacy Act 2023), the Liberal Democrats (who oppose the Legacy Act 2023 but want the Troubles Bill replaced). Success of the Troubles Bill, for NIO, will be less dependent on the agreement – or acquiescence – of the Irish government, pointedly confronting – or not -its own ECHR-deficit regarding the legacy of the conflict on its own bloody doorstep and with its eye on soft border EU trade and unification.

The opposition to the Troubles Bill including many of the tabled Amendments to it represent, in part, powerful interest groups (which to date has included the Labour government’s own MOD) including the retired senior officers and commanders of Operation Banner (the name for the British miliary operation in the North of Ireland between 1969 to 2007), and the current Chiefs of the Defence Staffs, the Director Generals of the Security Services (MI5, MI6 and GCHQ) and their Whitehall Mandarins and SPADS in conversations with right-leaning think-tanks including The Policy Exchange (see for example Policy Exchange 10 February 2025 and Policy Exchange 17 September 2025) and the Malone House Group.

(b)

The intent of Legacy Act 2023 was to ‘draw a line’ under the past in the North of Ireland.

The intent was to move away from criminal justice lead-investigations (police and coronial) and the cycle of public and private litigation, in favour of ‘reconciliation’ (on British government terms) through the recovery of information for families, according to a recent House of Commons Briefing Paper (CBP 5 November 20205).

“In the 2022 Queen’s Speech, the Conservative government committed to bringing forward legislation on Northern Ireland legacy issues that would provide “better outcomes for victims, survivors and their families, giving veterans the protections they deserve and focusing on information recovery and reconciliation” (Queen’s Speech 10 May 2022).

The architects of the Legacy Act 2023 sought to erase what it described as the pernicious counter-narrative in which collusion and impunity are exposed as the architectural core elements of a domestic counterinsurgency military-intelligence-political strategy-agenda by way of the imposition of state-centric historical narrative.

This narrative was to be written by British government appointed historians and curated by civil service supervised archivists:

“It is a version of the Troubles that seeks to displace responsibility from the people who perpetrated acts of terrorism and place the State at the heart of nearly every atrocity and murder that took place – be it through allegations of collusion, misuse of agents and informers or other forms of unlawful activity.  For some, every allegation of wrongdoing by the State – or those working for it – is treated as fact, however unsubstantiated or whatever the source and whatever the consequential distress to victims.” (Belfast Newsletter 11 February 2026)

The Legacy Act 2023 was therefore an extension of the Emergency Powers legislation relied upon by successive British government throughout the course of the conflict.

The development on the pernicious counter-narrative propagated by Conservative Ministers and SPADS and entrenched Whitehall Manadarins, and their supporters in the right-wing think-tanks and  media, developed in part as a response to the exposure of the extensiveness of collusion (and impunity) between British state agencies (the security forces) and their agents and informers and paramilitary groups, Loyalist and Republican. 

The pernicious counter-narrative therefore becomes an attack strategy  to impose the ‘official narrative’ in a propaganda exercise reminiscent of the work of the British Information Research Department and provided to a Minister: Villiers: A way forward for legacy of the past in Northern Ireland 11 February 2016 reported in Belfast News Letter 11 February 2016.

(c)

The process of exposure of collusion and impunity as a British Security Force strategy as ‘developed’ throughout the course of the Conflict, has its evolution in the reports of Judge Cory, the statutory statements of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI) into  ‘misconduct’ by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), in The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review (De Silva), in work of civil society organisations and by academics, and in public and private law Conflict-related Legacy litigation, one result of which (Re Barnard [2013] NIQB 47) was Operation Kenova. 

The Re Barnard judgment led to the establishment of Operation Kenova whose remit  included an ‘independent’ (separate from the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI))  police investigations into the activities of the Loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) Glenanne Gang responsible for at least 120 murders in the 1970s and whose members included those serving with the RUC and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR).

That part of the Operation Kenova – specifically its Operation Denton investigation – although concluded – has yet to be published due to legal challenges. Once again, truth to denied to families: The Irish News 17 January 2026.

By prohibiting due process legal mechanisms of investigation by independent criminal justice authorities including by way of the policing, in favour of ‘reviews’ by the Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR), the Legacy Act 2023 mechanism and the prohibition on legacy inquests, and on legacy civil actions, and imposing a  ‘state-centric’ historical narrative (Part 4 provides for the British government to appoint a ‘designated person’ to direct the organisation of an oral history of ‘the Troubles’), was all seen by families as abandoning any meaningful political and legal attempt to enable their access to truth, justice and accountability

For the families of victims, securing the right to truth through ECHR-compliant investigatory mechanisms enabling the possibility to establish accountability (even by way of acknowledgement and reparation if not by criminal justice censure or sanction) for conflict-related human rights violations, including state-sponsored murder, is core to the reconciliation processes demanded in a post-conflict society and to the development of transitional justice because they are victim-centred rights.

This was what has been denied to families by the Legacy Act 2023. The Legacy Act 2023 ignored the demands of victims – the families of the dead – for it denied their ability to ask the basic questions of ‘why and who’ and to expect any answers.

As the current  Chief Constable of the PSNI said: ‘(where) we know there has been wrongdoing so that it can be properly examined and learned from, and families can understand better what happened’ (Answer 36 in Evidence to Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 14 01 2026).  

The current Chief Constable of the PSNI was also the Officer in Command (OIC) of Operation Kenova.  He has made a number of bold statements about the legacy and the current the role of the PSNI in the out-workings of it.

Specifically, he has been concerned about the costs of Policing the Past from a devolved budget (as policing and criminal justice are devolved matters). Although, of course,   this devolution does not include National Security, or for funding for investigating the crimes of the conflict from Westminster not Stormont.  And, of course, National Security is not defined beyond broad brush strokes of the public interest which is less than convincing when the questions families have relate to killings from before 1998. That does not diminish the impact of death but it does diminish the compellability of the National Security veto argument and intensifies the failure to allay rumour and suspicion by the British state.

There has been a marked tension between the PSNI, the MOD and the Security Services regarding disclosure of sensitive material (that touching upon National Security) in legacy litigation-related civil claims and legacy inquests.

This tension of interests has been seen most recently in the Liam ‘Paul’ Topper Thompson legacy inquest into his killing in a sectarian attack (Re Thompson UKSC) and in the settlement  reached with the MOD regarding the sectarian murder of the three brothers of Eugene Reavey (BBC News 18 June 2026)

This tension between the Security Services and the PSNI can be traced back in terms of the planning for the Legacy Act 2023, when the latter were involved in a secret (perhaps covert is a more appropriate description) policymaking group (the NIO Legacy Senior Working Group – June 2020) involved in devising the Act.

The existence of this Working Group was revealed in Minutes recently disclosed under FOIA identifying that attendees had close ties to security services and state agencies, despite the fact the Legacy Act 2023 was supposed to investigate the state’s role in many killings. The PSNI declined to be part of the group but a former Chief Constable of the PSNI did attend the group to ‘stress test’ the proposed legislation (The Detail 26 May 2026).

(d)

To date the statutory investigatory mechanism established by the Legacy Act 2023 to ‘review’ conflict-related criminality and human rights violations (‘a Troubles related offence’ – section 1) – the ICRIR – has failed to secure  the confidence of families. It has, to date, failed to produce a report  as required by Legacy Act 2023 ( ‘production of reports on the findings of reviews’ – section 15)). Any family who has engaged with the ICRIR therefore cannot ‘report back’ on the quality of the goods produced. A limited number of referrals have been made by police forces in cases of conflict-related killings, the majority of which involved members of the British Army. 

NIO commissioned a non-statutory review of the ICRIR from Peter May, a former senior civil servant (the permanent secretary at Northern Ireland’s Department of Health until April 2025), following concerns about both its corporate effectiveness and culture in raised with it in December 2025. (Civil Service World 16 April 2026).

The May Review exposed serious problems resulting from a combination of factors including within the Legacy Act 2023 itself (specifically an absence of investigatory powers), internal governance shortcomings and the culture of the organisation at senior levels the Senior Leadership Team (SLT), tension between investigators and administrators in terms of purpose and operation, resources and results – or lack of any.

The SSNIO commented on the non-statutory review that the performance of the ICRIR was “unacceptable and falls below the standards expected” (BBC News 11 May 2026):

“I am deeply concerned to see some of the findings in Peter May’s Review. What has been identified is unacceptable and falls below the standards expected. It is for ICRIR Board to take whatever steps are necessary and appropriate to address this” (NIO PR 11 05 2026)

A statutory Section 36 Legacy Act 2023 review of ICRIR and its performance of its statutory functions must be completed by 30 April 2027.

This reads as a statutory authority – a poorly performing English comprehensive school of Welsh Hospital – being placed into ‘Special Measures’. 

In evidence to both NIAC and to the Northern Ireland Assembly Committee for the Executive Office, the SLT of ICRIR have partially admitted failure but sought to lay blame upon the lack of resources, lack of cross-border agreement on disclosure protocols in  legacy investigations with the Republic of Ireland, and the complexities of the case load.

They seek to draw fire away from the ICRIR by way of trying to undermine cogent remarks of a former Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland following the publication of the May Review.

The SLT of the ICRIR say that the function of the OPONI to investigate misconduct by officers of the RUC was different from the role of their role and that a comparison between the two in terms of ‘product’ cannot be fairly made.

For example, during evidence to the Committee for the Executive Office of the Northern Ireland Assembly following the publication of the May Review, a member of the SLT of the ICRUR said:

“Sometimes I do not think that there is an understanding of the scale of the work that we are being expected to do, and, as Sir Declan said, we are still running at less than 50% of the resources that we need to do the job”  … “When the ombudsman started, there may have been reports in the first couple of years, but they were disciplinary and misconduct cases. That is not what I am investigating. I am investigating deaths of people and connected deaths of people. That takes time, unfortunately. It is as if the £60 million is about having five reports, for instance, and that that is worth £60 million.” (NIA Committee for the Executive Office Minutes 17 June 2026)

This was a direct reaction to comments made by a former a Police Ombudsman for  Northern Ireland immediately following the publication of the non-statutory review made by a former senior member of RUC Special Branch and who is now a member of the SLT of the ICRIR.

It should be pointed out the endeavours of the former Police Ombudsman and her colleagues, assisted by the resilience and fortitude of families, did result in developments in understanding the extent of collusion and impunity between RUC and paramilitary groups throughout the course of the Conflict despite, resistance from the Northern Ireland Retired Police Officers Association (NIRPOA) through litigation: see for example Re Hawthorne and White [2020] NICA 33.

The first Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland had said, in a media interview on the publication of the May Review of the ICRIR that there was:

“Something fundamentally very wrong” with the ICRIR and “she claimed the organisation was deliberately ‘set up to fail’ by the last government, which had limited its ability to carry out full investigations. ‘When we were debating the [Troubles Legacy and Reconciliation] Act through parliament they removed the primary investigative powers at a late stage.’ Baroness O’Loan said she understood fewer than 50% of the ICRIR’s staff were investigators and even they ‘haven’t got the powers they need – this was always the problem’. ‘They can’t carry out surveillance, they can’t access financial information, they can’t access phone data to find out who is talking to whom’. ‘They can’t get information from the government of Ireland because there are no processes to enable that’ she argued.”  (BBC News 12 May 2026).

Here the former Police Ombudsman  identified that ICRIR was designed without any RIPA powers to assist investigations (Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000).

(e)

The statutory review process of the ICRIR will be occur as the Troubles Bill to ‘reform’ the ICRIR continues to progress through the UK Parliament.

Despite it failings and failures to encourage the engagement of families it purports to serve, the language used by the then SSNIO and the Whitehall officials of the NIO is such that there is an increasing elision that the ICRIR will become the Legacy Commission investigatory review mechanism proposed by Part 2 of the Troubles Bill. That will be fulfilment of the 2023 Labour Party Manifesto to ‘repeal and replace’ (page 113) (NIO PR 14 October 2025

This is also the language of the ICRIR when pushed on its future by both its SLT and sympathetic anti-Troubles Bill opposition politicians at both Westminster and Stormont. 

Progress of both the Troubles Bill and the SI 2025 Remedial Order (the latter approved by the House of Commons to ensure ECHR compliance with the offending provisions of the Legacy Act 2023 (Erskine May) – introduced by the SSNIO out-with an extant legal challenge at the time of publication of the Bill) – now depends on both the Parliamentary timetable of business following recess (having been subject to a Carry Over Motion to ensure the Bill’s continuance in the next session of the UK Parliament).

A Motion to  Stop the Instrument (the Remedial Order) in the House of Lords laid by Conservative Peer Lord Garnier (Telegraph 22 April 2026) was stalled on the prorogation of Parliament.  This failure to progress was noted by the JCHR:

“The Government’s lack of progress on the NI Remedial Order since that report is deeply concerning. The Government has had over eight months to move the approval motions in both Houses.” (JCHR Letter to SSNIO 6 July 2026)

The operation of the ICRIR (specifically in terms of Next-of-Kin participation in investigations) and other measures, specifically regarding the conditional immunity provisions,  and the Windsor Framework Agreement Article 2(1), implemented by the Legacy Act 2023,  had been subject to Judicial Review on the grounds of their failure to comply with the standards demanded to ensure compliance and compatibility with the ECHR in Re Dillon NICA – the progress of the Remedial Order was in part hindered by all parties awaiting this judgment. However, it’s the judgment delivered  of Re Dillon UKSC has not assisted Parliamentary passage of either the Bill or the Order. 

The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal (NICA) determined that the conditional immunity provisions of the Legacy Act 2023 were disapplied by Article 2(1) of the Windsor Framework and that the Act’s restrictions on civil actions,  as well as core aspects of the operations of ICRIR particularly in relation to the effective participation by the Next-of-Kin and in relation to disclosure of information, were each a breach of the Human Rights Act 1998. All four senior judges of the judiciary in the North of Ireland struck down the offending provisions of the Legacy Act 2023.

The NICA judgment was appealed by the SSNIO to the UKSC. The judgment of the lower court was overturned by the UKSC in Re Dillon UKSC. This was a unanimous bench decision delivered by the senior judge from the North of Ireland. The unanimity of the UKSC bench stamped its judicial authority on the issues under scrutiny, betraying again, what legal commentators had previously noted in another contentious judgment (securing Executive supremacy over the disclosure of sensitive material (Re Thompson UKSC) was a purposeful  blindness to what “are felt on the ground in Northern Ireland, where the conflict remains subject to enduring questions, and the darkest of accounts of its conduct are left to fester.” (UKCLA 18 12 2025)

The UKSC judgment in Re Dillon:

“Demonstrates an intense form of regressive judicial activism at work in UK constitutional law. Arising, as it does, at the intersection of issues around the Windsor Framework and Northern Ireland’s conflict legacy legislation, which do not attract the attention of many UK public lawyers, this decision is unlikely to receive the scrutiny it warrants. But here the periphery is projecting an urgent warning to the core of constitutional law discourse. The UK Government had made rights commitments to the people of Northern Ireland under the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement that ministers thereafter found to be getting in the way of their policy priorities, and the Court has worked assiduously to hollow out those commitments.” (UKCLA 14 05 2026)

The UKSC Re Dillon judgment ‘hollowed out’ commitments secured by way of the GFA98.

 In terms of the Troubles Bill and the transition (now being sold as ‘reform’) of the ICRIR into the Legacy Commission, both judgments enable the (new) SSNIO to commend the Troubles Bill to the House of Commons, bolstering his arguments by reliance upon the UKSC judgment in Re Dillon to say that the work of the ICRIR cannot be criticised until it has been further tested by way of a result or product (a report to a family regarding a specific killing) which – as noted – it has yet to produce – because the Re Dillon challenge to the ICRIR was, according to the UKSC ab ante:

“The human rights claims against the operation of ICRIR are treated by the Court as an ab ante challenge. For such a challenge to succeed on human rights grounds, the UK Supreme Court has, since Bibi, adopted the position that the breach of rights must be apparent ‘in all or almost all cases’. This explains the wide framing of the conflict by the Court. ICRIR primarily exists because of a series of complex and controversial cases involving the activities of state bodies or allegations of collusion between them and paramilitary groups leading to convoluted litigation. In those challenging cases, the issues raised by the Court of Appeal remain live, and to be litigated down the line.” (UKCLA 14 05 2026)

“In adopting such a facilitatory stance, the UK Supreme has tied its credibility to the UK Government’s legacy policy. The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal was highlighting, on multiple levels, how the legacy scheme did not secure minimum rights standards. It therefore gave the distinct impression of being created to serve the UK Government’s desire to draw a line under the conflict and prevent further embarrassing revelations about the conduct of the police, military and security agencies in the courts. Just four days after the Supreme Court refused to entertain these concerns, the UK Government released the ICRIR – Corporate Effectiveness and Cultural Health Review  that found that ICRIR to be a deeply dysfunctional organisation, insufficiently funded, divided, and undermined by inadequate legislative underpinnings. It gives the distinct impression of being a body set up to fail victims and their families, and the Supreme Court just gave the process more rope, further undermining the credibility of its oversight in Legacy cases.” UKCLA 14 05 2026.

[f]

Parallel to the litigation in the North of Ireland and then England (always a point of contest given devolution and historical significance of the legacy of Emergency Powers legislation when the judgment of Belfast is quashed by the judgment of London), the Irish government applied to the ECtHR to challenge the UK on the compatibility of the Legacy Act 2023 with ECHR.

Specifically, the Irish government challenges the UK on the failure to implement standards of investigation into conflict-related human rights violations required pursuant to violations of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. Extraneous to both the JFA25  and the Troubles Bill, this inter-state application (Ireland v UK No (2)) rests in Strasbourg and has to date not been withdrawn.  It exists because of the current political will of the Irish government

The future of the Irish inter-state application will perhaps balance on the ‘success’ (from the point of view of the current Labour government) of its Troubles Bill and the associated Remedial Order and the out-workings of the judgment of the UKSC in Re Dillon.

There will need to be continuing and steadfast political will of current political administration in Dublin to hold the UK to its intent as articulated in the JFA25 which would otherwise be viewed as having been negotiated by the British government in bad faith.

The Irish government will want to avoid the snub of replicating the unilateral actions of the previous Conservative administration which reneged on the SHA14, the New Decade, New Approach deal in favour of Command Paper 498 and the imposition of the Legacy Act 2023. But Irish-Anglo politics is a long-game (perhaps more so post-BREXIT) and memories can be selective and short, and a snub can be played to domestic advantage.

(g)

The Irish government agreed under the JFA25 to implement its own legislative framework to mirror the Troubles Bill and to ensure cross-border co-operation in investigations, which, in any event,  is demanded when ECHR violations of Articles 2 and 3 are engaged.  It has published General Scheme Legacy of the Troubles Bill which has been introduced to the House of the Oireachtas (9 June 2026). 

The Irish government has established a Troubles Legacy Liaison Unit within An Garda Síochána as  single point of contact for co-operation with the British authorities and for co-ordination for victims and families in relation to Troubles-related investigations undertaken by the police forces of both jurisdictions. 

To date regarding conflict-related killings in the South, Dublin has created its own ECHR-deficit by being reliant on the mechanism established in the North by way of the Package of Measures agreed by the British government with the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe following the McKerr Group of Judgments of the ECtHR and the obligations arising from cross-border concords including the Weston Park Agreement 2001.

The operation of the Package of Measures mechanisms (the PSNI Historical Enquiries Team-Legacy Investigations Branch, the Historical Directorate of PONI and Legacy -inquests) were stopped on the introduction of the Legacy Act 2023.

The remaining obligations under the Weston Park Agreement 2001 have only just been fulfilled by the British government through the establishment of the Patrick Finucane Inquiry after years of litigation at domestic and ECtHR level and a desk top review (De Silva – followed by a government apology Prime Minister David Cameron statement on Patrick Finucane 12 December 2012.

There are ECHR-obligations upon Ireland and Britain regarding co-operation in cross-border criminal justice lead investigations into Article 2 and 3 human rights violations.

These obligations are being developed through the engagement in Omagh Bombing Inquiry 1998 – the first atrocity of the post-GFA98 peace – by way of a Dublin-Belfast-London Memorandum of Understanding (forming the basis of arrangements to mirror Westminster legislation – at this juncture the Troubles Bill).

The Irish government introduced International Co-operation (Omagh Bombing Inquiry) Act 2026 (No. 12 of 2026) to fulfil its expected role in the Omagh Bombing Inquiry 1998 proceedings.

These legislative arrangements are now being adopted by the Irish government in its mirror to the British government Troubles Bill, General Scheme Legacy of the Troubles Bill 2026, the passage of which depends on the Houses of the Oireachtas and its committees and the ‘final shape’ of the troubled British Troubles Bill before the Houses of Parliament.

A recent written question on this from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade to a TD updated the situation:

“Our discussion was constructive and the Secretary of State is seized of the need to progress implementation of the commitments in Joint Framework on the Legacy of the Troubles, including by advancing the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill in Westminster. That is the best route to legacy mechanisms that are compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights and can secure the confidence of victims and survivors of the Troubles.”   (28 July 2026 Houses of the Oireachtas)

Both the inter-state application to the ECtHR and the commitments under Joint Framework Agreement 2025 are, as noted, leverage for the Irish government, whether the British government consider them or not – and tests of faith.

The Irish government has been solid to date. The inter-state application to the ECtHR remains in place (Ireland v UK No. 2) and there will be no co-operation with the ICRIR because of its lack of ECHR-compliance – much to the chagrin of the SLT of the ICRIR and Unionist politicians:

“Irish foreign affairs minister Helen McEntee has said a legacy body set up by the British government is not human rights compliant after it emerged Gardai have rejected requests for information” (The Irish News 10 March 2026).

[3]

The Troubles Bill was introduced by the current Labour government, together with a Remedial Order, to secure ECHR-compliance of the state-sponsored mechanisms of investigation into Conflict-related crimes and human rights violations and to remedy the ECHR deficiency of the Legacy Act 2023 which had been challenged in Re Dillon.

In part, the Legacy Act 2023 was a ‘blind’ by the Conservative government of Boris Johnson to sell to its back-benchers its increasingly mistrust and contempt for the ECHR per se out-with ‘the Northern Ireland Troubles’ (‘a little local difficulty – over there’ – along the Narrow Ground), as part of the post-BREXIT political agenda of the assertion of UK sovereignty (which would in fact mean leaving the Council of Europe which – as we know – is a complete separate entity to the EU), and to stave off the threat of the Reform Party ascension to dominance of the political right in England within both the Tory Shires and Red Wall constituencies.  As one academic commentator noted:

“The Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023 is considered an extension of the emergency law regime, intended to avoid legal accountability for alleged state-perpetrated human rights abuses committed under emergency powers, rather than a genuine reconciliation measure. Engaging with historical institutionalism and emergency legal theory, this article situates the Legacy Act within the United Kingdom’s tradition of legal exceptionalism in Northern Ireland”

The Legacy Act 2023 “demonstrates how emergency legal regimes can persist and influence transitional justice efforts in post-conflict societies”  and “The Legacy Act’s sweeping curtailment of traditional legal redress mirrors past emergency laws in their ability to shield state actors from accountability and undermine fundamental rights”  (From Emergency Law to Transitional Justice).

The JFA25, the Troubles Bill and the Remedial Order have been accepted by some politicians and some within civil society as ‘progress’ or at least an improvement on the Legacy Act 2023. The only achievement of the latter was to unite in opposition cross-community  and to attract condemnation from international human rights community including within the United Nations and the Council of Europe.

Save for a former Lord Chief Justice for Northern Ireland, a former senior RUC officer, members of the Unionist NGO Malone House Group and the right-wing think-tank such as Policy Exchange, and the decimated backbenches of the Conservative parliamentary party whose ideological plan in terms of ‘Ulster and the Union’ was in tatters.

For families, who are relatives of the dead of the conflict – and for those injured and during the conflict and living with the physical and psychological wounds and scars of violence – it is far less clear what their views are on this next development in the ‘resolution’ and ‘reconciliation’ towards a process to secure truth, justice and accountability.

There has been minimal consultation with those in the North or Ireland to whom the consequences of the Troubles Bill will apply – the families.  There has been extensive consultation, by the admission of the British government, with the veterans community, represented in government by their own Minister for Veterans and People at the MOD.

It is now almost 30 years since the GFA98. The state-sponsored mechanisms proposed and introduced since then have to all, to greater or lesser extent with limited exceptions, failed save for the steadfastness of families, civil society organisations and a handful of judges.

Following the Legacy Act 2023, those mechanisms ceased to exist, even when their creation had been a direct result of the GFA98, cross-border agreements and the directions of the Committee of Ministers (CoM)  of the Council of Europe (CoE).

The standards demanded by the ECHR and as articulated by the ECtHR where there has been an identified violation of rights, specifically Articles 2 and 3, and  recommended to the British government by the CoM of the CoE in what are known as the McKerr Group of judgments brought to the ECtHR by families of victims of the Conflict, have still not been implemented to the satisfaction of the Committee and remains under scrutiny by the Department for the Execution of Judgments.

The inter-state application made to the ECtHR by the Irish government is an important legal and political leverage point to bolster the regular process of supervision by the relevant section of the CoM – the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights – of the British government’s failure to implement effectively the Package of Measures, now symbolic and practically abandoned by way of the Legacy Act 2023 and now only partially restored (at least in terms of civil legal actions called Legacy litigation) by the Remedial Order before the British Parliament.

Parallel to the out-workings of the Package of Measures of criminal justice based legacy investigations by PSNI, PONI and Coroners, there were valiant attempts to resolve truth, justice and accountability with reconciliation about the past, how to deal with it, how to police it, how to avoid its toxicity and how to move forward (without drawing a line under it) for families and their communities, on both sides of the interface walls.

Starting with the good intend of the cross-community Healing Through Remembering initiative, then Eames (Bishop – Protestant Church) and Bradley (Catholic -Civil Society) and the Consultative Group on the Past, of Haas and O’Sullivan (US  Diplomats) and the eventual SHA14 and draft Stormont House Agreement Bill (Northern Ireland (Stormont Agreement and Implementation Plan) Act 2016) which lay on the statute book until the Legacy Acy 2023 when Conservative politicians conjectured that there never was a consensual SHA14.

The JFA25, the Troubles Bill and the Remedial Order are being ‘sold’ to families as having cross-border political consensus, as being ECHR compliant, and as dismantling the inequities of the Legacy Act 2023 and as returning to the ‘principles’ of the SHA14.

[4]

(a)

The Troubles Bill purports to implement the commitment of the Labour Pary Manifesto 2024 which states that “The Legacy Act denies justice to the families and victims of the Troubles. Labour will repeal and replace it, by returning to the principles of the Stormont House Agreement, and seeking support from all communities in Northern Ireland” (2024 pages 116 – 117).

The Troubles Bill will, according to the British government:

“put in place a fair and transparent system that enables families of victims, including those who never came home from service in Northern Ireland, to seek answers” following “extensive consultation with victims and families, community organisations and civil society, the Northern Ireland political parties and our Armed Forces community” and “reflects the Joint Framework” and “to help families who have waited too long to find answers about what happened to their loved ones during the Troubles” and that this is “our opportunity to deliver on this final part of the Good Friday Agreement and help Northern Ireland politics and broader society to find those answers and move forward”  (NIO PR 14 October 2025.

To date – since the JFA25 and the Troubles Bill – were published in the Autumn in 2025 – the discussion and debate has been between two poles.

First, the commitment of the Irish government to the draconian sword of its inter-state application to the ECtHR and its watchful eye over the progress of the Troubles Bill, the Remedial Order, the former in the context of its own General Scheme provision and its engagement with the Omagh Bombing Inquiry and pressure bought by families and civil society originations  to address its own ECHR-deficit regarding the Legacy of the Conflict, for example, regarding the Sallins Men (a miscarriage of justice following a train robbery in 1976 involving the notorious Garda ‘Heavy Gang’ of senior detective: see Sallins conviction declared miscarriage of justice.

Second, the febrile political out-workings within the corridors and alleyways of Westminster and Whitehall, on the floor of the House of Commons, in the Committee Rooms of the Palace of Westminster and in the shared flats of MPs in Dolphin Square. 

But also, where lobby-power rests, in the bars and restaurants of the Army and Navy Club (the Rag) in Pall Mall and similar habitats, in the editorial offices of the media (from Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mail to GB News) and in the right-wing think tanks a such as Policy Exchange at Old Queen Street SW1H and their colleagues in the Malone House Group: (see for example Why a statute of limitations on Troubles-related incidents is the right answer 16 July 2021).

And this febrile manoeuvring to erase history and secure the post-BEXIT Union is occurring against the context of global and risk and the inexorable rise of the execrable Reform Party and within a Labour Party stuffed with first term back-benchers subject to Ministerial ambitions and the stroke of the Whip and where the North of Ireland is ‘over there’ – happily devolved, happily at peace, happily with its soft-EU border – despite economic deprivation, sectarian-dissident threat and the police-state use of plastic bullets and water cannon.

(b)

Whilst consultation-engagement with families – save by way of the Commissioner for Victims and Survivors  – has been at best vacant and partial, consultation-engagement with veterans – whose families can also be victims – has been orchestrated and vocal (including by way of a Northern Ireland Veterans’ Commissioner and a Minister for Veterans Affairs and People). 

The power and influence of those purporting to speak for veterans (usually understood to include those soldiers who served in the North of Ireland as part of Operation Banner) exposes an alliance between a ‘perma class’ of Whitehall senior servants and Director Generals of the security agencies who constitute the security community of the English political Establishment and senior members of the British military system (past and present). The later careers of all thrive and survive by way of established links to the global technological-military-industrial complex which is the defence industry and by-ways of ‘public’ procurement processes, buying last year, selling this year.

This alliance is using the Conservative and Unionist parliamentary opposition to amend the Troubles Bill and to introduce by ‘the back door’ statutory amendments (and by way guidelines and protocols proposed by the MOD), which would send any good intent of the Troubles Bill back down the ladder to the iniquities of the Legacy Act 2023 by way of the provisions of protections for veterans.

The MOD is strongly advocating for protections of  ‘its’ veterans of Operation Banner and the (new) SSNIO is promising his own amendments to the Troubles Bill on this issue at the behest – orders – of his more powerful Whitehall departmental colleague.

The new SSNIO is “looking forward to getting properly stuck in” – yomping across the Narrow Ground – NIO PR 21 July 2026 (last accessed 11 August 2026).

An early indication of his views on legacy – following no doubt extensive briefings and guidance from SPADS and the NIO Permanent Secretary – were: “Everybody is going to have to give a bit if we’re going to get a piece of legislation that can really stand the test of time, and delivers what everybody wants, which is that people have the security of knowing what really happened.” He is committed to a “full steam ahead” approach to the Troubles Bill in order to get it right.  For whom? The families? Or the sticky interest groups and opposition in Whitehall and Westminster? (The Independent 31 07 2026).

He has ‘stuck in’ by deciding not to renew the term of the Troubles Permanent Disability Scheme (TPDS) and not to extend the work of the Victims’ Payments Board (VPB) beyond the 31 August 2026, despite the consequences for applicants of a recent Northern Ireland judgment (Re McCabe [2026] NIKB 24 (last accessed 11 August 2026)). He decided this on the basis that he had not received a request to extend the operation of the scheme and the board from the Northern Ireland Executive (NIE). The NIE has no statutory authority or jurisdiction in this matter as the statutory foundation is Westminster legislation and this not a devolved matter (see: The Standard 11 August 2026). This is save for the cost of the TPDS being borne by the NIE through the Treasury block grant and the machinations of the Barnett Formula.

Whilst denying an extension to the TPDS, a colleague of the yomping new SSNIO at the MOD has extended the Military Hearing Loss Matrix until 31 January 2027, giving more current and former Armed Forces personnel the opportunity to benefit from the compensation framework established through litigation led by our military team: MOD Extends Military Hearing Loss Matrix Until January 2027 .

The new SSNIO has yet to publish the long-awaited Amendments to the government’s own Bill, which will then be picked over for debate by the Whips and the Speaker of the House of Commons. 

Whilst the forces of the Forces engages in alliances with those already in opposition to Troubles Bill, including along the Opposition Benches in the Commons and the crowded Conservative benches of the House of Lords, the Labour government faces criticism of its Troubles Bill which seeks to ‘repeal, reform and restore’ because it is not ECHR- compliant, has not engaged families, is not honest to either the SHA14, or the JFA25  and may fail on arrival in the upper chamber – and is passed will be litigated against.

This matrix of possible outcomes may tragically leave families still searching for truth and accountability via investigatory systems they can trust and support and processes they believe up-hold the Rule of Law, Common Law (which itself articulates all the rights found in the ECHR – see for example the judgment of a differently composed UKSC – before the ancien régime – in Ex parte Pham [2015] UKSC 19 ), and are true to the spirit and letter of the GFA98.

Families are used to waiting. They know attrition and betrayal. They know that their burden will be carried resolutely by those who come after them – inheriting this responsibility – because truth will out even through peace, for them, comes dropping slow.

(c)

The Second Reading of the Troubles Bill on 18 November 2025 was an opportunity for  politicians at Westminster to debate its provisions following the inter-state application by the Irish government to the ECtHR and the JFA25.

The Troubles Bill predictably passed to its Committee Stage of the House due to the substantial Labour  majority in the Commons.

The Troubles Bill was subject to scrutiny by both the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee (NIAC) and the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR).

The progress of the Troubles Bill to the new Parliament was subject a Carry Over Motion on 28 April 2026, which was secured by the government.

The Committee Stage of the Bill – at the point of the Summer Recess – is ‘TBC’.

Following the Second Reading, Amendments (last accessed 11 August 2026) to the Troubles Bill have been laid by primarily by Conservative and Unionist opposition politicians seeking to secure the  protections for veterans.

On 11 August 2026 over 100 Amendments had been laid to Troubles Bill.

As noted, the new SSNIO is yet to publish the Amendments to the Troubles Bill proposed by the Labour government, despite assurances made by his recent predecessor (BBC News 22 April 2026), and his commitment to get ‘stuck in’ – by deliberately not understanding the  nature of devolved matters and the practical demands and needs of families, including those applying for the TPDS –  has to date garnered little confidence save for his commitment to steer the Troubles Bill into law. His predecessor had said:

“It is clear … that we must do more through the legislation to safeguard our veterans community … “It is vital that those who served the State, to whom we owe so much and to whom we have a particular duty of care, are able to have confidence in the legislation … the Government will bring forward a substantial package of amendments designed to improve the process for victims and families, further safeguard our Operation Banner veterans and ensure oversight of their protections, and clearly differentiate between the role played during the Troubles by our brave security forces and the actions of paramilitary terrorists” (The Irish Times 22 April 2026 and Hansard 22 April 2026).

The upper chamber has a substantial majority of Conservative peers who have to date frustrated the legislative intent of the Labour government since it was elected to power at Westminster (see for example: The Observer 23 November 2025). The upper chamber may do so again with the backing of their colleagues and coalitions in the lower chamber in opposition to the Troubles Bill  which they fear threatens the British Army veterans community.

The House of Lords also includes Lord Caine, the Conservative Shadow Northern Ireland Minister and one of the architects of the Legacy Act 2023, whose career spans the Conservative Research Department (the cauldron of post-Thatcherite policy thinking whose staff rotate with positions at McKinsey & Co management consultants (although Caine had a spell at the defunct Bell Pottinger Public Affairs)), long-term NI SPAD (various).

By 2016, Caine had worked for six Conservative SSNIOs and was described as “one of the foremost experts on Northern Ireland” by Owen Paterson, the SSNIO who pushed for the official appointment historians to write the official version of the history of the conflict which became part of the Conservative Party mantra about the imposition of an British narrative over pernicious-counter narratives (BBC News 17 November 2010).

Lord Caine is a graduate historian, whose specialism was the Conservative Party 1902-1940 which included the Home Rule Crisis 1912-14 and the Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921.

As it was the previous Conservative government Legacy Act 2023 that was the catalyst for the current legislation,  there may a protracted period of ‘ping-pong’ between the Lords and Commons before the Troubles Bill becomes law.  

Meanwhile the tattered Legacy Act 2023 remains the law and the operation of the ICRIR continues – with direct government funding.

[5]

(a)

The Second Reading debate was an indicator of intent of the future troubled passage of the Troubles: Bill:

First, the debate – if it can be called that given minimal discussion of actual detailed provisions of the Troubles Bill  – was dominated by the veterans question/issue even  though there are no direct provisions relating to British Army veterans in the Troubles Bill.

Second, the event was political theatre in terms of the presence veterans in the Gallery of the House of Commons and Conservative and Unionist (and Reform) opposition politicians playing to that audience.  

Perhaps the new intake Labour MPs who are ‘first termers’ were mindful of the interests of veterans living in their constituencies and their voting intentions given the slim margins of majorities of many of those MPs and the current political landscape in the UK.

An additional layer of context was the sabre-rattling correspondence in the right-wing dominated London media from former British Army senior officers (‘the Generals’).

This cavalry charge was led by a former head of the British Army, who was suspended from the House of Lords for four months for breaching the rules on lobbying (so much for codes of military honour), in defence of veterans (The Guardian 25 November 2025.

The ‘charge’ utilised opposition to both the ECHR and to ‘lawfare’  (the weaponization of litigation to achieve strategic objectives), pointing to the then Prime Minister and the then Attorney-General.

This pre-debate skirmish by the Generals was played out in The Times against both the acquittal of Soldier F in Belfast (BBC News 23 October 2025  and Village Magazine 10 July 2021 and Village Magazine 17 July 2021) for his role in Bloody Sunday and the continued exposure of potential criminality by British Army Special Forces during the invasion of Afghanistan through a statutory public inquiry in London to “investigate matters arising from the deployment of British Special Forces to Afghanistan between mid-2010 and mid-2013.”

In a letter to The Telegraph 20 January 2026, published ahead of the Remedial Order debate, former commanders of the SAS joined the fray in light of the possibility of a legacy inquest being approved into the Loughgall Ambush, in which eight PIRA members killed were by the SAS, in addition to the restoration of civil legal actions (legacy-litigation) issued on behalf of families against primarily the MOD and PSNI (on behalf RUC) (The Independent 24 March 2025).

The skirmishing has been picked up in the Dublin media, at least in the pages of the Irish Times, with the Generals sending messages to Leinster House, saying that the JFA25:

“may be well-intentioned, [but] it is flawed on three counts since, firstly, it abdicates UK sovereign responsibility by sharing the announcement with the Irish Government . Secondly, it raises unrealistic expectations that can never be satisfied – especially given the passage of years. Thirdly, it exposes British veterans once again by allowing inquests to resume … Only by acknowledging the past honestly, protecting those who acted in good faith, and upholding the British state’s side of the contract can we secure the trust on which military service and democratic government ultimately depend,” they said. (The Irish Times 10 March 2026).

By ‘contract’ the Generals appear to mean an ‘unwritten contract’ that “the British state would stand up for those who were “prepared to risk their lives”. The Generals – strategically using the Irish media – admit that it not they or their paymaster, the politicians, who stand in the dock and are harassed by vexatious litigation but those to whom they gave the orders. 

More recently Sir Nick Parker, former GOC when Operation Banner ended in July 2007, said:

“If somebody does somethings that is outside the law of conflict that you are operating,  in they need to be held to account. But I do think you also need to hold to account the state that put you there and the chain of command that out you there”

“You are a soldier, you have written a contract (sic) and you have an unlimited liability, that your life may be taken by the state’s enemies, but the state is going to stand up for you and your family. It is a disservice to say to any veterans that they are a victim.”  (Belfast Telegraph 10 August 2026)

The General here is cautious to circumscribe his views by way of the Law of Conflict (in fact the Law of Armed Conflict) – which did not apply to Operation Banner.  This is why successive the British governments have refused to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 which ‘denies women and girls their rightful place in post-Conflict Northern Ireland’ (Open Democracy 26 June 2014) because it would designate the conflict as an Armed Conflict subject to the Laws of War, including the Geneva Conventions.

Defining military action and intervention as a war or conflict is an important distinction in terms of legal obligations, domestic and international and in one sense depends on the intentions of the opposed combatants ‘forces’ – ‘insurgents’ – the definition and its implications become complex when contested in terms of international human rights and humanitarian legal standards and norms, for example in terms of the extra-territorially of the ECHR as tested in Al-Skeini v UK and the reliance of members of the British Armed Forces upon the protections of the ECHR, whether ‘in contract’ or not.

The General here commits a disservice to veterans who themselves, or by through the grief of their families, might identify as victims when commanded to undertake actions that breach the Law of Conflict, the Rule of Law – and military guidance (no matter unsatisfactory) whilst on.

For example,  for the family of Telford ‘Ted’ Stuart (BBC News 26 April 2016), killed by the IRA whilst on operational service in Belfast as a member of the British Army Military Reaction Force (MRF) on 2 October 1972 (a covert British Army unit established by Frank Kitson (BBC News 24 January 2024: “Sir Frank was heavily involved in counter-insurgency methods, and established the Military Reaction Force”).

First, an unwritten contract might impose a moral obligation upon its parties. However, such an obligation has no force in law or, indeed, ethics. A covenant cannot and should not undermine the Rule of Law or the precepts of Common Law wherein are found the human rights norms now expressed within the ECHR. The Generals deploy an exercise in casuistry.

Second, the exposure – over years – of collusion and impunity as sanctioned state-practices in terms of the British response to the Conflict in the North of Ireland as a counterinsurgency operation has to be accounted for. This means the ‘chain of command’ or ‘following orders’ defence (then and now) and the expediency argument collapses at the point of the full extent of the exposure of the ‘The Dirty War’ of covert operations, agent handling and running, paramilitary group infiltration and manipulation, commencing with the arrival of Frank Kitson and the mindset of military-security practice imported by him and his like from the colonial insurgencies ‘fought’ by the Old Empire across the world since the 1945.

(b)

Inquests and litigation involving conflict-related issues – including killing – are viewed by the MOD and former members of the British Army – including the SAS – as both vexatious and an harassment of their soldiers – following orders. The anger of the Generals concerns  alleged  ‘vexatious’ prosecutions by way of lawfare of British Army veterans serving under their command in post-colonial counter-insurgency operations, including Operation Banner. 

Some within the MOD supported these allegation through reference to the civil actions bought against the MOD on behalf of families, which were ‘frozen’ by the Legacy Act 2023 but will be ‘unfrozen’ and restored by a Remedial Order (subject to debate in the House of Commons on 21 January 2026 and waiting debate in the House of Lords) (BBC News 21 01 2026. 

These civil actions – usually settled without an admission of liability by the MOD – include a writ issued against Frank Kitson (deceased) BBC News 27 April 2015. The claim made in the writ was that Kitson was “liable personally for negligence and misfeasance in public office”, because, in creating his policy, he was “reckless as to whether state agents would be involved in murder”.

The MOD was forceful, on the publication of the Troubles Bill, to ensure that ‘protections’ for veterans in criminal justice investigations (including legacy inquests) were secured and strengthened.

The MOD, apparently beleaguered of resources given enhanced global security risks and reputational damage affecting both retainment and recruitment, has been prepared to defend and contest each civil legal action made against it, at considerable expense, only to settle at the door of the court in increasing number of cases, without liability, also at considerable expense.

Similarly, the MOD has been prepared to prolong legacy inquests involving military personnel through its failure to comply with disclosure orders and requests, over years, most notably in the recent verdict of the ‘last’ legacy inquest before the Legacy Act 2023 prohibition into the Springhill Whiterock Massacre 1972 (BBC News 30 April 2026).

Here the verdict was that British soldiers did not use reasonable force in the killing of five people in the Springhill-Westrock area of West Belfast within minutes of each other on 9 July 1972.  The MOD claimed that they were unable to identify the names of the soldiers behind the ciphers used in court. Whether a reference for prosecution has been made by the coroner is not known.

(c)

The Remedial Order passed on 20 January 2026  (373 to 106). If it is passed through the House of Lords, it will restore legacy based civil claims against the MOD and the PSNI (in the name of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)).

The Remedial Order will also strike down the conditional immunity provisions of the Legacy Act 2023 prior to the judgment of the UKSC in Re Dillon on that point. (BBC News 22 01 2026 and Hansard 21 01 2026)

The veterans question/issue can be formulated in two ways around the concepts of amnesty and immunity:

First, a former British Army solider deployed within Operation Banner is immune from prosecution for breaches of the criminal law-human rights violations – this constitutes an amnesty.  There is no amnesty in place.

Second, a former British Army soldier deployed within Operation Banner is offered a contract for immunity (protection) from criminal prosecution in return for co-operation with state-sponsored mechanisms of investigation. Such an engagement might enable  truth-recovery and information-retrieval for families.  This would constitute conditional immunity. 

It is this conditional immunity provision of the Legacy Act 2023 that was struck down by both the NICA in Re Dillon (and a limb abandoned by the SSNIO in his application to the UKSC) and Parliament by way of the passage of the Remedial Order in the House of Commons (pending before the House of Lords). The NICA said: “the immunity provision which prevents misconduct charges being pursued is incompatible with the Convention” (page 107 paragraph  307).

However, the Generals fear that unless (additional) ‘protections’ for veterans are in place when they are subject to criminal investigation for alleged Troubles-related offences relating to Operation Banner, then a slew of ‘vexatious’ prosecutions with minimal prospect of success of conviction (according to the Generals) will follow based on avaricious ‘lawfare’ leaving veterans ‘utterly exposed’ (in the words of the then Prime Minister at PMQs 7 January 2026 (Hansard).  Two points:

First, immunity from prosecution is not the same as an amnesty.  An amnesty is Legislative or Executive act whereby the criminal investigation and prosecution of an individual, a group or class of persons for specific offences, is prospectively or retroactively barred, and any penalties ‘cancelled’. Immunity does not extinguish criminal-penal responsibility but exempts those accused of an offence from protection from prosecution or reprieve (a pardon) for those crimes already prosecuted.

Second, amnesty is a concept used to secure peace and to assist in cessation of violent conflict and achieve consensual transitional justice arrangements out-with the status of combatants. Immunity is a mechanism that does not offer ‘absolution’ from criminal acts but rather is used to secure participation in truth-seeking and information-retrieval systems, including state-sponsored investigations,  established after violent conflict.

Therefore, against the noise generated by Generals shouting in the media, the Second Reading debate of the Troubles Bill was an exercise in the rhetorical expression of political vested-interest indignation and righteousness around the veterans question/issue on the back of the criminal trial of Soldier F, which, according to the Generals and others, was a vexatious exercise in lawfare exploiting the ECHR with no prospect of success and should not be repeated.

[6]

The predictable display of political theatre in the cockpit of the House of Commons by Conservative and Unionist was indulged in at the expense of any actual sustained debate about the provisions Troubles Bill and its failure to implement the intent of the Labour Party Manifesto 2024 (page 113) or to achieve, regarding the proposed Legacy Commission, compliance with the ECHR.

Indeed, the veterans question/issue is absent from the Troubles Bill – as noted by the Generals (See: Belfast Telegraph 10 August 2026).

There is no direct provision, or even mention, of veterans in the Troubles Bill as it stands.

The Troubles Bill contains one provision relating to the welfare of witnesses (Clause 69).

This clause applies to those participating in the investigations and inquisitorial processes within the jurisdiction of the proposed Legacy Commission, the work of which will ‘replace’ (replicate?) the investigations-reviews of the now institutionally entrenched but proven as not-fit-for-purpose ICRIR.

As the SLT of ICRIR said in evidence to the NIA Committee of the Executive Office:

“The number of veterans who have come to the commission since then has nosedived to less than a handful” (Hansard 17 June 2026).

Clause 69 of the Troubles Bill does not offer protections to witnesses-suspects within the criminal justice system of investigation and immunity from prosecution by independent law officers within discreet statutory agencies.

The proposed  ‘reformed’ Legacy Commission mechanisms are out-with the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system and therefore decisions on prosecution – including of veterans – remains with independent law officers, in this instance the Public Prosecution Service Northern Ireland (PPSNI) (for example at Clause 43). 

The legacy of the PPSNI in relation to the legacy of the conflict is troubled and requires an independent ECHR-compliant statutory inquiry into public concerns regarding its role in collusion via impunity throughout  the course of the conflict in the North of Ireland.

However, the PPSNI is the independent statutory authority operating without apparent political interference of the British government. It is the independence criteria that is a core aspect of the ECHR-compatibility-compliance demand attaching to conflict-related legacy investigations and would ensure the confidence of those engaging with those investigations, specifically families.

[7]

The Irish government ‘signed up’ to the Labour government strategy by way of the JFA25.

The Irish government has stated that there can be no changes that “shift the balance” of what the two governments agreed on the issue last year and that large amounts of work went into making sure it represents all voices” (BBC News 10 January 2026).

The Westminster Second Reading debate of the Troubles Bill opened with Unionist politicians cajoling and coercing commitments on Legacy from politicians in Leinster House and that criticism has continued in committee and following the damning review of the ICRIR, blaming lack of cross-border co-operation on Dublin’s intransigence.

The Irish government cannot comment on domestic provisions regarding criminal justice investigations and prosecution processes in North of Ireland. This prohibits comment on the protections for veterans question/issue. However, the Irish government has made it clear there will no cross-border co-operation with the ICRIR until it is ECHR-compliant.

The Troubles Bill is the British response to the JFA25 statement of commitment and intent, and seeks to address ECHR-compatibility, in which it fails, despite the rhetorical flourish in the JFA25 to be ‘mindful of’ and to be ‘guided by’ the principles of the SHA14 and the ECHR as articulated within the GF98 and its obligations without any specific commitments so to do.

The United National Special Rapporteur on the on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence addressed Parliamentarians on 20 April 2026. Four MPs and one Peer attended the meeting. The Special Rapporteur spoke to  International Standards and the Legacy of the Troubles. He noted:

“In October 2025, my mandate sent a joint communication to the Governments of the UK and Ireland welcoming the Joint Framework’s commitment to acknowledge victims, restore trust, and replace the previous Legacy Act, but noted that key elements still risk undermining truth and accountability, including the overly restrictive disclosure regimes, potential limits on prosecutions, investigations, inquests, and civil remedies, and reliance on non‑judicial mechanisms.”

In conclusion he said:

“How the Northern Ireland is addressed is watched carefully by states, civil society organisations, and victims’ groups around the world who are navigating their own post-conflict legacies. When a state with the rule-of-law standing of the United Kingdom enacts legislation that its own courts find incompatible with fundamental rights, it sends a corrosive signal. When that same state then undertakes a genuine legislative correction, in cooperation with a neighbouring government, guided by international standards and attentive to victims, it sets a different kind of precedent, one that matters enormously for the credibility of transitional justice as a field, and for the people who depend on it.” (UN SR Truth).

The JCHR commended the comments of the UN Special Rapporteur to the SSNIO, and his remarks were noted in the Carry Over Motion debate by Labour MP Andy  McDonald:

“We should listen carefully to Bernard Duhaime, the UN special rapporteur, who met the Secretary of State and briefed Members last week. He recognised that the September 2025 joint framework with the Irish Government provides a genuine multilateral foundation for a comprehensive legacy mechanism, but he also issued clear warnings: that the governance of any legacy commission must preclude interference by those whose conduct may be under investigation; that a reparations mechanism should be considered, to give victims an accessible route to remedy; and that claims of disproportionate targeting of veterans are simply not supported by the evidence. Protecting individuals from poor-quality investigations is one thing; shielding anyone from accountability where evidence exists is quite another, and the Bill must not permit that outcome. When the Secretary of State speaks of safeguarding Operation Banner veterans, he must take care not to alienate the families who are still seeking justice in cases involving the actions of British forces.”  (Hansard 27 April 2026 Colum 674)

The Generals have been silent on the comments of the UN Special Rapporteur.

[8]

The Troubles Bill fails on four primary grounds (amongst others).

First, Executive control over the disclosure of information (Clauses 16 and 17)

Second, Executive control over the appointment of personnel to the proposed Legacy Commission (in fact ‘ICRIR 2’) (Clauses 4 – 6)

Third, Executive control over Legacy-inquest touching upon issues of National Security (Clause 16)

Fourth, the prohibition on re-investigation of conflict-related criminal acts and human rights violations (Clause 36)

The control over the non-disclosure of information on the basis of National Security – (‘sensitive, prejudicial and protected international information’ Clause 16 and Schedule 4)) which is never defined save by the implied interpretation of its gate-gatekeeps – the British Security Service community  – MI5, MI6, GCHQ and Army Intelligence – advising ‘come and go’ Westminster Ministers by way of entrenched career civil servants inhabiting the hierarchies of Whitehall) – has been tightened by judgment in Re Thompson UKSC.

The Re Thompson judgment secures further Executive discretion and the powers of Ministers  (“the ordinary position is likely to be that the court will look to the Secretary of State for the relevant assessment” paragraph 163) over the disclosure of the information touching upon National Security in the public interest, begging the question, for families – for whose security and in whose interest?

The Minister – in this instance the SSNIO – and colleagues within the Executive, at the behest of their Chiefs of Staff and DG’s, argue (and the former SSNIO stated this), that these decisions on disclosure can be challenged by way of Judicial Review by the independent judiciary. There are two points that can be ventured here:

First, Judicial Review in England, Wales and Northern Ireland is not a test of the merits of an Executive-administrative decision but rather the processes through which that decision was made and arrived at. The judges cannot substitute the decision only set aside and request that the decision be taken again. Given the position of the UKSC in Re Thompson the Minister in Westminster has been increasing confidence that he or she is best placed to make these decisions and that the judges across Parliament  Square agree. Obviously, Ministers come go whilst Mandarins and Spooks, filtering the ‘sensitive’ information, guiding the decision-making process, and defining National Security and the public interest, are permanent.

Second, Judicial Review in England and Wales is an expensive process and the majority of applicants are reliant on legal aid funding. The merits tests applied by the Legal Aid Agency (LAA) for England and Wales are draconian and exclusionary – as noted by a recent inquiry report by the Justice Committee of the House of Commons:

“Eligibility for civil legal aid is ‘unacceptably low’, with overwhelming evidence of a growing ‘justice gap’ in England and Wales, the report warned, with people ineligible for legal aid and unable to afford legal representation and advice privately … LAA remains deficient in delivering access to justice.” (UK Parliament 17 July 2026)

Therefore, a family in England wanting to challenge the decision of the SSNIO regarding a decision on the disclosure of sensitive information relating to a ‘Troubles-related incident’ would have great difficulty – save by way of Crowd Funding – to seek a Judicial Review of that decision before the High Court for England and Wales.

This would apply, for example, to the families who loved ones were murdered (now in record via an inquest verdict secured in 2019 (The Justice Gap 30 April 2019), by the IRA in the Birmingham Pub Bombings 1974, who have been denied a section Inquiries Act statutory inquiry (BBC News 30 October 2025) and referred to the ICRIR-Legacy Commission mechanism, which they refuse to engage with and are publicly boycotting.

The Birmingham families had to seek Crowd Funding to challenge – by way of Judicial Review – a decision of the coroner to exclude the question of perpetrators from their inquest. They would have to do the same again if engaging with the ICRIR-Legacy Commission. 

The situation in the North of Ireland, where legal aid is a devolved matter, may be less draconian as Judicial Review is viewed by the judiciary as an important supplement to address the ECHR-deficit created by successive British governments regarding the legacy of the conflict, but it still takes a toll on families and as seen in Dillon and Thompson, the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Belfast are increasingly set aside by the UKSC in London. 

The decision in Re Thompson in any event gives judicial authority to the decision-making discretion and powers of the SSNIO which lower court judges – including the Court of Appeal in the North of Ireland – would find difficult to depart from.

The imprint of the ‘dead hand’ of the vested interests of British Security community  and its stakeholders (the military-industrial-technological complex of alliances and allegiances) can also be seen throughout the Final Report of Operation Kenova.

Specifically, regarding the failure to secure any prosecutions of agents and handlers by way of decisions made on files sent to the PPSNI based on information provided in part by the Security Service (MI5).  But also, regarding the failure of MI5 to co-operate with Operation Kenova in terms of disclosure of request material (BBC News 9 December 2025).

The imprint of the ‘dead hand’ of the vested interests of British security community is also present within the Troubles Bill by way of the maintenance of Executive control over the disclosure of sensitive material touching upon National Security, now bolstered for the SSNIO by the Re Thompson judgment.

In this litigation the MOD, the FCO, the Attorney-General for England and Wales as Advocate General for Northern Ireland (another anomaly) and the Home Office applied and were accepted as interveners, without question, by the justices of the UKSC including Lord Sales.

As Phillip Sales he had been Treasury Devil ‘advising’, on behalf of MI5,  against breach of the Neither Confirm Nor Deny ‘doctrine’ 20 years before in the Re Freddie Scappaticci (2003) NIQB 56 – Scappaticci now being accepted by Operation Kenova as at least an element if the state-agent Stakeknife project – but denied still by the British government: BBC News 26 January 2026 and The Irish News 24 March 2025.

Freddie Scappaticci was a state-agent. He was an employee – at great cost – of the state, paid to infiltrate the PIRA. Brian Nelson was a state-agent. He was an employee – at great cost – of the state, paid to infiltrate the UDA. Both were run/handle/brief/de-briefed by the Security Forces including the FRU/MRF, MI5 and RUC Special Branch.

There were, under one definition, Crown Servants, and therefore under one proposed Amendment 5 to the Troubles Bill, veterans.

[9]

(a)

The ‘veterans question/issue’ reflects the vested interest of elements of the British Army.

The ‘veterans question/issue’ also reflects the vested interest of elements of the British Security Services.

Both are concerned, at one level, with reputational damage limitation, which can be seen as exercise in the assertion of a dominant narrative about the Legacy of the Conflict in the North of Ireland, in which any counter-narrative are pernicious and anti-British and therefore disloyal.

Both are concerned with establishing a hierarchy of victims based upon excusable permissibility (immunity) for state-sanctioned actions expressed in terms of moral righteous and the duty to follow orders (‘good soldier-bad terrorist’, which does not fit well with the veteran versus victim dichotomy).

These uncomfortable equations and balances in terms of victims are tested when:

First, there is clear statutory authority which avoid the imposition of a hierarchy of victims by way of the Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006.

Second, when veterans are in the dock it is the NCOs and other ranks not the officers, those following orders not giving them – including the politicians and civil servants developing and delivery ‘policy’ to the Chiefs of Defence Staff and GOC.

The Generals have been generous enough to admit this but glossed the admission with the ‘Laws of Conflict’ and the general confusion of military actions ‘on the ground’. This misses the target of long-term collusion and impunity as administrative state practices throughout the course of the conflict.

Those giving the orders get promoted to the House of Lords or becomes Non-Executive Directors and advisers to the defence/technology industries-sectors.

Their interest is one of maintenance of the authority and dominance of the administrative-political hegemony out-with the comings and goings of Ministers threw the revolving doors of Westminster.

These are the interests which being articulated by its former senior officers, the Generals, many of whom now sit within the English Establishment and within the industrial-technological defence sector of the and forming part of the influential political perma-class (The Guardian 2 January 2026) of the Corridors of Whitehall and the alleyways of the Westminster Village.

The Generals – and MOD/Home Office/FCO Whitehall civil servants and the Directors Generals of the security services/agencies – are the guardians of the corporate institutional memory of the British Security Forces all the way back to Brigadier Sir Frank Kitson and others like him. 

Kitson may have been an architect of the post-war colonial counter-insurgency operation in the North of Ireland, but he did not plan and implement alone as  a maverick commander, a military wayward Colonel Kurtz.

Kitson’s malign presence covers the post-war colonial ‘adventures’ of the British Army of Empire from Borneo to Belfast to Basra  and the present elision of the identification and exposure of criminality by the British Security Forces constituting  Operation Banner and by the British Special Forces in Afghanistan, the latter now being investigated by an independent statutory public inquiry sitting behind often closed doors in London.   

It is in the shadow of Kitson and his ilk (his brother’s in arms) that the protection for veterans is being sought to secure the reputations of those who were in command and those – Generals and Mandarins – who developed and deployed – including collusion and impunity as administrative state-practices (as articulated in the jurisprudence of ECtHR since Ireland v UK) strategies of counterinsurgency throughout the course of the conflict.

It is within the accompanying statements made by the NIO (very much in step with the Big Brother of the MOD), and in the responses of the then SSNIO, to vested interest groups  (depending on who was addressing), that the protections for/of veterans issue is  articulated and the proposed measures/guarantees/assurances are being touted to ‘buy’ the Troubles Bill its passage into law.

(b)

There are two reasons for this evasion of veterans question/issue in the Troubles Bill.

First, that the Labour government knows that the conditional immunity point has been ‘lost’ in terms of ECHR-compatibility (hence the passage of the Remedial Order on 21 January 2026 in the House of Commons and its progress to the House of Lords) and the abandonment of that limb of the appeal in  the Re Dillon appeal to UKSC.

Second, that protections for those within the criminal justice system, for example following a referral from the ICRIR or the Legacy Commission to the PPSNI,  cannot be offered within the legislation because they would offend the Common Law principles of due process (let alone Article 6 ECHR fair trial rights) and undermine the integrity of the Rule of Law out-with the rights secured by way of the ECHR, rights which apply to victims and to perpetrators including suspects and ‘persons of interest’.

Also, because the statistics on prosecutions of British Army veterans are not compelling when viewed in the context of both ‘lawfare’ and threats to withdraw from the ECHR, which is a cornerstone of the GFA98 and given reference in both the SHA14 and the JFA25 (see for example CBP-8352). As one observer noted:

“Between January 2012 and May 2023, the Northern Ireland Public Prosecution Service brought prosecutions in nine cases related to republican paramilitaries, four related to loyalists, five to former soldiers and none to former police officers. To date, only one former British soldier has been convicted of a historical Troubles-related offence.” (Daniel Trilling · Slow Waltz: Trouble with the Troubles Act LRB 6 June 2024)

This point was also made in an opinion piece in the Irish Times (The Irish Times 24 March 2026) that there is no evidence beyond the obvious that: “a critically informed commitment to human rights and the rule of law, with all its flaws, remain the sine qua non, the indispensable requirement, of efforts to combat denialism and acknowledge past harms in the post-truth era.”

Therefore, ‘protections’ for veterans are indicated as being developed and offered ‘incrementally’ but without the possibility to prevent any future prosecution of veterans should the evidential threshold for criminal prosecution be attained and should there be no political interference in the implementation of those thresholds by independent law officers.

However, independent decision-making by the PPSNI has not always passed without adverse comment from hostile politicians: BBC News 26 January 2017.

The six protections for veterans proposed to date, out-with the criminal justice system, therefore only apply to those engaging with or within the jurisdiction of the Legacy Commission proposed investigations and inquisitorial processes. They are a right to stay at home, right to anonymity, protection in old age, protection from ‘cold calling’ and the right ‘for your voice to be heard’ (Six Protections). On protection in old age: there is no statute of limitations on murder.

The six protections are being framed by those who propose and proclaim them as veteran ‘rights’ in the sense of being based on of legal authority yet to be established (probably, if they come to pass, through secondary-delegated legislation or policy-guidance to prosecutors and judges).

They are being choreographed by NIO and opposition politicians (Conservative-Unionist) and stakeholder interest groups (the Generals and their assorted brethren from the Security Services) as a necessary ‘rights for veterans’ beyond those already available under Common Law and through the ECHR.

Any ‘additional’ protections to those available to all under Common Law and through the ECHR would be subject to review by the independent judiciary.  The review function of the judiciary cannot be ousted without rattling the constitutional bars of the cages of the judges (whether in Belfast or London). 

However, the sovereignty of the Separation of Powers doctrine (when considered in the context of the devolution issue which the new Prime Minister is enthusiastic about) now looks questionable in the light of both the Re Thompson and Re Dillon judgments of the  UKSC whose jurisprudential leanings are toward the entrenchment Executive authority at the expenses of judicial oversight save for the role of the legislature which is problematic given substantial Parliamentary majorities.

In short, the judges of the UKSC, may read into the legislation of the Troubles Act (date TBC), protection for veterans through the elliptical language of the Troubles Bill drawing upon secondary legislation, guidelines, and policy intentions.

Further, on the issue, the Labour government will be aligning itself to the opposition benches and the veterans lobby in order to secure the passage of its Troubles Bill. 

This will be, of course, to the detriment of families when their loved one was killed by a state-actor, veteran – or not.

A further ‘right’ which is being articulated is a prohibition on repeated criminal justice investigations which the Generals consider harassment of their subordinates. This ‘right’ would mean that a conflict-related criminal justice investigation could not apply to an individual – a veteran – who has previously been engaged in or subject to an investigation (for example, an investigation by the Royal Military Police (RMP) at the time of the incident).

Since many of those historic investigations, specifically by the RMP, have been found to have been flawed in law (see: Re Marie Louise Thompson [2003] NIQB 80) and not  complaint with ECHR-standards of investigations demanded following a violation of Article 2, or where investigations were undermined by collusion between the British Security Forces (specifically RUC Special Branch) and paramilitaries, they therefore secured no confidence of families.

Any attempt to prohibit a fresh investigation in this context would be subject to legal challenge and would  be flawed in terms of the maintenance of the Rule of Law and the discharge of obligations under the ECHR.

(c)

The right for your ‘voice to be heard’ is being shouted by the Generals and by the Northern Ireland Veterans Commissioner (most recently in the London Times of 2 January 2026) and by Conservative and Unionist politicians.  The SSNIO is clear that the Troubles Bill facilitates the role of veterans in oversight mechanisms by way of the Section 8 Victims and Survivors Advisory Group:

“to provide general advice to the Legacy Commission and the Secretary of State about exercising their functions under this Act in such a way as to meet the needs and uphold the rights and interests of victims and survivors of conduct forming part of the Troubles and their family members”

The Group is to consist of at least three but not more than seven members appointed by the SSNIO. Affirming, again, a flaw in the mechanism, by default, in providing the Executive powers to determine membership of Group on the basis of  being “balanced as respects associations with the different communities in Northern Ireland” specifically at section (5) “In this section references to victims and survivors include victims and survivors who were members of the armed forces or a police force”.

Whether this shouting on behalf of veterans to secure additional protections against alleged harassment and vexatious prosecutions through lawfare and giving veterans a forum from which to shout louder than other interested parties  – including the core group which are the families – is representative of all veterans can be contested. 

Whether the ‘first term’ new Labour Party MPs recognise the complexity and sensitivity of the issues beyond those made on behalf of veterans demanding constituency meetings with their political representatives is not known.

The Conservative Shadow SSNIO exploited the absent Labour back-bench engagement on this issue during the debate on the Remedial Order on 21 January 2026:

“I do believe that if Labour Back Benchers were to mount significant pressure in private, the Government would think again. If they did, they would create the opportunity, once again, for many of our brave veterans from Operation Banner to be able to sleep peacefully at night.” Hansard 21 January 2026 Colum 396.

The Minister for Veterans and People ‘missed’  the vote on the Carry Over Motion of the Troubles Bill on 25 April 2026 (NI Troubles Bill: What we know about controversial legislation after MP vote) as  “Nearly 100 veterans protest outside Parliament ahead of a carry-over motion vote on the Troubles Bill in the House of Commons, which passes by a majority of 103.”

(d)

And who are these veterans, not mentioned in the Troubles Bill?

The Amendments laid to date seek to introduce veteran protections into the legislative schema proposed by Troubles Bill (including by statutory instrument and other delegated legislation and policy guidelines/memoranda of understanding) by the ‘back door’.  

They seek to limit the scope of the proposed provisions regarding the investigations and inquisitorial processes of the Legacy Commission.

These include by way of an ‘active service’ exclusion, an exemption from the mens rea of criminal responsibility:

“In evaluating the actions or omissions of any person under investigation while serving in the armed forces or the police there shall be a rebuttable presumption that there was no criminal mens rea involved” – Amendment 4)

They also include resources being made available to veterans to provide support – specifically publicly funded legal representation via the MOD.  The MOD already as The Defence Inquests Unit .

Soldier F would now be joined in the court of public opinion by service personnel and  Crown Servants including all designated members of the British Security Forces.

As noted, one Amendment states “Any actions which were lawfully performed by members of the Armed Forces, or Crown servants, in the course of their duties shall not, as a consequence of this Act, be considered as unlawful acts of terrorism or criminal violence.” (Amendment 5).

Officers of the FRU/MRF, MI5 handlers and agents, and RUC Special Branch detectives, could all claim sanctuary under such a definition.

Conclusion

Are there other veteran voices which are not being heard over the shouting of the Generals and erstwhile ‘Commissioners’?

Is there another veteran question/issue which is not being articulated by the right-wing Conservative owned and Reform influenced London media?

In his defence, the then SSNIO stated (ahead of the debate on the Remedial Order) that:

“In our frequent discussions with those who served, they have been clear that they do not ask to be placed above the law. Our veterans understand the responsibility that comes with the uniform they have worn … What they are asking for, and what they deserve, is a system that is fair and based on the rule of law.” (SSNIO 20 01 2026)

Here that SSNIO articulated the other voice of the veterans. It is a voice of former members of the British Army who believe that soldiers are not above the law but are employed as a standing army in a constitutional democracy to uphold the Rule of Law and to defend the principles of the society they are employed to defend. It is a voice been quietly spoken by the Centre of Military Justice in a co-authored letter to the London Times on 13 November 2025 (CMJ Letter to Times 13 11 2025)).

An extract from that letter states:

“They claim not to be calling for impunity for the small number of British soldiers that may have perpetrated serious crimes in Northern Ireland – but what then do they seek? They speak of the need for “fairness”. That is exactly what a principled adherence to the rule of law requires and which they, as former members of our armed forces, should support. You cannot have a system of law that applies to some groups and not to others. It is vital that soldiers operating in support of the civil powers are held fully accountable to the laws they are required to enforce. That is the difference between the soldier and the terrorist.”

“The vast majority of British soldiers who served in NI did so in appallingly difficult circumstances and they did so with distinction. They behaved in accordance with the rules of engagement and the law, as they understood it to be. As long as they did so, they have nothing to fear.”

“There has been just one conviction of a veteran since the Good Friday Agreement – and he got a suspended sentence for manslaughter. The tiny number of prosecutions of veterans that have resulted in an acquittal were founded upon serious evidence to suggest that a crime had been committed. The reason they came so late in the day was because there had been no investigation or accountability at the time, something some senior soldiers and others colluded in. One conviction does not amount to a witch hunt of British soldiers. There are many people inside the armed forces that understand that. They recognise that there is no time limit on a criminal prosecution, that the law must apply to them and they do not want to serve alongside those that break the law, or who think they have the right to do so with impunity.”  (CMJ 11 November 2025)

This ‘other’ veterans voice needs to be ventilated and to be heard by the majority of Labour back bench MPs who will, eventually, ensure the passage of the Troubles Bill. 

Criminal justice investigations – and prosecutions if evidential thresholds are met to the standards demanded by independent law officers – are one element of the truth-recovery and information-retrieval processes required within a transitional justice society.

They sit with legacy civil law actions (to be restored by the Remedial Order) which provide opportunities for discovery applications and with restored Legacy-inquests which provide opportunities for disclosure orders for the access to the material – sensitive or otherwise – needed to answer the questions that families have.

The importance of these mechanisms was most recently clearly demonstrated in the inquest into the murder of Liam Paul ‘Topper’ Thompson – the Thompson judgment – and tested by the independent judiciary that concluded, in its highest court that Executive authority over National Security disclosure, was sovereign, despite:

“When the issue at stake is a gist which does no more than set out ‘a summary at a very high level of abstraction and in a very indeterminate manner’ (at [136]), the assertion that ministers are free to insist on non-disclosure because of the immediate threat of the alternative to national security becomes difficult to accept. The consequences of this position, however, are felt on the ground in Northern Ireland, where the conflict remains subject to enduring questions, and the darkest of accounts of its conduct are left to fester.” (UKCLA 18 December 2025). 

On the ground in the North of Ireland, it could be argued that its highest court was correct in its interpretation and findings in both Re Dillon and Re Thompson.

On the ground in the North of Ireland, it could be argued that independent coroners have delivered for families in legacy inquests, for example in the recent verdict in the Springhill-Whiterock inquest in which the actions of soldiers of the British Army resulted in the shooting of five people in Belfast in 1972, that the force used was “not reasonable” and that the soldiers has lost control (The Guardian 30 April 2026). 

On the ground in the North of Ireland, the MOD are appealing against the coronial verdicts in a number of Legacy inquests (for example in the Clonoe Inquest verdict which said SAS soldiers were not justified in opening fire and killing a gang of IRA  (BBC News 22 March 2025).

On the ground in the North of Ireland, the MOD are settling civil liability claims at the doors of the court in number of civil actions based on legacy-litigation being bought by families and subject to contestation and delay over years.

On the ground in the North of Ireland, the MOD and the PSNI contest every conflict-related FOIA request made by families in search of information about the death of their loved-ones and accused of abusing the FOIA system.

If the exposure of criminal wronging  or a human rights violation through the disclosure or discovery of information/material, sensitive or otherwise, and through those criminal justice lead investigations, reaches the required evidential threshold for prosecution, then it cannot be disregarded but it must be tested by the independent judicial process system and in accordance with both Common Law principles and statutory authorities which underpin the Rule of Law and in compliance with the standards of the ECHR.

These principles protect veterans as much as the families of the victims of the violence of the conflict. 

Christopher Stanley is the Domestic and International Human Rights Advocate with Relatives for Justice. He is a Times Lawyer of the Week and a LALY/LAPG Public Law Lawyer of the Year Nominee. The views expressed in the article are his own.